Headquarters Daily Report OCTOBER 24, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS OCTOBER 24, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0130 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: PARTIAL CORE FLOW BYPASS DURING SHUTDOWN AT HOPE CREEK he NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on October 3, 1995, classified the set of two mode changes, one undetected, of the reactor at Hope Creek to be a Significant Event for the NRC Performance Indicator Program. The basis for classifying this event as a Significant Event is the failure of the operating staff to comprehend the condition of the plant for an extended period of time. On August 9, 1995, the licensee reported that a shutdown cooling bypass event had occurred at approximately 1100 hours on July 8, when the operating crew left the B recirculation loop discharge valve in a partially open position to mitigate potential thermal binding of that valve. During the shutdown cooling evolution, which involved securing residual heat removal system (RHR) operation to test RHR valves, approximately 2000 gpm of RHR heat exchanger outlet flow was diverted through the open recirculation valve and redirected from the intended path through the core to a parallel path through the RHR system, causing the first mode change, which the licensee did not recognize. Shutdown cooling was then returned to service. About ten hours later, bypass flow increased to approximately 4000 gpm when the recirculation valve was further opened in an attempt to reclose it, causing the second mode change. The valve was manually closed at 0550 hours on July 9, terminating the event. Licensee investigation into this event identified key corrective actions in the areas of operator training, operator procedure compliance, valve thermal binding assessment, and management response to the event. The licensee determined on August 4 that an operational condition change occurred from cold shutdown to hot shutdown (the first mode change). This was not known at the time of the event. As a result of these unplanned mode changes, several technical specification limiting conditions of operation were not met. The NRC conducted a special inspection of circumstances surrounding this event and concluded that this event was initiated when plant operators inappropriately left open the recirculation pump discharge valves, allowing shutdown cooling flow to bypass the reactor vessel, which decreased the ability of the shutdown cooling system to remove decay heat and allowed the reactor coolant system temperature and pressure to increase. This resulted in an undetected change in the plant operational condition from the desired cold shutdown to the hot shutdown condition (the first mode change). The inspection team concluded that the principal causes of this event were inadequate communications and failure to follow procedures and that contributing causes were poor quality procedure instructions and inadequate training. In addition, senior plant management initially failed to correctly assess the significance of this event. The failure resulted in a 10-day delay in initiating a comprehensive root cause evaluation and contributed to the failure to make the required HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 24, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0130 (cont.) notification to the NRC. The team also concluded that this event was safety significant. However, the consequences of this event were minimal and this event had no direct adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The identified weakness in both operator and management performance during and following this event were also significant. CONTACT: V. Hodge, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1861 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 24, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0131 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Bulletin 95-02, "Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode," dated October 17, 1995. The NRC is issuing this bulletin to alert addressees to complications experienced during a recent event in which a licensee initiated suppression pool cooling in response to a stuck-open safety relief valve and subsequently experienced clogging of one RHR pump suction strainer. The bulletin requests addressees to verify the operability of their emergency core cooling system and other pumps which draw suction from the suppression pool while performing their safety function. Technical contact: Robert Elliott, NRR (301) 415-1397 Lead project manager: Robert M. Latta, NRR (301) 415-1314 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 OCTOBER 24, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing MR Number: 3-95-0159 Minn. Mining & Manuf. Building 236 Date: 10/23/95 St. Paul,Minnesota TELECON Dockets: 03004950 License No: 22-00057-03 Subject: MISSING STATIC METER CONTAINING TRITIUM Discussion: Licensee reported to the NRC Operations Center on 10/20/95 that one of its tritium static meters was missing from its storage locker. The device, a Model 703 Static Meter manufactured by Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) containing approximately 114 millicuries (4,218 mega- becquerels) of tritium was last accounted for in an inventory on December 22, 1994. It was stored in a cabinet in Building 236 on licensee property. An inventory was performed on August 24, 1995, during which the device was determined to be missing. The licensee has been performing a search for the missing device since that time. The licensee has now declared the device missing, although it still believes that the device is somewhere within their facility. The licensee notified NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201. (Reports of theft or loss of licensed material). The device is used to measure static electricity and is issued under a general license. The device is normally inside of a brown carrying case with no special markings on the carrying case. The licensee indicated it will submit a written report on this event in the next 30 days. Regional Action: Region III will monitor the licensee's efforts to recover the device. This licensee is due for an inspection within the next two months. This issue will be reviewed at the time of inspection. Contact: THOMAS KOZAK (708)829-9866 JOHN D. JONES (708)829-9832 _