Headquarters Daily Report NOVEMBER 22, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I NOV. 22, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0142 Vermont Yankee 1 Date: 11/22/95 Vernon,Vermont Branch Chief Dockets: 50-271 BWR/GE-4 Subject: Degraded Individual Rod Scram Insertion Times Discussion: On November 7, the Vermont Yankee (VY) staff conducted individual rod scram insertion time testing per Technical Specification (TS) 4.3.c.2 on 45 of 89 control rods. TS 4.3.c.2 requires 50 percent of the control rod drives in each quadrant to be tested every 32 weeks (all rods once per year). Subsequent VY staff review of the test data identified that the average time from drop out (scram insertion signal) to position 46 had degraded approximately 30 milliseconds (beginning of cycle average scram insertion time for these 45 rods was .317 seconds and the as-found average was .347 seconds). The TS 3.3.c limit of .358 seconds from drop out to position 46 is an average of all (89 total) control rods. The remainder of the insertion times (from position 46 to 06) for the rods tested remained relatively unchanged. Additional confirmatory testing of four rods using a high speed recorder verified the adequacy of the testing methodology and computer software. On November 15, the VY staff replaced one scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) assembly with a new spare assembly. Bench testing of both SSPV assemblies and post-maintenance scram insertion testing of the rod indicated that the degraded scram time was associated with the SSPV installed since April 1995. During the Spring 1995 refueling outage, all of the SSPVs were replaced with new ASCO SSPVs containing VITON Elastomer diaphragms (Model No. HV-266000-2J). On November 21, VY replaced two additional SSPV assemblies for shipment to ASCO for further testing and material examinations. VY staff communications with other BWR owners has identified similar, but less severe degradation in drop out to position 46 scram insertion times with the new VITON diaphragms installed. VY has notified the industry on the "Nuclear Network." Regional Action: The resident inspectors continue to monitor licensee actions to resolve this concern. Contact: William Cook (802)257-4319 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 22, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-95-0099 Sequoyah 1 2 Date: 11/22/95 Soddy-Daisy,Tennessee Dockets: 50-327,50-328 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: SEQUOYAH ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER Discussion: Sequoyah recently announced the selection of Jeffrey S. Summy to the newly created position of Assistant Plant Manager, effective at the end of November. Mr. Summy has previously held positions with Failure Prevention Incorporated, ABB C-E Korea, and with the Arizona Public Service Company's Palo Verde Nuclear Station. Contact: MARK LESSER (404)331-0342 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 22, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Illinois Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0175 Clinton 1 Date: 11/21/95 Clinton,Illinois RI VIA TELEPHONE Dockets: 50-461 BWR/GE-6 Subject: CORPORATE MANAGEMENT CHANGE Discussion: The licensee announced today that Mr. Larry Brodsky, Executive Vice President, Energy Supply, will be leaving Illinois Power. (John Cook, Vice President - Clinton Power Station reports directly to Mr. Brodsky.) Mr. Brodsky has accepted the position of President and Chief Operating Officer of Orange and Rockland Utilities of Pearl River, New York. A replacement for Mr. Brodsky has not been named. Regional Action: For information only Contact: B. CLAYTON (708)829-9602 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 NOVEMBER 22, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Union Electric Co. MR Number: 4-95-0146 Callaway 1 Date: 11/22/95 Fulton,Missouri Notified by Senior Resident Insp. Dockets: 50-483 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: POTENTIAL FOR FATALITY DURING PLANNED ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE Discussion: At 8:15 a.m. (CST) on November 21, 1995, an electrician was involved in an event that had the potential to cause a fatal injury. Plant electricians were performing planned maintenance on nonsafety related electrical equipment on Bus PG105. Bus PG105 is normally fed by Transformer XPG105, a Stepdown 13.8kV/480V transformer. Bus PG105 supplies power to various fire protection equipment. An electrician was attempting to verify no voltage on the secondary side of the transformer with a multimeter. The electrician opened the back of the wrong cubicle and inadvertently got on the hot 13.8kV side of the disconnect, which caused a short to ground. No one was injured, although the journeyman electrician and his apprentice at the disconnect were distressed. The short to ground caused some protective relaying to actuate. Breaker PA0209, the feed to the disconnect for XPG105, tripped open. This in turn caused other nonsafety related electrical loads normally fed by PA0209 to automatically transfer to an alternate supply. Two electrical buses that supply power to demineralized water and water treatment equipment failed to transfer as expected. The licensee has written work requests on these bus transfer devices. The licensee formed an Event Review Team shortly after the event to begin the investigation. It appears that the electricians made an error in accessing the hot side of the disconnect, since the tagout and related clearance were written correctly. The licensee's investigation is also considering programmatic improvements which would prevent a similar event in the future. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to follow this issue. Contact: D. Passehl (314)676-3181 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 NOVEMBER 22, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Wolf Creek Nuclear Oper. Corp. MR Number: 4-95-0147 Wolf Creek 1 Date: 11/22/95 Burlington,Kansas SRI Review of Shift Supervisor Logs Dockets: 50-482 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: INADVERTENT TRANSFER OF WATER FROM THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK TO THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK Discussion: On November 21, 1995, at 9:39 a.m., operators received an unexpected automatic makeup of water to the volume control tank (VCT). Subsequent investigation revealed that concurrent VOTES testing of Valve EM HV8807B, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger A, chemical and volume control system (CVCS) to Safety Injection (SI) Pump A downstream isolation, provided an unexpected flowpath from the VCT, through Valve EM HV8807B, SI Pump A, and its recirculation Valve EM HV 8814A, to the refueling water storage tank (RWST). During a 50-minute period when operators had Valve EM HV8807B open for VOTES testing, approximately 200 gallons of water transferred from the VCT to the RWST. Operators promptly diagnosed and isolated the flowpath by shutting Valve EM HV8814A. After closing Valve EM HV8814A with Valve EM HV8807B still open, no water flowed through SI Pump B and its open recirculation Valve EM HV8814B to the RWST. Apparently differences in the Train A and B SI Pump internal clearances allowed flow through SI Pump A but not SI Pump B. The Vice President Plant Operations stopped all in plant VOTES testing pending the development of actions to prevent recurrence. Regional Action: The SRI is monitoring licensee activities. Contact: F. Ringwald (316)364-8653 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 NOVEMBER 22, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-95-0148 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 11/22/95 Richland,Washington Phone Call from Licensee Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: POTENTIAL EXCEEDANCE OF LICENSED THERMAL POWER LIMITS Discussion: As a result of followup of an issue identified at the Nine Mile Point facility, the Supply System has confirmed that they are also affected by a non-conservative thermodynamic heat balance calculation. The bases of the problem is that the heat balance calculation did not account for seal flow to the reactor recirculation pumps and reactor water cleanup pump purge flow (about 12 gpm total). This translates to approximately a 2-3 megawatt (thermal) nonconservative difference. Therefore, the licensee reported that they may have exceeded licensed thermal power limits of 3486 megawatts. The WNP-2 license requires that the exceedance of licensed thermal power limits be reported to the NRC. The licensee documented this problem in a letter to the NRC dated November 21, 1995. Because of previous problems related to feedwater flow testing, reactor power had been reduced by 2.5 percent awaiting further evaluation of the test results. More recent results indicate a deviation of only 1.5 percent in feedwater flow. Therefore, the licensee concludes that the heat balance problem is bounded by the corrective actions taken related to the feedwater flow issue. The licensee intends to correct the heat balance problem when resolving the feedwater flow issue. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 _