Headquarters Daily Report NOVEMBER 13, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I NOV. 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-96-0099 Hope Creek 1 Date: 11/13/96 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: SINGLE CONTROL ROD SCRAM DURING TURBINE VALVE TESTING Discussion: On November 8, 1996, with the plant at 87 percent power, a half scram on the 'A' reactor protection system channel was generated while Hope Creek operators were conducting main turbine stop valve testing. The half-scram signal was an expected result of the test procedure. However, upon receipt of the signal, control rod 42-07 unexpectedly scrammed fully into the core. Operators reset the scram signal and withdrew the rod to its normal at-power position under the supervision of reactor engineering personnel. Operators reported this event to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (reference event no. 31303). At the time of the report, operators believed the likely cause of the individual rod scram to be due to a blown fuse for the 'B' channel scram solenoid pilot valve (which would result in the valve being in the vent position), however this condition had not been verified prior to notifying the NRC operations center. Following troubleshooting, Hope Creek technicians discovered that the 'B' scram pilot valve solenoid was energized (fuse not blown), but that the valve was stuck in the vent position. As a result of this initial condition, when the 'A' scram pilot valve was de-energized during the turbine stop valve testing, the control rod scrammed. Technicians replaced the 'B' valve and began testing to determine the root cause of its functional failure. Preliminary analysis indicated that the failure can be reproduced. However, more testing is necessary to establish a definitive root cause. Regional Action: Routine resident inspector follow up. Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 Robert Summers (609)935-3850 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-96-0100 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 11/13/96 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: LOSS OF DESIGNATED 115 KV OFFSITE POWER Reportable Event Number: 31307 Discussion: On November 9, 1996, an electrical disturbance on the Mason line, one of two 115 kV incoming lines at Maine Yankee, caused the supply breaker (K207-1) to trip at about 8:41 A.M. At that time, the other 115 kV line (Surowiec) was out of service (since November 4, 1996) because its breaker (K69-7) was undergoing repair. The plant was at 90% power and using the station service power for in house loads and was not adversely impacted by the loss of the offsite 115 kV power. Plant personnel distinctly heard three loud noises from the 115 kV switchyard a few seconds apart. A lightening arrestor on section 207 (Mason Station) of the 115 kV line was identified as catastrophically failed (blown apart). This lightening arrestor consists of 3 insulating sections in series connected to ground. Plant operators entered the remedial actions of station technical specification 3.12.B.1 due to both off-site reserve 115 kV lines being out of service. This technical specification requires that only one 115 kV be available for service. Upon loss of 115 kV to the station, the NRC is to be notified within 24 hours of the loss with information concerning the plans to restore service . If power cannot be restored within 7 days the station is to be brought to cold shutdown. During the day K207-1 and KR-1 repeatedly automatically tripped open when attempts were made to restore the line. A complete inspection of the 115 kV switchyard was being conducted to identify any other problems. Capacitor bank KR-1 was tested satisfactory and the Mason line restored to service at 7:00 p.m., when K207-1 was successfully closed. Both emergency diesel generators were operable at the time. There is no requirement to start or test either emergency diesel generator under the conditions described above. During power operations, power for in house loads is provided by the main generator through station transformers X-24 and X-26. The 115 kV lines are the standby power source and could be available through transformers X-14 and X-16 upon a loss (plant trip) of the normal power. When the plant is off-line, the off site 115 kV lines provide in house power and could be backed up by back feeding through the 345 kV switchyard and the main station transformer. To do this, certain disconnects would have to be removed from the main generator and certain physical connections and alignment would have to be made taking up to 6 hours to complete. The Integrated Safety Assessment Team (ISAT) conducted in August 1996 questioned this backup source in light of a capacity REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 13, 1996 MR Number: 1-96-0100 (cont.) problem on the Surowiec line (ISAT report pp22-23). Regional Action: The resident inspectors are reviewing and following up on licensee's actions. The region is discussing this incident with the NRR electrical staff. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 William Olsen (207)882-7519 Richard Conte (610)337-5183 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-96-0111 Abb Industrial Systems, Inc. Date: 11/13/96 Columbus,Ohio Dockets: 03000561 License No: 34-00255-03 Subject: Update on Reported Extremity Overexposure Discussion: This is to update PNO-II-96-074 which discussed a reported dose of 100 rems to the hands of a technician servicing a gauge generally licensed at Gilman Paper Company in St. Mary's, Georgia. On November 7, 1996, Region II assisted a State of Georgia inspector in an interviewing of the technician. This support was provided because the State did not have an inspector with facility in spanish and as a result interviews of the technician were difficult. Based on discussions with the technician and other licensee employees, evaluation of the unit in question, and a reenactment of the activities conducted by the technician, the State inspector concluded that the suspected exposure did not occur. The technician had been working in the areas of the detector, some distance from the source, rather than working at the source. Licensee personnel indicated that a series of miscommunications led to the report of the apparent overexposure. The interview also revealed that, in addition to the one device with the shutter wired open, the shutter of another device had been removed, but there was no evidence of unnecessary exposures received by Gilman or licensee employees. The State is continuing their review of activities at the site. Regional Action: The Region plans no further action. Contact: H. Bermudez (404)331-7880 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 NOVEMBER 13, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. MR Number: 3-96-0117 Perry 1 Date: 11/09/96 Perry,Ohio SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-440 BWR/GE-6 Subject: INADVERTENT INSERTION OF CORE REACTIVITY Discussion: On November 9, 1996, a failed LPRM caused an unnecessary Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve (FCV) "runback" (automatic closing of the A and B FCVs). The runback was manually terminated by the operators by deenergizing the hydraulic power units (HPU) for the FCVs. Reactor power stabilized at approximately 98 percent. During recovery, operations found a blown fuse associated with one of the two HPU subloops for control of the A FCV. The other subloop for the A FCV was "limited use only" due to possible pump cavitation identified by the NRC 6 weeks earlier. After discussions with system engineering, the operators determined the subloop could be returned to service without replacing the blown fuse. The subloop pump was started and the FCV unexpectedly went from 49 percent to 61 percent open, increasing power to 105 percent by APRM and 100.2 percent by reactor thermal power. The operators deenergized the subloop and reduced power to 98 percent by closing the B FCV. This action created a greater than 5 percent flow mismatch between the A and B Recirculation loop flows, placing the plant in a 2 hour TS action statement. The resident inspector observed that the action statement was exited at 1 hour and 51 minutes into the action statement, when the operators completed insertion of rods to achieve a reactor power of 88 percent and opened the B FCV to balance Recirculation loop flows with power at 95 percent. The senior resident inspector observed the restoration of the A FCV after repairs on November 10. Regional Action: Resident Inspector Followup Contact: E. SCHWEIBINZ (630)829-9712 _