Headquarters Daily Report MAY 02, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MAY 2, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0036 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS Information Notice 96-28, "SUGGESTED GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION," was issued on May 1, 1996. This notice was issued to provide all material and fuel cycle licensees with guidance relating to the development and implementation of corrective actions that should be considered after violations are identified. Contacts: Nader L. Mamish, OE Daniel J. Holody, RI (301) 415-2740 (610) 337-5312 Internet:nlm@nrc.gov Internet:djh@nrc.gov Bruno Uryc, Jr., RII Bruce L. Burgess, RIII (404) 331-5505 (708) 829-9666 Internet:bxu@nrc.gov Internet:blb@nrc.gov Gary F. Sanborn, RIV (817) 860-8222 Internet:gfs@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 MAY 2, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0037 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Administrative Letter 94-13, Revision 2, "Access to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletin Board Systems," dated May 3, 1996. The NRC is issuing this administrative letter revision to give addressees updated information about the availability of NRC bulletin board systems and list server systems. Contacts: James W. Shapaker, NRR (301) 415-1151 Tom Dunning, NRR (301) 415-1189 Kevin Ramsey, NMSS (301) 415-7887 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 MAY 2, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-96-0042 Millstone 1 2 3 Date: 05/02/96 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-245,50-336,50-423 BWR/GE-3,PWR/CE,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: Contractor Found with Contamination Upon In-Processing Discussion: On May 1, 1996, while in-processing at Millstone Station, a contractor was found to have fixed contamination of Cs-137 on both hands. Initial detection was made with a whole body count and confirmed with a PCM, which alarmed, and direct frisking. The licensee unsuccessfully attempted decontamination, denied the individual access to the Millstone radiologically controlled areas, and notified the radiation safety officer of the contract company, HOLTEC International. Based upon interviews with the individual, it was learned that the contractor had successfully passed an exit whole body count at the Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant in early April, 1996; and had since worked at the HOLTEC facility in Palm Harbor,Florida. The Millstone Health Physics Manager notified NRC Region I of this event and documented the details and frisk results in a letter to the Chief Scientist at HOLTEC International. Regional Action: NRC Region II personnel are conducting a follow-up investigation in cooperation with representatives from the State of Florida. Contact: Jacque Durr (610)337-5224 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 MAY 2, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-96-0040 Browns Ferry 3 Date: 05/02/96 Decatur,Alabama Dockets: 50-296 BWR/GE-4 Subject: CONDENSATE SYSTEM VALVE FAILURE CAUSES LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL - REACTOR SCRAM Discussion: On May 1, 1996, at approximately 11:10 a.m., CDT, an automatic reactor scram from 100 percent power occurred on Browns Ferry Unit 3 when the reactor feed pumps tripped resulting in a low reactor water level condition. Immediately prior to the reactor scram, the licensee was performing maintenance on the valve actuator for 3-FCV-2-190 (a 16 inch butterfly valve in the condensate system which modulates open as power is increased to rated power). During the maintenance activity, the valve stem sheared below the actuator external to the pipe, which resulted in valve closure and loss of suction to the condensate booster pumps and the reactor feed water pumps. All control rods fully inserted. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system automatically started on low reactor water level as expected. Minimum reactor water level observed during the transient was -48.75 inches. Water level was recovered with HPCI and RCIC and maintained using RCIC. The plant is currently in hot shutdown with plant parameters stable. The licensee is conducting an incident investigation in order to determine the root cause of the failure. Previous problems had been experienced with the valve's stability. The licensee had installed a mechanical clamp on the valve stem, approximately a week earlier, to prevent instability. A crack on the stem was detected by craft personnel, however it appears that the licensee's subsequent engineering evaluation was not adequate. The licensee was in the process of removing the clamp and reconnecting the actuator when the failure occurred. Regional Action: The acting resident inspector responded to the control room following the scram. Resident inspector followup is focusing on the valve failure, planned repairs and verifying plant response. Contact: Mark S. Lesser (404)331-0342 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 MAY 2, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Babcock And Wilcox MR Number: 2-96-0039 Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Date: 05/01/96 Lynchbugh,Virginia Dockets: 00007027 License No: SNM-42 Subject: MATERIAL IMBALANCE Discussion: On April 30, 1996, B&W NNFD reported a process monitoring alarm indicating a material balance discrepancy which occurred on April 29 in a portion of the uranium recovery system. The amount of uranium removed from the process was less than the amount added. The discrepancy was discovered as a part of the licensee's routine weekly process monitoring tests. To account for the material, the licensee reviewed and verified accounting records and remeasured materials, including inprocess holdup. The investigation by the licensee has determined that the discrepancy apparently resulted from measurement system inaccuracies. The uranium recovery process was shutdown by the licensee pending resolution of the discrepancy. Regional Action: Region II and NMSS staff have been following the licensee's activities. Conference calls were held with the licensee on April 30, and May 1, 1996, by Region II, NMSS staff, and the Resident Inspector. Region II and NMSS agreed with the licensee restarting uranium recovery based upon (1) the material was not diverted, (2) the process alarm was resolved and the apparent causes determined, (3) the licensee's proposed actions would reasonably prevent a further recurrence, and (4) there was no criticality safety concern. Contact: C. Hughey (804)847-7343 _