Headquarters Daily Report SEPTEMBER 25, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS SEP. 25, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0124 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 95-42, "Commission Decision on the Resolution of Generic Issue 23, `Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure'," dated September 22, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to notify addressees of the Commission's decision on Generic Issue (GI) 23, "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure." This decision was documented in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) from John C. Hoyle to James M. Taylor, dated March 31, 1995 (Accession Number 9504140300), written in response to SECY-94-225, "Issuance of Proposed Rulemaking Package on GI-23, `Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure'." Technical contacts: Chu-yu Liang, NRR Syed K. Shaukat, RES (301) 415-2878 (301) 415-6592 Christopher Jackson, NRR (301) 415-2947 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 SEPTEMBER 25, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0117 Waterford 3 Date: 09/25/95 Killona,Louisiana Telecon from RI Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: REFUELING OUTAGE 7 Discussion: On September 22, 1995, at 9 p.m. (CDT), the licensee initiated a controlled shutdown to begin their seventh refueling outage. The licensee projects a 39-day outage and expects to restart on October 31, 1995. Major modifications scheduled for implementation during the refueling outage include: upgrading the plant monitoring computer, installing a wet cooling tower chemical addition and filtration system, restoring the incore instrument thimbles, and modifying the incore instrument nozzle flanges. Additional activities scheduled include performing an automated reactor vessel inservice inspection, repairing valves that allow leakage from the safety injection tanks, inspecting the main generator, and evaluating/determining corrective actions needed to repair (in the future) the electrical buses affected by the fire that occurred on June 10, 1995. The facility is currently in MODE 5 at 110 degrees F and atmospheric pressure. Regional Action: Routine followup by the resident inspectors. Contact: G. Pick (817)860-8270 P. Harrell (817)860-8250 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 SEPTEMBER 25, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0118 Arkansas Nuclear 2 Date: 09/25/95 Russelville,Arkansas Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-368 PWR/CE Subject: UNIT SHUTDOWN FOR ELEVENTH REFUELING OUTAGE Discussion: On September 22, 1995, at 11:38 p.m. (CDT), Unit 2 shut down to begin the eleventh refueling outage. The outage is scheduled to last 29 days. Major outage activities include: (1) 100 percent eddy current testing of the tubes in each steam generator, and (2) replacement of high and low pressure safety injection valves, service water piping, Reactor Coolant Pump D seal cartridge, and four containment electrical penetrations. Major secondary plant work includes a main turbine generator and exciter inspection, stator cooling water leak repair, low pressure feedwater heater bundle replacements, circulating water pump modifications, and moisture separator reheater inspections. Prior to entering cold shutdown, the licensee tested the main steam relief valves (MSSV) to determine the setpoint. The results of the testing were: (1) Valve 2PSV-1052 was pressurized to approximately 1140 psig (setpoint - 1078 psig) and did not lift; (2) Valve 2PSV-1006 was pressurized to approximately 1200 psig (setpoint - 1078 psig) and did not lift and, (3) Valve 2PSV-1002 lifted at 1124 psig (setpoint 1078 psig), was reset, and lifted at its setpoint. Based on these results, the licensee suspended testing and currently plans to send all the MSSVs to a contractor for testing and refurbishment, as necessary. It is not known at this time why the two MSSVs failed to open at the specified setpoint. Regional Action: The resident inspectors and regional staff will monitor the unit shutdown and outage activities. Contact: K. M. Kennedy (501)968-3290 S. J. Campbell (501)968-3290 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 SEPTEMBER 25, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. MR Number: 4-95-0119 Diablo Canyon 2 Date: 09/25/95 Avila Beach,California Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-323 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MANUAL TRIP Reportable Event Number: 29366 Discussion: At 9:11 a.m. (PST) on September 23, 1995, Diablo Canyon Unit 2 was manually tripped due to an impending loss of circulating water flow. Unit 2 had been curtailed to 50 percent at approximately 2 a.m. in response to heavy seas which caused the buildup of kelp on the traveling screens. Unit 1 traveling screens were not significantly impacted by kelp due to the direction of the seas and flow into the intake cove. Each unit has two circulating water pumps (CWPs) with three traveling screens per pump. The Unit 2 CWP 2-2 screen high differential pressure (d/P) alarm was received in the control room indicating 15 inches of water differential pressure across the screens. Investigation at the intake revealed that screen d/P had increased to 114 inches of water. Upon notification of the high d/P, CWP 2-2 was manually tripped from the control room. After securing CWP 2-2, the d/P across the CWP 2-1 screens immediately increased to the alarm setpoint and above, to the point of breaking the drive shear pin on one of the screens. When it appeared that the screens could not keep up with the kelp loading, the operators tripped the reactor and secured CWP 2-1. The operators closed the MSIVs and broke vacuum in the condenser. Inspection of the traveling screens following the trip revealed that Screen 2-1 had sustained structural damage apparently caused by a large d/P across the screen. Three other screens were noted to have minor damage to fiberglass screen baskets and one screen drive shear pin was broken. The auxiliary salt water (ASW) system is less susceptible to screen fouling than the circulating water system, because the ASW has much lower flow rates and intake is at a different point from that of the circulating water system. It was also noted that Units 1 and 2 ASW systems have separate intake points, and Units 1 and 2 ASW systems are crosstied. Following the reactor trip, two main steam safety relief valves (MSSVs) set at 1065 psig lifted prematurely at approximately 1025 psig prior to the 10 percent atmospheric steam dumps opening at 1035 psig. In order to stop the MSSVs from lifting, the atmospheric steam dump control setting was reduced to 960 psig and the two reliefs were gagged. A third MSSV lifted later apparently due to interaction caused during the cycling of a 10 percent atmospheric steam dump. MSSV testing of the Unit 2 valves was ongoing at the time of the trip. Testing had been completed on 15 of the 20 MSSVs. An AVK (Ultrastar) hydraulic assist device was being utilized to accomplish the testing. Of the three MSSVs which lifted, two had been adjusted during testing to lower their lift pressure. One of the valve's adjustment locknuts had not been tightened because it was being tested. The valve's adjustment was noted to have moved approximately 2 1/2 flats REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 SEPTEMBER 25, 1995 MR Number: 4-95-0119 (cont.) after lifting following the manual reactor trip. Unit 1 MSSVs had been tested and adjusted the previous week. During the testing 18 of the 20 MSSVs were noted to be outside of the +/- 1 percent tolerance allowed by Technical Specifications (discussed in a previous morning report). The licensee is performing additional testing of the Unit 2 relief valves prior to restart of the unit to determine the cause of the MSSV lifting. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors responded to the site upon notification of the manual reactor trip and are following the licensee's investigation into the MSSV issue. A conference call is being set up with the licensee to discuss MSSV lift results as they pertain to both units. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 M. Tschiltz (805)595-2354 _