Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 13, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-96-0060 Indian Point 3 Date: 06/13/96 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: SMALL HYDROGEN EXPLOSION IN THE TURBINE BUILDING Discussion: On June 9, at 8:47 a.m., the two foot by two foot control panel door of the 32 hydrogen dryer blew off due to a small hydrogen explosion. There was no other damage to equipment in the area, and no one was injured. Because the explosion was in the protected area, the licensee declared an Unusual Event at 9:35 a.m. The Unusual Event was terminated at 11:10 a.m. The licensee is continuing their review of the event. They have confirmed that the seal between one of the hydrogen dryer towers and an electrical conduit was leaking. This allowed hydrogen to accumulate inside the control panel and resulted in the small explosion. The seal consists of a glass-plastic compound, surrounded by a steel shell, which is then welded to the top plate of the tower. This top plate and seal will be sent for root cause analysis by a vendor to determine whether the leak is through the weld or through the glass-plastic compound, and to determine the likely failure mechanism. Prior to the explosion, the 32 hydrogen dryer was returned to service during the week of June 3, 1996 after completing preventive and corrective maintenance. Due to the location of the seal, post maintenance leak testing of the dryer with soapy water did not detect the failed seal. Until the completion of root cause analysis, however, it cannot be determined whether this failure was service-related or maintenance-related. The licensee plans to replace the entire hydrogen dryer unit with an upgraded model in the near term which would preclude the accumulation of hydrogen in the control panel. Regional Action: The residents will follow-up on the results of the root cause evaluation being performed for the licensee. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 David Lew (914)739-8565 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 4-96-0060 Infinity Analytical Services Date: 06/12/96 Gore,Oklahoma Dockets: 03005948 License No: 35-12636-03 Subject: LABORATORY SHUTDOWN AFTER EMPLOYEES WALK OFF JOB Discussion: The RIV Arlington office (AO) was notified by the Laboratory Directorate on June 12, 1996, that the employees of Infinity Analytical Services (IAS) located in Gore, Oklahoma, were leaving the facility amid claims that they have not received a payroll check in over a month. IAS is authorized to perform environmental and bioassay sample analyses on samples containing small amounts of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material. Based on discussions with RIV AO and the Executive Vice President of the parent company of IAS, Investment Resources Management (IRM), located in Addison, Texas, the employees have been paid for the period June 1-15, 1996. IAS is currently going through a reorganization. According to the Executive Vice President of IRM, he will send someone to Gore, Oklahoma, on the afternoon of June 12, 1996, to ensure that the building is secured from unauthorized access. In a letter sent to the Executive Vice President of IRM, it was stated by the employees of IAS that Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (SFC) will pick up all their samples containing small amounts of source material on June 12, 1996, and the facility keys have been sent to IRM by UPS 2nd Day Air. The Laboratory Directorate stated that around 11:30 a.m. on June 12, 1996, the building would be locked upon departure. Verification of the building being locked and secured was made by the Radiation Safety Officer of SFC. Regional Action: Monitor licensee actions and issue a CAL, if necessary Contact: JACQUELINE D. BURKS (817)860-8132 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JUNE 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0061 Diablo Canyon 1 Date: 06/13/96 Avila Beach,California Licensee to RIs Dockets: 50-275 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: BLOCKED EXHAUST VENTILATION PATH IN THE TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM Reportable Event Number: 30618 Discussion: On May 13, 1996, the licensee noted that the ventilation exhaust path for the turbine-driven (TD) auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump was blocked. Exhaust ventilation for the TD pump room is routed through a floor grating that had been covered by sheet metal plates and a chair. A security watch had laid down the metal plates and set a chair over the grating. The plates had been installed for a period of up to 2 weeks. The plates and the chair were removed the same day they were discovered in order to restore the normal ventilation exhaust flowpath. During the time that the exhaust flow through the floor grating was blocked, ventilation air flowed through a normally open fire damper into the room containing the two motor-driven (MD) AFW pumps. The air exhausted from the MD pump room through a separate ceiling grate. An auxiliary steam line for which the licensee has postulated a crack break passes through the TD pump room. The resulting steam leak would cause the TD pump to become inoperable. With the TD pump room exhaust grating blocked, the steam would exhaust through the fire damper into the MD AFW pump room and through a ceiling grate. The licensee's existing analysis assumed that, with normal ventilation exhaust flow through the grating, operator action was required to isolate an auxiliary steam leak and restore heating, ventilation, and air conditioning within 1 hour in order to ensure that the temperature in the MD pump room would not exceed 128 degrees F; however, since the TD pump room exhaust was blocked, the licensee determined that for the postulated steam leak the temperature in the MD pump room would exceed 128 degrees F and cause the MD pumps to be outside of their design basis. On June 11, 1996, the licensee's technical review group reviewed this issue and determined it to be reportable. The licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 report for being outside of design basis. The licensee plans on installing warning signs to help ensure that the floor grate is not blocked and is performing reviews to determine whether similar types of problems or vulnerabilities exist in other vital equipment rooms of both units. Regional Action: The Senior Resident Inspector is following this issue. Contact: M. Tschiltz (805)595-2354 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319 _