Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 12, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 12, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0058 Nine Mile Point 1 Date: 06/10/96 Lycoming,New York Dockets: 50-220 BWR/GE-2 Subject: LOSS OF FEEDWATER HEATER STRING Discussion: At 4:02 a.m. on June 6, 1996, while at 100 percent, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) experienced a level transient in one of the feedwater heating strings(the No. 12 train). Operators reduced power to 98.5 percent, and attempted to restore level for feedwater heaters No. 123 (third stage heater in string 12) and No. 122 (second stage heater in string 12). Operators observed movement of the No. 122 feedwater heater piping, due apparently to water flashing to steam within the system. At 4:40 a.m., operators reduced power below 80 percent and isolated feedwater heater string No. 12. Operators appropriately completed actions in accordance with procedures. Later that day, investigation by NMP1 found one piping support for extraction steam to feedwater heater No. 122 separated from the concrete wall, with some damage to the concrete. Three other pipe supports for the extraction steam to feedwater heater No. 122 were found to be bent. Various other components associated with the No. 122 feedwater heater were also found damaged. On June 6, the licensee evaluated the extent of damage. The licensee determined the root cause to be a failure of the level control valve for feedwater heater No. 122 (in the condensate "drip" line to the No. 121 heater). Repairs to the system and further evaluation of the damage were completed June 10. A Station Operations Review Committee approved the repairs and the evaluation on June 10. The feedwater heater string No. 12 was returned to service and the plant was returned to full power on June 11. At NMP1, the feedwater heaters are part of the flow path for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The inspectors determined that only one of the three feedwater heater string is required for HPCI operability. Regional Action: The resident inspector observed the damage to the feedwater heater string, and will continue to monitor licensee activities. Contact: Richard Skokowski (315)342-4041 Richard Conte (610)337-5183 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 12, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-96-0059 Hope Creek 1 Date: 06/10/96 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: REACTIVITY MISMANAGEMENT DURING POWER INCREASE Discussion: At 10:30 p.m. on June 8, 1996, an error by the on-shift reactor engineer resulted in the plant operators moving control rods out-of-sequence. The plant was at about 52 percent rated power with a power ascension in progress, in recovery from a short down power evolution to about 15 percent rated power performed earlier that day in support of maintenance activities. The reactor engineer had given the plant operators the wrong control rod pull sheet, resulting in the operators moving four control rods in sequence 10A from position 00 to position 12. After completing the pull, the reactor engineer reviewed the core map and determined that the wrong rods had been moved. The reactor engineer had intended to move four different control rods from sequence 10C. After verifying that no core operating limits were violated, the reactor engineer had the operators insert the four mispositioned rods back to step 00 and had the rods in the 10C sequence pulled to position 12. At that time, with reactor power at about 52 percent of rated power, the power ascension was halted until the cause of the reactivity mismanagement event could be determined and corrected. Subsequently, after initial review of the event determined the cause to be the reactor engineer's error, the reactor engineering supervisor responded to the plant and verified the extent of the error and provided an interim corrective action by requiring a second verification by reactor engineering for the remaining rod pulls during the power ascension. At 1:16 a.m. on June 9, 1996, the power ascension recommenced and rated power was achieved at 3:28 p.m. that day. The licensee has initiated a full root cause analysis for this event to ascertain the cause of the reactor engineering error and evaluate the event for additional corrective actions. Regional Action: Routine resident follow up. Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 Robert Summers (609)935-3850 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JUNE 12, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power Corporation MR Number: 2-96-0053 Crystal River 3 Date: 06/12/96 Crystal River,Florida Dockets: 50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES Discussion: On June 11, 1996, Florida Power Corporation announced an organizational change at Crystal River. G. L. Boldt, site Vice President - Nuclear Production, assumed direct oversight of the Nuclear Engineering Department. Mr. Boldt will remain acting director until this position is filled. This change became effective on June 10, 1996. Additional changes in the engineering department are planned. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JUNE 12, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-96-0054 Harris 1 Date: 06/12/96 Raleigh,North Carolina Dockets: 50-400 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: NUCLEAR GENERATION GROUP RESTRUCTURE Discussion: On June 10, 1996, Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) announced the completion of a restructuring of the Nuclear Generation Group. The restructure has resulted in the elimination of 165 staff positions, 56 of which were vacant. The positions eliminated were at Harris (73 positions), Brunswick (31 positions), and Robinson (46 positions), plant sites and at the corporate office in Raleigh, NC (15 positions). In all, the staffing changes affect approximately 109 CP&L employees. The licensee does not plan to issue a press release. There has been media interest. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. SHYMLOCK (404)331-5535 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 JUNE 12, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-96-0061 Monticello 1 Date: 06/09/96 Monticello,Minnesota Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS Discussion: On June 9, 1996, at about 4:00 p.m., one of two generator stator cooling water pumps failed. About 4 hours later, the second pump also failed resulting in a turbine generator and subsequent reactor automatic shutdown about 3 minutes later. Operators had immediately reduced reactor power from 100 to 54 percent power prior to the shutdown. Both main feedwater pumps tripped following the shutdown; however, operators restarted the #12 pump immediately. Reactor level dropped to about -30 inches. No ECCS equipment initiation was necessary. Preliminary investigation showed that both stator cooling water pumps failed due to a lack of lubrication. Both pumps were installed during this past refueling outage which ended on May 23, 1996. Also, the licensee believes that a perturbation in the level instrumentation lines caused channel B ATWS level transmitters to actuate (at 48 inches) resulting in the feedwater pump trips. A level instrument in the same line showed a spike at 57 inches. The licensee is still investigating the cause of the spike. The licensee anticipates a startup early on June 13. Regional Action: The resident inspectors and a region-based lead engineering assessment inspector are following the licensee's root cause investigation and corrective actions. Contact: M. JORDAN (708)829-9637 _