Headquarters Daily Report AUGUST 25, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 25, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0108 Hope Creek 1 Date: 08/25/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI/PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: DROPPED NEW FUEL BUNDLE Discussion: On August 23, 1995, while lowering a new fuel bundle into the fuel inspection stand, the bundle upper tie plate momentarily hung up on the inspection stand retaining ring. The bundle subsequently dropped the remaining distance, about two inches, into the bottem of the stand. The bundle remained secured in place following the short drop. No external damage to the new fuel assembly, the inspection stand, or the handling system were found during subsequent inspections. The new fuel inspections were stopped until corrective actions were identified and implemented to prevent recurrence. On August 24, 1995, an interference on the fuel inspection stand retaining ring was corrected. Fuel moves into the inspection stand are still on hold while the corrective actions are evaluated. The licensee plans to ship the dropped bundle back to the fuel vendor for fuel pellet damage evaluation. Regional Action: Routine resident follow up. Contact: Robert Summers (609)935-3850 Scott Barber (610)337-5232 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 AUGUST 25, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0109 Vermont Yankee 1 Date: 08/25/95 Vernon,Vermont RI/PC Dockets: 50-271 BWR/GE-4 Subject: APPENDIX R: PHYSICAL AND PROGRAMMATIC DEFICIENCIES (ENS 29106, 29126 and 29146) Discussion: On July 25, Vermont Yankee (VY) reported that design deficiencies existed in the implementation of the Appendix R hot short mitigation strategy. These deficiencies were the result of a VY re-review of information contained in NRC Information Notice 92-18. Specifically, 24 motor operated valves required to achieve safe shutdown were susceptible to hot short failure. Subsequently, on July 27 VY determined that safety relief valve cabling located in the RB-3 area of the reactor building was also vulnerable to fire-related damage and therefore could not be credited for one fire scenario within this area. On August 1, cabling for the inboard steam isolation valve of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system located in the RB-3 area was also found to be susceptible to fire damage, which would prevent this system from fulfilling its Appendix R function. On August 23, VY determined that during one of the fire scenarios for a fire in area RB-2, the RCIC and high pressure coolant injection system's high energy line break temperature isolation circuits would fail, thereby causing the inadvertent isolation of these high pressure injection systems that could be used to achieve safe shutdown of the plant. Fire watches were established to minimize the potential for a fire to damage Appendix R systems in these areas. Also on August 23, VY identified from a review of one of their computer codes that their currently established fire related safe shutdown timeline for plant operators to accomplish the injection of water into the reactor vessel prior to core uncovery was nonconservative by 18 minutes. This timeline was established by an evaluation of the use of the RCIC system and other plant design features in the remote shudown mode for Appendix R safe shutdown scenarios. Because the newly identified 25 minute injection requirement to commence core injection prior to core uncovery cannot be achieved using current VY Appendix R assumptions, an additional fire watch (west switchgear room) is augmenting the existing watches as an interim compensatory measure to address this deficiency. Regional Action: The Region I staff and resident inspectors are monitoring VY's investigation and corrective actions, and Region I plans a special inspection in October 1995. Contact: Richard J. Conte (610)337-5183 _