Headquarters Daily Report APRIL 10, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS APRIL 10, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0026 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-22: "Improper Equipment Settings Due to the Use of Nontemperature-Compensated Test Equipment," dated April 11, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the potential for improper calibration and setting of safety-related equipment setpoints as a result of using nontemperature-compensated measuring and test equipment. Technical contacts: Morris W. Branch, RII (804) 357-2101 Stephen G. Tingen, NRR (301) 415-1280 S. V. Athavale, NRR (301) 415-2974 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 APRIL 10, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0027 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, SAFETY INJECTION, NATURAL CIRCULATION WITH ONE DIESEL OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNING MAINTENANCE The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel meeting on March 26, 1996, classified the February 6, 1996, Catawba, Unit 2, loss of offsite power event as a significant event for the Performance Indicator Program. The panel considers the risk implications of the event and the complications associated with post-trip recovery important enough for this event to warrant Significant Event classification. On February 5, 1996, intermittent ground faults occurred on the one phase of the output bus of Unit 2. These faults were too short in duration for protective relay action to initiate. On February 6, 1996, a ground fault occurred on a different phase of the Unit 2 output bus concurrent with a repeat of the intermittent ground fault experienced the previous day. The two simultaneous phase-to-ground faults resulted in a phase-to-phase fault that triggered the actuation of protective relaying causing a loss of offsite power to Unit 2. No damage was incurred by the main station transformers. The ground faults resulted from the failure of resistor wall bushings associated with potential transformers connected to the Unit 2 output buses. Emergency diesel generator (EDG) A started and loaded as designed. EDG B was inoperable due to unplanned maintenance of its battery charger. EDG B was restored to an operable status roughly three hours into the event. Both EDG's were secured when power was made available to the safety busses via cross-ties from Unit 1. The plant went water solid during a subsequent safety injection. As a result, one of three pressurizer PORVs opened approximately 74 times to control pressure. The pressurizer relief tank rupture disc relieved to containment. Reactor coolant pumps tripped on loss of station power. The reactor was stabilized in natural circulation with heat removal via auxiliary feedwater and steam generator PORV's steaming to the atmosphere. Some minor flooding occurred in a penetration room adjacent to the auxiliary feedwater pump room. The conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for this event has been preliminarily estimated to be 2E-4. CCDP's on this order are indicative of accident precursor events. Contact: E. Nick Fields, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1173 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 APRIL 10, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-96-0036 Waterford 3 Date: 04/09/96 Killona,Louisiana SRI and Licensee Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Entergy Operations, Inc. Arkansas Nuclear 1 Russelville,Arkansas Dockets: 50-313 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES TO ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. ORGANIZATION Discussion: On April 5, several personnel and organizational changes to Entergy Operations, Incorporated, were announced. The following changes were effective immediately: J. J. Fisicaro, Director, Nuclear Safety, Waterford 3 (formerly Director, Nuclear Safety, River Bend); R. F. Burski, Director, Plant Modification and Construction, Waterford 3 (formerly Director, Nuclear Safety, Waterford 3); A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering, Waterford 3 (formerly Manager, Systems Engineering, ANO Unit 1); R. G. Azzarello, Operations Management Trainee, Waterford 3 (formerly Director, Design Engineering); R. S. Starkey, Manager Systems Engineering, ANO Unit 1 (formerly Manager, Operations and Maintenance, Waterford 3); and J. E. Venable, Operations Manager, Grand Gulf (formerly Licensing Manager, River Bend). Regional Action: For information only. Contact: Phil Harrell (817)860-8250 Greg Werner (817)860-8269 _ Headquarters Daily Report APRIL 10, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS APRIL 10, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0026 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-22: "Improper Equipment Settings Due to the Use of Nontemperature-Compensated Test Equipment," dated April 11, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the potential for improper calibration and setting of safety-related equipment setpoints as a result of using nontemperature-compensated measuring and test equipment. Technical contacts: Morris W. Branch, RII (804) 357-2101 Stephen G. Tingen, NRR (301) 415-1280 S. V. Athavale, NRR (301) 415-2974 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 APRIL 10, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0027 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, SAFETY INJECTION, NATURAL CIRCULATION WITH ONE DIESEL OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNING MAINTENANCE The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel meeting on March 26, 1996, classified the February 6, 1996, Catawba, Unit 2, loss of offsite power event as a significant event for the Performance Indicator Program. The panel considers the risk implications of the event and the complications associated with post-trip recovery important enough for this event to warrant Significant Event classification. On February 5, 1996, intermittent ground faults occurred on the one phase of the output bus of Unit 2. These faults were too short in duration for protective relay action to initiate. On February 6, 1996, a ground fault occurred on a different phase of the Unit 2 output bus concurrent with a repeat of the intermittent ground fault experienced the previous day. The two simultaneous phase-to-ground faults resulted in a phase-to-phase fault that triggered the actuation of protective relaying causing a loss of offsite power to Unit 2. No damage was incurred by the main station transformers. The ground faults resulted from the failure of resistor wall bushings associated with potential transformers connected to the Unit 2 output buses. Emergency diesel generator (EDG) A started and loaded as designed. EDG B was inoperable due to unplanned maintenance of its battery charger. EDG B was restored to an operable status roughly three hours into the event. Both EDG's were secured when power was made available to the safety busses via cross-ties from Unit 1. The plant went water solid during a subsequent safety injection. As a result, one of three pressurizer PORVs opened approximately 74 times to control pressure. The pressurizer relief tank rupture disc relieved to containment. Reactor coolant pumps tripped on loss of station power. The reactor was stabilized in natural circulation with heat removal via auxiliary feedwater and steam generator PORV's steaming to the atmosphere. Some minor flooding occurred in a penetration room adjacent to the auxiliary feedwater pump room. The conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for this event has been preliminarily estimated to be 2E-4. CCDP's on this order are indicative of accident precursor events. Contact: E. Nick Fields, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1173 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 APRIL 10, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-96-0036 Waterford 3 Date: 04/09/96 Killona,Louisiana SRI and Licensee Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Entergy Operations, Inc. Arkansas Nuclear 1 Russelville,Arkansas Dockets: 50-313 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES TO ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. ORGANIZATION Discussion: On April 5, several personnel and organizational changes to Entergy Operations, Incorporated, were announced. The following changes were effective immediately: J. J. Fisicaro, Director, Nuclear Safety, Waterford 3 (formerly Director, Nuclear Safety, River Bend); R. F. Burski, Director, Plant Modification and Construction, Waterford 3 (formerly Director, Nuclear Safety, Waterford 3); A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering, Waterford 3 (formerly Manager, Systems Engineering, ANO Unit 1); R. G. Azzarello, Operations Management Trainee, Waterford 3 (formerly Director, Design Engineering); R. S. Starkey, Manager Systems Engineering, ANO Unit 1 (formerly Manager, Operations and Maintenance, Waterford 3); and J. E. Venable, Operations Manager, Grand Gulf (formerly Licensing Manager, River Bend). Regional Action: For information only. Contact: Phil Harrell (817)860-8250 Greg Werner (817)860-8269 _