Headquarters Daily Report DECEMBER 05, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV DEC. 02, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-96-0122 Arkansas Nuclear 1 Date: 11/30/96 Russelville,Arkansas Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-313 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: STEAM GENERATOR LEAKAGE Discussion: On November 30, 1996, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 detected a leak from Steam Generator B. As of December 2, 1996, the leak was estimated at roughly 70-80 gallons per day. The licensee has an administrative limit for plant operation with steam generator leakage of 0.1 gpm. Technical Specifications limit leakage to 0.5 gpm. The licensee has increased secondary plant sampling to monitor the leakage. The licensee has indicated that they will begin shutdown of the unit when leakage reaches 100 gallons per day. Regional Action: NRC resident and regional inspectors are following licensee activities. Contact: E. Collins (817)860-8291 I. Barnes (817)860-8176 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 DECEMBER 2, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-96-0123 Grand Gulf 1 Date: 11/30/96 Port Gibson,Mississippi Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-416 BWR/GE-6 Subject: STARTUP FROM REFUELING Discussion: On November 29, 1996, at 11:48 p.m. (CST), the licensee entered Mode 1 to complete Refueling Outage 8 in 41.5 days. Major activities completed included replacing 24 jet pump beams, replacing 28 control rod drive mechanisms, completing the first 10-year inservice interval, upgrading the first stage low pressure turbine, cleaning the suppression pool, and changing out six safety/relief valves. The licensee had shut down the reactor on October 19 and had planned for a 32-day outage. However, the startup was delayed because of refueling equipment problems (refueling bridge and jet beam weld machine) and operational difficulties (i.e., valve lineups took longer than expected and an unanticipated reactor scram). On November 27, as described in Event Notification 31387, a reactor scram occurred because of a failed condensate storage tank level transmitter that affected the control rod drive pump NPSH. As of December 2, the licensee had completed testing of their main feedwater control system and the turbine overspeed test at 25 percent power. However, a steam leak on a high pressure turbine first stage instrument line required the licensee to downpower to 15 percent and place the turbine on the turning gear to repair the steam leak. The licensee expects to continue power ascension today. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: Phil Harrell (817)868-8250 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 DECEMBER 2, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Union Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0124 Callaway 1 Date: 12/02/96 Fulton,Missouri Resident Inspector Call Dockets: 50-483 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN TO REPAIR FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES Discussion: On December 1, 1996, the licensee shut down the Callaway Plant to repair leaks on both hydraulic actuation trains of Feedwater Isolation Valve D. A hydraulic leak on the red train of hydraulics had occurred on November 28, and the licensee had made preparations to repair that leak while at power. With the appearance of the leak on the yellow train of hydraulics on December 1, the licensee began a plant shutdown to repair the leaks. The actuating hydraulic systems for each feedwater isolation valve are independent of the actuation systems for the remaining valves. The main generator output breakers were opened at 5:37 p.m. on December 1, and Mode 4 was reached at 2:15 a.m. on December 2. The licensee intends to remain in Mode 4 to perform the repairs and the current schedule is to have the unit back online on December 4. Additionally, while shutdown, the licensee intends to repair a body-to-bonnet leak on Feedwater Isolation Valve B. Regional Action: The resident inspector is monitoring the licensee's repair activities. Contact: Frank Brush (573)676-3181 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 DECEMBER 3, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-96-0117 Turkey Point 3 4 Date: 12/03/96 Miami,Florida Dockets: 50-250,50-251 PWR/W-3-LP,PWR/W-3-LP Florida Power & Light Co. Saint Lucie 1 2 Florida Dockets: 50-335,50-389 PWR/CE,PWR/CE Subject: FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT MANAGEMENT CHANGE Discussion: Florida Power and Light Company announced that Mr. William Bohlke will resign his position as Vice President of Nuclear Engineering effective December 2, 1996. Mr Bohlke will be replaced by Mr. Raj Kundalkar who will assume these duties as of December 16, 1996. Mr. Raj Kundalkar was the former Site Engineering Manager at Turkey Point. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: S. NINH (404)331-5583 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 DECEMBER 4, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: General Electric Co. MR Number: 2-96-0118 General Electirc Co. Date: 12/04/96 Wilmington,North Carolina Dockets: 00701113 License No: SNM-1097 Subject: URANIUM MATERIAL ACCUMULATION IN PROCESS EQUIPMENT Discussion: On December 3, 1996, the licensee reported to the NRC Operations Center loss of some criticality controls in connection with its calciner process. The loss resulted in the accumulation of material, containing uranium enriched to 4.9 percent uranium-235, in the annular section of a calciner. The calciner converts ammonium diuranate (ADU) to uranium oxide by heating it to about 800 degrees F as the material moves down the inside of a rotating, heated tube and then reacting with hydrogen gas. The tube is a nominal 10 inches inside diameter by 26 feet long. The annular section is between the rotating tube and heat shield within the calciner. On November 30, 1996, an operator noticed smoke around the Line 3 calciner and reported it to the control room. The control room operator also observed the calciner temperature profile was higher than normal. As a result of these conditions, the licensee halted the calciner process on Line 3. After allowing cooling sufficient to examine the calciner, the licensee opened the calciner heat shield and outer casing on December 3, 1996. A visible accumulation of material was observed in the bottom of the casing. Approximately 38-39 kilograms of material was removed and placed into criticality safe storage containers. The material is being analyzed for moisture and uranium content. The cause of the material accumulation in annulus was a crack about 3/8-1/2" wide running around the circumference of the tube. The crack was approximately three feet from the tube end. The breakage of the tube represented a loss of one criticality safety control (for geometry) on the calciner process. Another control to stop material accumulation outside the tube when the tube breaks was a switch which detects slow movement or stoppage of the tube. The switch is designated as an Active Engineered Control AEC) and shuts down the flow of ADU and process gases to the calciner when activated. The switch did not activate in this case, since the tube continued to rotate after the break. On December 3, 1996, the licensee established an investigation team and halted the use of all similar calciners until the integrity of the tubes and the adequacy of the AEC to detect loss of function are evaluated. Regional Action: On December 3, 1996, Region II and NMSS established a special inspection team to review the licensee's nuclear criticality safety analysis and evaluation of the incident. The team is lead by the Fuel Facilities Branch Chief in Region II. REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 DECEMBER 4, 1996 MR Number: 2-96-0118 (cont.) Contact: G. L. TROUP (404)331-5566 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 DECEMBER 4, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-96-0122 Advance Medical Systems, Inc. Date: 12/03/96 Cleveland,Ohio Dockets: 03016055 License No: 34-19089-01 Subject: DISPOSAL OF COBALT-60 SOURCES FROM ADVANCE MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. Discussion: On Dec. 3, 1996, ChemNuclear Systems, Inc. (CNSI) shipped (via truck) approximately 24,400 curies of cobalt-60 from Advanced Medical Systems (AMS) Cleveland, Ohio facility to Barnwell S.C., for disposal. The cobalt-60 is in the form of bulk sources (pellets contained in screw-top containers) and sealed sources. The sources are packaged in a lead/steel cylindrical liner, which is contained inside a CNSI 1-13G type B shipping cask. The truck is expected to arrive at Barnwell on Dec. 4, 1996. NRC inspectors from Region III (Chicago) were on site when the sources were packaged and shipped. The inspectors performed confirmatory exposure rate and smear surveys of the cask and truck before the truck left the site. The survey results were far below applicable NRC and DOT limits. Later this week, an additional 23,700 curies of cobalt-60 will be shipped from AMS facility to Barnwell. This will leave AMS with a cobalt-60 inventory of approximately 5000 curies, made up of bulk and sealed sources, and approximately 40 curies of packaged wastes. Regional Action: Region III inspectors will continue to be on site when the sources are packaged and shipped. Contact: MICHAEL F. WEBER (630)829-9825 JOHN R. MADERA (630)829-9834 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 7 DECEMBER 4, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0123 Braidwood 1 Date: 12/04/96 Braceville,Illinois SIR/RI VIA TELECON AND PC Dockets: 50-456 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: STARTUP FOLLOWING PLANNED OUTAGE Discussion: ON 12/03/96, THE REACTOR WAS MADE CRITICAL AT 0435 AND AS OF 0700 WAS AT 12 PERCENT POWER. THE UNIT WAS SYNCHRONIZED TO THE GRID AT 1205. THE REACTOR WAS SHUTDOWN ON 10/12/96 FOR A PLANNED MIDCYCLE OUTAGE PRIMARILY FOR TESTING AND REPAIRING OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBES. Regional Action: THE SHUTDOWN AND OUTAGE ACTIVITIES WERE MONITORED BY THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS. THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS WERE MONITORED BY A REGIONAL SPECIALIST. THE STARTUP AND POWER ASCENSION WERE MONITORED BY THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS. Contact: R. D. LANKSBURY (630)829-9631 T. M. TONGUE (630)829-9613 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 8 DECEMBER 4, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Omaha Public Power District MR Number: 4-96-0125 Ft Calhoun 1 Date: 12/04/96 Fort Calhoun,Nebraska Phone Call to Regional Office Dockets: 50-285 PWR/CE Subject: RESIGNATION OF DIVISION MANAGER - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Discussion: Effective December 13, 1996, Mr. T. L. Patterson will resign as the Division Manager - Nuclear Operations for Omaha Public Power District. No replacement has yet been named. Regional Action: Information purposes only. Contact: W. D. Johnson (817)860-8148 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 9 DECEMBER 5, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0087 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: PROGRAMMATIC WEAKNESSES IN MANAGEMENT AT HOPE CREEK CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT On November 19, 1996, the NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel classified the programmatic weaknesses that resulted in violations and imposition of civil penalties totaling $150,000 to be a significant event. Classification was based on repeated failures to (1) plan appropriate testing of equipment following maintenance, and (2) identify and correct problems concerning safety related equipment. Inspections were conducted at the Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station between February 11 and March 30, 1996, and between June 23 and August 3, 1996. The most significant violations, from a safety standpoint, involve control rod testing and maintenance. During the November 1995 to March 1996 outage, maintenance had been performed on the control rods, yet appropriate surveillance testing had not been planned to be completed prior to restart. The licensee intended to perform the testing at 40 percent power. This was discovered when inspectors questioned a control room operator. Had there been no intervention, a technical specification limiting condition for operation violation would have occurred. Another violation involved separate occasions on February 15, 1991 and April 25, 1994 where startup was commenced without completing surveillance tests on control rods following maintenance. During control rod withdrawal time testing on March 14, 1996, several control rods were found to withdraw faster than allowed by procedure. Corrective action consisted of adjusting the rods to the desired speed with no effort to determine the cause of the excess speed, or the significance of the misadjusted rods during the previous operation. In addition, further review identified that on May 10, 1992, a control rod was found to be traveling at excess speeds but was not corrected until October 12, 1992. By doing this, the licensee showed a lack of appreciation of the safety significance of control rod withdrawal speed and operated the plant without taking corrective actions to address a condition outside the design basis. CONTACT: M. Kotzalas, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1113 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 10 DECEMBER 5, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0088 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS AT SEQUOYAH, UNIT 2, CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT On October 22, 1996, the NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel classified the manual reactor trip with complications at Sequoyah, Unit 2, as a Significant Event. Classification was based on the programmatic weakness associated with maintenance practices which both caused and complicated the event. On October 11, 1996, at 5:22 a.m., Sequoyah Unit 2 began a controlled shutdown based on a higher than expected leakoff from the number two seal on a reactor coolant pump. At approximately 47 percent reactor power, as required by procedure, plant operators manually tripped one main feedwater pump. The plant then experienced a main turbine runback and initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system. Based on the unexpected plant performance, the operators manually tripped the reactor at 8:27 a.m. All control rods fully inserted. The event was complicated in that operators were unable to take manual control of the auxiliary feedwater system. The reactor coolant system experienced a cooldown to approximately 538 degrees F, requiring operators to emergency borate. Steam generator water levels were maintained within procedural limits at all times during the transient. The initial reason for the controlled shutdown and the unexpected plant performance can be attributed to poor maintenance practices. The higher than expected reactor coolant pump seal leakoff was due to a failed o-ring in a solenoid valve that had been in operation past the vendor recommended service life for the application. The turbine runback and initiation of and inability to control the auxiliary feedwater system occurred as a non-safety related logic circuit failed because of moisture induced corrosion after insufficient cleanup following inadvertent operation of the fire protection system. Additional complications also attributed to poor maintenance practices were a failure to close by a main feedwater isolation valve and indications of water hammer in the steam dump system. The isolation valve failed to close when moisture induced corrosion caused the motor to seize. This valve has been disabled previously by the same failure mechanism. The water hammer was caused by a failed level switch in the steam dump drain tank; this allowed condensate to back up in the steam dump system. The region conducted a special inspection following the event and will document the results in NRC Inspection Report 50-328/96-13. The region also issued a task interface agreement, TIA 96-021, to NRR on October 31, 1996, to review the instrumentation and controls associated with the auxiliary feedwater system. The event was briefed on October 23, 1996, in Operating Reactors Events Briefing 96-13, "Reactor Trip With Complications." HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 11 DECEMBER 5, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0088 (cont.) CONTACT: S. Koenick, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-2841 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 11 DECEMBER 5, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-96-0124 Allied Signal, Inc. Date: 12/04/96 Metropolis,Illinois VIA LICENSEE Dockets: 04003392 License No: SUB-526 Subject: REPORTED COMPLETE LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER Discussion: On December 4, 1996, the licensee reported that at approximately 5:00 p.m. (CST) on December 3, 1996, the facility experienced a complete loss of electrical power. The power outage lasted approximately four minutes. The loss of power caused the dust collectors in the Feed Materials Building to lose vacuum and resulted in the release of natural uranium ore dusts and "green salt" dusts into the facility. The facility was evacuated but approximately 20 workers were potentially contaminated with the dust. No releases of material occurred outside the facility. The licensee is currently conducting bioassays on the potentially contaminated workers. No significant personnel exposures are expected from the incident. The facility was returned to normal operation at 10:15 p.m. (CST) on December 3, 1996. The power failure affected the city of Metropolis, Illinois and the surrounding area. The cause of the failure was not known at the time of this report. Regional Action: Region III inspectors will review the event on December 5 and 6, 1996, as part of an already scheduled inspection. Contact: G. SHEAR (630)829-9876 _