Headquarters Daily Report OCTOBER 26, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I OCTOBER 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0137 Salem 1 Date: 10/26/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey Dockets: 50-272 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: LOSS OF OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR Reportable Event Number: 29421 Discussion: On October 4, 1995, the Salem Unit 1 Overhead Annunciator (OHA) system failed (Event No. 29421). The licensee declared an Alert due to a loss of greater than 75 percent of its OHA system for greater than 15 minutes. During the event, two failures actually occurred. The initial failure resulted in alarms not being received by the annunciator window boxes. A second failure occurred when operators attempted to reset the annunciator computers. The second failure was a software configuration failure which affected the system printer and engineering workstation. The initial failure is of particular concern since it resulted in a 100 percent loss of OHA and was not readily detectable by plant operators. Although the actual initiating event of the first failure is unknown, the licensee has identified that the most probable failure mechanism can be attributed to the system software. The system computer had stopped processing alarms and yet no errors were reported by the computer operating system. The failure was silent in that the operators had no indications; the computer clock continued to update and the OHA trouble annunciator did not alarm. During the licensee's root cause investigation, they identified a list of other software design flaws including possible silent failures associated with the distributed logic cards. Due to the nature of these silent failures, Salem operators have been performing a test every ten minutes to ensure system operability. The test involves opening a door to ensure that a valid input into the OHA system would result in an output to the OHA windows. Other current compensatory measures include local monitoring of significant plant parameters. Salem has a Beta Model 4100 Sequential Event Recorder Based Annunciator System manufactured by Beta Products of Hathaway Systems Corporation in Carrollton, TX. Other plants known to have this system installed include Kewaunee 1 and 2, Sequoyah 1 and 2, Prairie Island 1 and 2, Three Mile Island 2, and Pilgrim. Beta/Hathaway reports that all versions of the Model 4100 system are susceptible to the above described failures. Although the annunciators are not safety-related, and therefore 10 CFR Part 21 does not apply, the licensee and vendor are contacting the applicable plants. Regional Action: A Special Inspection is ongoing, including the emergency response aspect of this event. REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 26, 1995 MR Number: 1-95-0137 (cont.) Contact: William Ruland (610)337-5227 Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duquesne Light Co. MR Number: 1-95-0138 Beaver Valley 1 2 Date: 10/26/95 Shippingport,Pennsylvania SRI PC Dockets: 50-334,50-412 PWR/W-3-LP,PWR/W-3-LP Subject: REORGANIZATION Discussion: On October 25, 1995, Duquesne Light Company announced the following Beaver Valley site organization changes to become effective November 1, 1995: Kevin L. Ostrowski will assume the position of Manager, Quality Services Unit, he is presently the Unit 1 Operations Manager. Brian T. Tuite will assume the position of General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit, he is presently the Unit 2 Operations Manager. Kenneth D. Grada will assume the position of Technical Assistant to the Division Vice President, Nuclear Operations Group, he is presently the Quality Services Manager. Larry R. Freeland will assume the position of Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department, he is presently the Acting General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit. H. Michael Siegel will assume the position of Manager, Information Services Department, he is presently the Nuclear Engineering Department Manager. These organization changes include the elimination of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operations Manager positions that are presently filled by K. Ostrowski and B. Tuite, respectively. Contact: Lawrence Rossbach (412)643-2000 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 OCTOBER 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Indiana MR Number: 3-95-0160 Cook 1 Date: 10/25/95 Bridgman,Michigan Dockets: 50-315 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: UNIT 1 RESTART FROM REFUELING OUTAGE Discussion: At 4:57 p.m on October 24, 1995, Unit 1 went critical following a refueling outage. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on October 25, 1995, the licensee paralleled Unit 1 to the grid. The outage commenced approximately six weeks earlier than planned, on August 10, 1995, due to main generator transformer problems. Major activities during the outage included the following: main generator transformer replacement (twice), installation of a mono-block main turbine rotor, and reactor vessel 10-year inspection. The outage was extended nearly 4 weeks to address reactor vessel former bolt issues and other miscellaneous problems. Regional Action: The resident inspectors monitored the initial startup and will continue to monitor power ascension activities. Contact: WAYNE KROPP (708)829-9633 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 OCTOBER 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0132 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 10/26/95 San Onofre 1 San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-206 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: HALON ACTUATION/LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING EVENT Discussion: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (SONGS-1) began commercial operation on January 1, 1968, and was permanently shut down on November 30, 1992. Since that date, the licensee has defueled the reactor, stored the spent fuel in the unit's spent fuel pool, and begun activities related to placing the unit in SAFSTOR. A possession-only license was issued for SONGS-1 in March 1993. On October 25, 1995, at about 7:47 a.m. PDT, the licensee became aware that the halon system had activated in the "A" train 4160-volt switchgear room. The halon system actuated as a result of a breaker malfunction. The electrical fire, if any had existed, had extinguished prior to the emergency response team's entry into the area. The primary bank of halon, consisting of five bottles of halon, was discharged during the event. The secondary bank was not discharged. At the time of the halon system actuation, fire protection system sprinkler tests were in progress. A motor-driven fire pump, powered by a breaker on the "A" train 480-volt Bus Number 1, received an actuation signal. The licensee speculated that the actuation signal was the result of low system header pressure. The licensee apparently anticipated that the pressure in the header could drop and the motor-driven pump would automatically start to maintain pressure as needed. The breaker for this pump malfunctioned during the pump start sequence, resulting in the actuation of an overcurrent (86 series) relay. The breaker fault/86-relay actuation also caused the feeder breaker to the 480-volt Bus Number 1 to trip open. This resulted in a loss of power to the Train "A" safety-related components, including the operating spent fuel pool Pump "A" and 480-volt Bus Number 3, which was cross-tied to Bus Number 1. Spent fuel pool cooling was restored using the Train "B" spent fuel cooling pump shortly after the incident. Pool temperature increased about 1 degree, from 72 to 73 degrees Fahrenheit, because of the incident. Backup fire protection systems were available during the incident. The licensee had previously calculated and determined that the spent fuel pool heatup rate, utilizing conservatism, was 3 degrees per hour. The licensee also performed a calculation and has determined that the pool temperature would have stabilized at about 115 degrees Fahrenheit if spent fuel pool cooling had not been restored in a timely manner. Short-term corrective actions planned by the licensee included restoring power to the 480-volt busses and troubleshooting the cause of breaker malfunction. The licensee did not plan to officially notify the NRC of REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 OCTOBER 26, 1995 MR Number: 4-95-0132 (cont.) the incident via the Operations Center or issue a press notice. Regional Action: Routine followup by the Resident Inspectors. Contact: D. D. CHAMBERLAIN (817)860-8249 _