Headquarters Daily Report APRIL 11, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0028 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-20, "DEMONSTRATION OF ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 34.20," was issued on April 4, 1996. This notice was issued to all industrial radiography licensees and radiography equipment manufacturers to inform them of acceptable methods to demonstrate that their associated equipment used in radiographic operations meets the regulations in 10 CFR 34.20. Contact: Thomas W. Rich, NMSS (301) 415-7893 Internet:twr@nrc.gov ========================================================================= NRC Information Notice 96-21, "SAFETY CONCERNS RELATED TO THE DESIGN OF THE DOOR INTERLOCK CIRCUIT ON NUCLETRON HIGH-DOSE RATE AND PULSED DOSE RATE REMOTE AFTERLOADING BRACHYTHERAPY DEVICES," was issued on April 10, 1996. This information notice was issued to all medical licensees authorized to use brachytherapy sources in HDR and PDR remote afterloaders to alert them to the recent discovery that the treatment room door interlocks used with Nucletron devices are rendered inoperative by the failure of the control unit, or by the loss of communications between the control and treatment units. Contacts: Robert L. Ayres, NMSS James A. Smith, NMSS (301) 415-5746 (301) 415-7904 Internet:rxa1@nrc.gov Internet:jas4@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0029 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Generic Letter 95-09, Supplement 1, "MONITORING AND TRAINING OF SHIPPERS AND CARRIERS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS," was issued on April 5, 1996. This supplement was issued to all licensees to clarify the guidance provided in the original generic letter. Inquiries and requests indicated that many licensees either misunderstood current NRC regulations, or were unaware of recent rulemakings in the affected areas. Contact: Sami Sherbini, NMSS (301) 415-7902 Internet:sxs2@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0030 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: REACTOR TRIP WITH INCOMPLETE ROD INSERTION AND ICING OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on April 2, 1996, classified the January 30, 1996, manual scram at Wolf Creek, Unit 1, as a Significant Event. The classification was based upon a reactor scram with complications. At approximately 2:00 a.m. (all times CST) on January 30, 1996, operators at Wolf Creek received alarms indicating that the circulating water (CW) system traveling screens were becoming blocked. The site watch reported that the traveling screens for Bays 1 and 3 were frozen and that water levels in these bays were approximately eight feet below normal. The emergency service water system (ESWS) was started with the intent to separate the ESWS from the service water (SW) system. However, the emergency service water system was incorrectly aligned to provide flow to the service water system and reduced warming flow to the ESWS suction bays. At approximately 3:30 a.m., operators received a service water low pressure alarm (CW system bays were subsequently determined to be at 12 feet below normal) and an electric fire pump started on low service water pressure. The shift supervisor then directed a manual reactor/turbine trip. Following the scram, five control rods failed to fully insert (from 6 to 18 steps out). The event was further complicated by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump developing a packing leak and being declared inoperable. The loss of circulating water bay level was subsequently determined to be caused by ice blockage of the traveling screens caused by freezing water from the spray wash system. Train "A" ESWS pump was tripped and declared inoperable at 7:47 a.m. due to low discharge pressure and high strainer differential pressure. At about 5:45 p.m. the operators declared Train "A" operable based on an engineering evaluation. However, the pump was stopped 1-1/2 hours later at approximately 7:30 p.m. when the pump exhibited further oscillations in flow and pressure. At approximately 8:00 p.m., operators noted that ESWS Train "B" suction bay level was 15 feet below normal and decreasing slowly. Operators placed additional heat loads on Train "B" and the suction bay levels subsequently recovered. At 10:14 p.m., the operators again started Train "A" ESWS and secured it at 10:27 p.m. due to decreasing flow and pressure. At about 9:00 a.m. on January 31, 1996, divers inspected the suction bay of Train "A" and noted complete blockage of the trash racks by frazil ice. Train "B" was not inspected because the pump was running. The ice blockage was cleared later that day using heating and air sparging of the trash racks. The event was briefed February 7, 1996, Operating Reactor Events Briefing 96-02, "Plant Trip with Multiple Complications." Contact: John R. Tappert, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1167 HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0030 (cont.) _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-96-0034 Millstone 3 Date: 04/03/96 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-423 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE Reportable Event Number: 30229 Discussion: The recirculation spray system (RSS) at Millstone Unit 3 is designed to provide ECCS flow during the recirculation phase of a LOCA; i.e., when the source of cooling water is the containment sump vs. the refueling water storage tank (RWST). One of the available flow paths is to the containment spray ring headers with both trains of RSS feeding the two ring headers from opposite sides. The significance of this is that a structural problem with either one of the RSS flow paths affects the entire containment spray function because it cannot be isolated. The spray headers are designed for a temperature of 150 degrees F. November 13, 1985 (NOTE: Unit 3 received its low-power license on November 25, 1985), the architect engineer (AE) for the unit, Stone and Webster, documented a concern regarding the loss of service water to an RSS heat exchanger. Stone and Webster recommended either of three options; in short (1) pipe support modifications, (2) automatic circuitry to isolate the RSS train with loss of service water, (3) operational procedures to direct the operators to trip the affected RSS train upon loss of service water. Currently, none of the above three options have been implemented. When the licensee started analyzing this problem in 1996, it became evident that another issue was of concern. This issue involves the peak accident temperature and pressure conditions inside containment relative to the design of the RSS piping and supports. Also, since the containment atmosphere, and not the sump water, provides the elevated temperature conditions, the problem was also identified to affect the Quench Spray (QS) piping that would take suction on the RWST. The licensee believes the correct, worst case accident conditions to be analyzed for the RSS and QS piping and supports are 260 degrees F and 23 psig. The reason the worst pressure is not the containment design pressure of 45 psig is that at this higher pressure, the containment would "grow" relieving some of the stresses on the pipe supports. Stone and Webster has been working to determine if this is an analytical problem only, or whether pipe supports will have to be modified. As many as 87 pipe supports inside containment appear to be affected. The RSS and QS piping appears less affected than the pipe supports. Since stress reconciliation to the new "design" conditions is required, this must be accomplished by iterative runs of the computer codes. It is not clear how Stone and Webster initially determined that the RSS and QS piping inside containment was acceptable for a design condition of 150 degrees F. This problem may also affect North Anna 1 and 2, Surry 1 and 2, Beaver Valley 1 and 2, and Comanche Peak 1. Stone and Webster has REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: 1-96-0034 (cont.) reportedly notified the other potentially affected plants, but it is not known what the status and design acceptability at those plants currently is. The licensee has not submitted this issue through INPO notepad for industry review. Regional Action: The resident inspector will monitor the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: Antone Cerne (860)447-3170 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-96-0033 Millstone 1 2 3 Date: 04/10/96 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-245,50-336,50-423 BWR/GE-3,PWR/CE,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MILLSTONE SITE VISIT SCHEDULED BY THE GOVERNOR OF CONNTECTICUT Discussion: The Governor of Connecticut has scheduled a Millstone site visit on April 11, 1996. The visit is expected to begin at approximately 3:00 p.m., will include a tour of the three units and a conclude in a 4:15 p.m. meeting with NU employees. At the completion of the meeting the governor has scheduled a news conference to be held at the South gate. Regional Action: No regional Action planned. Contact: Arthur Burritt (860)447-3170 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-96-0028 Turkey Point 4 Date: 04/11/96 Miami,Florida Dockets: 50-251 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 17 PERCENT POWER Reportable Event Number: 30259 Discussion: Turkey Point Unit 4 initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 17 percent reactor power at approximately 6:00 p.m. on April 9, 1996. Just prior to the trip, operators noted sluggish main turbine governor behavior and ultimately a rapid increase in generator load from 90 to 240 MWe without operator demand. The 4A S/G level swelled to 71 percent caused by further opening of the turbine control valves and steam flow was noted to be greater than feedflow on all three S/Gs. A manual reactor trip was initiated which caused the main turbine to also trip. Procedures 4-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip/SI and later 4-EOP-ES 0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery were appropriately entered. RCS Tavg reduced from approximately 552 degrees F to 531 degrees F due to the low decay heat levels. Minimum RCS pressurizer level reached was approximately 12.4 percent. The MSIVs were closed to prevent further cooldown and decay heat was rejected through the atmospheric dumps. Post trip response was normal with few exceptions. Significant among these was shutdown bank A, control rod N-9 RPI not indicating 0 steps until approximately two hours after the trip; however, the rod bottom light came in within the expected time frame. The licensee attributed the governor sluggishness to a blocked (from corrosion buildup) orifice within the governor impeller oil pressure line. The orifice was cleaned and the governor refurbished. Further, control rod N-9 was individually tested, including rod drop, and confirmed to behave as required and expected. The analog control room RPI associated with rod N-9 which was suspected to be sticking was changed out and responded normally during startup. The resident inspector responded to the site upon notification. A 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) notification was made by the licensee at 7:00 p.m. on April 10, 1996. The unit was restarted on April 10, 1996, at approximately 5:00 p.m. after an Event Response Team reviewed the event and the onsite safety committee and plant management authorized restart. Regional Action: Resident Inspector followup. Contact: DAVID LANY1 (404)331-5574 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 7 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Longview Inspection MR Number: 2-96-0029 Longview Inspection, Inc. Date: 04/11/96 Richmond,Virginia Dockets: 03033388 License No: 45-25279-01 Subject: STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY TRUCK FOUND Discussion: This is followup to Event 30271. On April 10, 1996, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (GEPD) notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer that a truck which had been reported stolen from Longview Inspection, Inc., Richmond, Virginia, had been stopped at a routine traffic check in Camden County, Georgia. The driver of the truck, an employee of the licensee, had left the licensee's Richmond, VA office on March 26, 1996, to go to a job in Florida and had not been heard from since. The truck was carrying a radiography camera containing a 44 curie iridium-192 source. The driver was detained by the Camden County Sheriff. The Camden County Sheriff's Office obtained a radiation survey instrument from a local hospital and following the guidance of the GEPD performed a radiation survey of the truck. The survey confirmed that the source was still in the shielded position. The licensee sent a representative to Georgia by chartered plane early on April 11. Surveys performed by the licensee indicated that the source was in the shielded position and locked. The licensee will return the truck to the Richmond office on April 11. Regional Action: Region II followed the licensee's actions to note that the source was secured in the shielded position. Region II notified the Commonwealth of Virginia. Contact: C. Hosey (404)331-5614 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 8 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. MR Number: 3-96-0040 Perry 1 Date: 04/11/96 Perry,Ohio SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-440 BWR/GE-6 Subject: PLANT STARTUUP FOLLOWING REFUELING OUTAGE Discussion: ON APRIL 10 AT 10:15 A.M. (EDT) THE LICENSEE SYNCHRONIZED THE MAIN GENERATOR WITH THE GRID AND CLOSED THE OUTPUT BREAKER DENOTING COMPLETION THE ITS FIFTH REFUELING OUTAGE (RFO5). THE OUTAGE, SCHEDULED FOR 65 DAYS, HAD A DURATION OF 74 DAYS. COMPLETION OF THE OUTAGE WAS DELAYED DUE TO REWORK OF AN INCORRECT MODIFICATION BY THE VENDOR OF A MAIN GENERATOR SEAL. OTHER MAJOR WORK COMPLETED DURING THE OUTAGE INCLUDED MODIFICATIONS OF THE MAIN TURBINE, REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS, RCIC EXHAUST VALVE, RECIRCULATION PUMP SEALS, LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM, AND EMERGENCY CLOSED COOLING TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVES, REBUILDING OF 25 CRDMS, COMPLETION OF GL 89-10 MOV TESTING, INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF UNDERGROUND SW PIPING, EDG INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS, FUEL SIPPING AND A PROCESS COMPUTER UPGRADE. THE PLANT WAS STARTED UP WITH COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN PLACE FOR THE REMOVED UNIT 1 STARTUP TRANSFORMER THAT WAS BEING REPAIRED DUE TO DAMAGE FROM A BUSHING FAILURE AND EXPLOSION. Regional Action: INFORMATION ONLY Contact: R.D. LANKSBURY (708)829-9631 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 9 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-96-0041 Monticello 1 Date: 04/11/96 Monticello,Minnesota Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: UNIT SHUT DOWN FOR REFUELING OUTAGE Discussion: On April 10, 1996, the licensee shut down the Unit for a scheduled 38-day refueling outage. The licensee inserted a manual reactor shutdown from 10 percent power to verify the capability of the control rods to scram. All equipment responded as expected. Some control rods scram times were slower than previous; however, the average scram time of all rods was within technical specifications. The unit had been operating for 476 continuous days. Major activities planned include: high pressure and low pressure turbine replacements, core shroud inspection, HPCI overhaul, and modifications to feedwater and recirculation control circuitry. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. JORDAN (708)829-9637 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 10 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Clevite Corp. Neighborhood Progress, MR Number: 3-96-0042 Inc. Date: 04/10/96 Clevite Corp. Neighborhood Progress BY TELEPHONE AT 2PM (CDT) Cleveland,Ohio Dockets: 04000133 Subject: RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IDENTIFIED IN PUBLIC DOMAIN Discussion: The Clevite Corporation is on the SDMP (Site Decommissioning Management Plan) list, and is currently undergoing a site remediation. On the morning of April 10, 1996, a long time employee of the Clevite Corporation brought a box of miscellaneous items to the office from his home. After arriving at the office, another employee indicated that a bag that was amid the items in the box appeared to contain radioactive material. The bag was subsequently taken to the radiation technicians at the site involved in the site remediation. Surveys indicated that there was no external contamination on the bag. However, readings of 12 milliRoentgen per hour (mR/hr) (3.1 æC/kg/hr) on contact and 28 microRoentgen per hour (æR/hr) (7.2 nC/kg/hr) at three feet were measured. The State of Ohio was notified by Region III of the incident. Because the employee who had brought the material to the office had left the building in the morning, it was not until late in the day that he was informed of the survey results. The State of Ohio was making arrangements to question the employee and conduct surveys of his home. Regional Action: Region III is monitoring the State of Ohio's progress. Contact: W. SNELL (708)829-9871 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 11 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Texas Utilities Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0037 Comanche Peak 1 Date: 04/11/96 Glen Rose,Texas RIV Duty Officer Notified by HOO Dockets: 50-445 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN, RECOVERY, AND SUBSEQUENT MANUAL REACTOR TRIP Events 30269 and 30272 Reportable Event Number: 30269 Discussion: CPSES Unit 1 was in the process of shutting down in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.3 because of a cracked weld on a relief valve in a common injection line from the safety injection pumps to the reactor coolant system (EN 30269). The leak was repaired by cutting out and replacing the associated relief valve. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at approximately 12:13 a.m., on April 11, the power decrease was terminated, and power ascension was commenced. At approximately 2 a.m., with the reactor at approximately 30 percent power, a significant leak occurred on a heater drain tank level control valve at a mechanical seal. The licensee began reducing power in order to isolate and repair the leak. The main turbine was removed from service and a normal reactor shutdown was commenced. During the shutdown, malfunctions in the rod control system prompted the operators to initiate a manual reactor trip (EN 30272). The licensee plans to take a 1 to 2-day outage to repair the heater drain system leak, troubleshoot and repair the rod control system, and implement the requested actions of NRC Bulletin 96-01, "Control Rod Insertion Problems." Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's actions. Contact: A. T. Gody (817)897-1500 _ Headquarters Daily Report APRIL 11, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0028 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-20, "DEMONSTRATION OF ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 34.20," was issued on April 4, 1996. This notice was issued to all industrial radiography licensees and radiography equipment manufacturers to inform them of acceptable methods to demonstrate that their associated equipment used in radiographic operations meets the regulations in 10 CFR 34.20. Contact: Thomas W. Rich, NMSS (301) 415-7893 Internet:twr@nrc.gov ========================================================================= NRC Information Notice 96-21, "SAFETY CONCERNS RELATED TO THE DESIGN OF THE DOOR INTERLOCK CIRCUIT ON NUCLETRON HIGH-DOSE RATE AND PULSED DOSE RATE REMOTE AFTERLOADING BRACHYTHERAPY DEVICES," was issued on April 10, 1996. This information notice was issued to all medical licensees authorized to use brachytherapy sources in HDR and PDR remote afterloaders to alert them to the recent discovery that the treatment room door interlocks used with Nucletron devices are rendered inoperative by the failure of the control unit, or by the loss of communications between the control and treatment units. Contacts: Robert L. Ayres, NMSS James A. Smith, NMSS (301) 415-5746 (301) 415-7904 Internet:rxa1@nrc.gov Internet:jas4@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0029 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Generic Letter 95-09, Supplement 1, "MONITORING AND TRAINING OF SHIPPERS AND CARRIERS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS," was issued on April 5, 1996. This supplement was issued to all licensees to clarify the guidance provided in the original generic letter. Inquiries and requests indicated that many licensees either misunderstood current NRC regulations, or were unaware of recent rulemakings in the affected areas. Contact: Sami Sherbini, NMSS (301) 415-7902 Internet:sxs2@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0030 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: REACTOR TRIP WITH INCOMPLETE ROD INSERTION AND ICING OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on April 2, 1996, classified the January 30, 1996, manual scram at Wolf Creek, Unit 1, as a Significant Event. The classification was based upon a reactor scram with complications. At approximately 2:00 a.m. (all times CST) on January 30, 1996, operators at Wolf Creek received alarms indicating that the circulating water (CW) system traveling screens were becoming blocked. The site watch reported that the traveling screens for Bays 1 and 3 were frozen and that water levels in these bays were approximately eight feet below normal. The emergency service water system (ESWS) was started with the intent to separate the ESWS from the service water (SW) system. However, the emergency service water system was incorrectly aligned to provide flow to the service water system and reduced warming flow to the ESWS suction bays. At approximately 3:30 a.m., operators received a service water low pressure alarm (CW system bays were subsequently determined to be at 12 feet below normal) and an electric fire pump started on low service water pressure. The shift supervisor then directed a manual reactor/turbine trip. Following the scram, five control rods failed to fully insert (from 6 to 18 steps out). The event was further complicated by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump developing a packing leak and being declared inoperable. The loss of circulating water bay level was subsequently determined to be caused by ice blockage of the traveling screens caused by freezing water from the spray wash system. Train "A" ESWS pump was tripped and declared inoperable at 7:47 a.m. due to low discharge pressure and high strainer differential pressure. At about 5:45 p.m. the operators declared Train "A" operable based on an engineering evaluation. However, the pump was stopped 1-1/2 hours later at approximately 7:30 p.m. when the pump exhibited further oscillations in flow and pressure. At approximately 8:00 p.m., operators noted that ESWS Train "B" suction bay level was 15 feet below normal and decreasing slowly. Operators placed additional heat loads on Train "B" and the suction bay levels subsequently recovered. At 10:14 p.m., the operators again started Train "A" ESWS and secured it at 10:27 p.m. due to decreasing flow and pressure. At about 9:00 a.m. on January 31, 1996, divers inspected the suction bay of Train "A" and noted complete blockage of the trash racks by frazil ice. Train "B" was not inspected because the pump was running. The ice blockage was cleared later that day using heating and air sparging of the trash racks. The event was briefed February 7, 1996, Operating Reactor Events Briefing 96-02, "Plant Trip with Multiple Complications." Contact: John R. Tappert, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1167 HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0030 (cont.) _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-96-0034 Millstone 3 Date: 04/03/96 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-423 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE Reportable Event Number: 30229 Discussion: The recirculation spray system (RSS) at Millstone Unit 3 is designed to provide ECCS flow during the recirculation phase of a LOCA; i.e., when the source of cooling water is the containment sump vs. the refueling water storage tank (RWST). One of the available flow paths is to the containment spray ring headers with both trains of RSS feeding the two ring headers from opposite sides. The significance of this is that a structural problem with either one of the RSS flow paths affects the entire containment spray function because it cannot be isolated. The spray headers are designed for a temperature of 150 degrees F. November 13, 1985 (NOTE: Unit 3 received its low-power license on November 25, 1985), the architect engineer (AE) for the unit, Stone and Webster, documented a concern regarding the loss of service water to an RSS heat exchanger. Stone and Webster recommended either of three options; in short (1) pipe support modifications, (2) automatic circuitry to isolate the RSS train with loss of service water, (3) operational procedures to direct the operators to trip the affected RSS train upon loss of service water. Currently, none of the above three options have been implemented. When the licensee started analyzing this problem in 1996, it became evident that another issue was of concern. This issue involves the peak accident temperature and pressure conditions inside containment relative to the design of the RSS piping and supports. Also, since the containment atmosphere, and not the sump water, provides the elevated temperature conditions, the problem was also identified to affect the Quench Spray (QS) piping that would take suction on the RWST. The licensee believes the correct, worst case accident conditions to be analyzed for the RSS and QS piping and supports are 260 degrees F and 23 psig. The reason the worst pressure is not the containment design pressure of 45 psig is that at this higher pressure, the containment would "grow" relieving some of the stresses on the pipe supports. Stone and Webster has been working to determine if this is an analytical problem only, or whether pipe supports will have to be modified. As many as 87 pipe supports inside containment appear to be affected. The RSS and QS piping appears less affected than the pipe supports. Since stress reconciliation to the new "design" conditions is required, this must be accomplished by iterative runs of the computer codes. It is not clear how Stone and Webster initially determined that the RSS and QS piping inside containment was acceptable for a design condition of 150 degrees F. This problem may also affect North Anna 1 and 2, Surry 1 and 2, Beaver Valley 1 and 2, and Comanche Peak 1. Stone and Webster has REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 APRIL 11, 1996 MR Number: 1-96-0034 (cont.) reportedly notified the other potentially affected plants, but it is not known what the status and design acceptability at those plants currently is. The licensee has not submitted this issue through INPO notepad for industry review. Regional Action: The resident inspector will monitor the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: Antone Cerne (860)447-3170 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-96-0033 Millstone 1 2 3 Date: 04/10/96 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-245,50-336,50-423 BWR/GE-3,PWR/CE,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MILLSTONE SITE VISIT SCHEDULED BY THE GOVERNOR OF CONNTECTICUT Discussion: The Governor of Connecticut has scheduled a Millstone site visit on April 11, 1996. The visit is expected to begin at approximately 3:00 p.m., will include a tour of the three units and a conclude in a 4:15 p.m. meeting with NU employees. At the completion of the meeting the governor has scheduled a news conference to be held at the South gate. Regional Action: No regional Action planned. Contact: Arthur Burritt (860)447-3170 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-96-0028 Turkey Point 4 Date: 04/11/96 Miami,Florida Dockets: 50-251 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 17 PERCENT POWER Reportable Event Number: 30259 Discussion: Turkey Point Unit 4 initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 17 percent reactor power at approximately 6:00 p.m. on April 9, 1996. Just prior to the trip, operators noted sluggish main turbine governor behavior and ultimately a rapid increase in generator load from 90 to 240 MWe without operator demand. The 4A S/G level swelled to 71 percent caused by further opening of the turbine control valves and steam flow was noted to be greater than feedflow on all three S/Gs. A manual reactor trip was initiated which caused the main turbine to also trip. Procedures 4-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip/SI and later 4-EOP-ES 0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery were appropriately entered. RCS Tavg reduced from approximately 552 degrees F to 531 degrees F due to the low decay heat levels. Minimum RCS pressurizer level reached was approximately 12.4 percent. The MSIVs were closed to prevent further cooldown and decay heat was rejected through the atmospheric dumps. Post trip response was normal with few exceptions. Significant among these was shutdown bank A, control rod N-9 RPI not indicating 0 steps until approximately two hours after the trip; however, the rod bottom light came in within the expected time frame. The licensee attributed the governor sluggishness to a blocked (from corrosion buildup) orifice within the governor impeller oil pressure line. The orifice was cleaned and the governor refurbished. Further, control rod N-9 was individually tested, including rod drop, and confirmed to behave as required and expected. The analog control room RPI associated with rod N-9 which was suspected to be sticking was changed out and responded normally during startup. The resident inspector responded to the site upon notification. A 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) notification was made by the licensee at 7:00 p.m. on April 10, 1996. The unit was restarted on April 10, 1996, at approximately 5:00 p.m. after an Event Response Team reviewed the event and the onsite safety committee and plant management authorized restart. Regional Action: Resident Inspector followup. Contact: DAVID LANY1 (404)331-5574 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 7 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Longview Inspection MR Number: 2-96-0029 Longview Inspection, Inc. Date: 04/11/96 Richmond,Virginia Dockets: 03033388 License No: 45-25279-01 Subject: STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY TRUCK FOUND Discussion: This is followup to Event 30271. On April 10, 1996, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (GEPD) notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer that a truck which had been reported stolen from Longview Inspection, Inc., Richmond, Virginia, had been stopped at a routine traffic check in Camden County, Georgia. The driver of the truck, an employee of the licensee, had left the licensee's Richmond, VA office on March 26, 1996, to go to a job in Florida and had not been heard from since. The truck was carrying a radiography camera containing a 44 curie iridium-192 source. The driver was detained by the Camden County Sheriff. The Camden County Sheriff's Office obtained a radiation survey instrument from a local hospital and following the guidance of the GEPD performed a radiation survey of the truck. The survey confirmed that the source was still in the shielded position. The licensee sent a representative to Georgia by chartered plane early on April 11. Surveys performed by the licensee indicated that the source was in the shielded position and locked. The licensee will return the truck to the Richmond office on April 11. Regional Action: Region II followed the licensee's actions to note that the source was secured in the shielded position. Region II notified the Commonwealth of Virginia. Contact: C. Hosey (404)331-5614 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 8 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. MR Number: 3-96-0040 Perry 1 Date: 04/11/96 Perry,Ohio SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-440 BWR/GE-6 Subject: PLANT STARTUUP FOLLOWING REFUELING OUTAGE Discussion: ON APRIL 10 AT 10:15 A.M. (EDT) THE LICENSEE SYNCHRONIZED THE MAIN GENERATOR WITH THE GRID AND CLOSED THE OUTPUT BREAKER DENOTING COMPLETION THE ITS FIFTH REFUELING OUTAGE (RFO5). THE OUTAGE, SCHEDULED FOR 65 DAYS, HAD A DURATION OF 74 DAYS. COMPLETION OF THE OUTAGE WAS DELAYED DUE TO REWORK OF AN INCORRECT MODIFICATION BY THE VENDOR OF A MAIN GENERATOR SEAL. OTHER MAJOR WORK COMPLETED DURING THE OUTAGE INCLUDED MODIFICATIONS OF THE MAIN TURBINE, REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS, RCIC EXHAUST VALVE, RECIRCULATION PUMP SEALS, LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM, AND EMERGENCY CLOSED COOLING TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVES, REBUILDING OF 25 CRDMS, COMPLETION OF GL 89-10 MOV TESTING, INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF UNDERGROUND SW PIPING, EDG INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS, FUEL SIPPING AND A PROCESS COMPUTER UPGRADE. THE PLANT WAS STARTED UP WITH COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN PLACE FOR THE REMOVED UNIT 1 STARTUP TRANSFORMER THAT WAS BEING REPAIRED DUE TO DAMAGE FROM A BUSHING FAILURE AND EXPLOSION. Regional Action: INFORMATION ONLY Contact: R.D. LANKSBURY (708)829-9631 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 9 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-96-0041 Monticello 1 Date: 04/11/96 Monticello,Minnesota Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: UNIT SHUT DOWN FOR REFUELING OUTAGE Discussion: On April 10, 1996, the licensee shut down the Unit for a scheduled 38-day refueling outage. The licensee inserted a manual reactor shutdown from 10 percent power to verify the capability of the control rods to scram. All equipment responded as expected. Some control rods scram times were slower than previous; however, the average scram time of all rods was within technical specifications. The unit had been operating for 476 continuous days. Major activities planned include: high pressure and low pressure turbine replacements, core shroud inspection, HPCI overhaul, and modifications to feedwater and recirculation control circuitry. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. JORDAN (708)829-9637 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 10 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Clevite Corp. Neighborhood Progress, MR Number: 3-96-0042 Inc. Date: 04/10/96 Clevite Corp. Neighborhood Progress BY TELEPHONE AT 2PM (CDT) Cleveland,Ohio Dockets: 04000133 Subject: RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IDENTIFIED IN PUBLIC DOMAIN Discussion: The Clevite Corporation is on the SDMP (Site Decommissioning Management Plan) list, and is currently undergoing a site remediation. On the morning of April 10, 1996, a long time employee of the Clevite Corporation brought a box of miscellaneous items to the office from his home. After arriving at the office, another employee indicated that a bag that was amid the items in the box appeared to contain radioactive material. The bag was subsequently taken to the radiation technicians at the site involved in the site remediation. Surveys indicated that there was no external contamination on the bag. However, readings of 12 milliRoentgen per hour (mR/hr) (3.1 æC/kg/hr) on contact and 28 microRoentgen per hour (æR/hr) (7.2 nC/kg/hr) at three feet were measured. The State of Ohio was notified by Region III of the incident. Because the employee who had brought the material to the office had left the building in the morning, it was not until late in the day that he was informed of the survey results. The State of Ohio was making arrangements to question the employee and conduct surveys of his home. Regional Action: Region III is monitoring the State of Ohio's progress. Contact: W. SNELL (708)829-9871 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 11 APRIL 11, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Texas Utilities Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0037 Comanche Peak 1 Date: 04/11/96 Glen Rose,Texas RIV Duty Officer Notified by HOO Dockets: 50-445 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN, RECOVERY, AND SUBSEQUENT MANUAL REACTOR TRIP Events 30269 and 30272 Reportable Event Number: 30269 Discussion: CPSES Unit 1 was in the process of shutting down in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.3 because of a cracked weld on a relief valve in a common injection line from the safety injection pumps to the reactor coolant system (EN 30269). The leak was repaired by cutting out and replacing the associated relief valve. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at approximately 12:13 a.m., on April 11, the power decrease was terminated, and power ascension was commenced. At approximately 2 a.m., with the reactor at approximately 30 percent power, a significant leak occurred on a heater drain tank level control valve at a mechanical seal. The licensee began reducing power in order to isolate and repair the leak. The main turbine was removed from service and a normal reactor shutdown was commenced. During the shutdown, malfunctions in the rod control system prompted the operators to initiate a manual reactor trip (EN 30272). The licensee plans to take a 1 to 2-day outage to repair the heater drain system leak, troubleshoot and repair the rod control system, and implement the requested actions of NRC Bulletin 96-01, "Control Rod Insertion Problems." Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's actions. Contact: A. T. Gody (817)897-1500 _