Headquarters Daily Report OCTOBER 16, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I OCTOBER 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0131 Indian Point 3 Date: 10/16/95 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: INDIAN POINT 3 ABOVE COLD SHUTDOWN WITH ESF SYSTEMS INOPERABLE Reportable Event Number: 29460 Discussion: At 11:25 a.m. on October 15, 1995, Indian Point 3 was heated up above the cold shutdown condition. At 3:23 p.m., with the plant at 220 degrees F. The licensee's Quality Assurance Department noted that both containment spray pumps and both recirculation pumps were still in Trip Pullout (TPO). Technical specifications required that both trains of containment spray and one train of recirculation be operable prior to exceeding cold shutdown. The control switches for both of the containment spray and recirculation pumps were taken to auto at 3:33 p.m., rendering them operable. The licensee held a critique of this event on the evening of October 15. The operating procedure for plant heatup required that operators verify that at least one train of recirculation and both trains of containment spray were operable prior to exceeding cold shutdown. These steps were completed by the control room supervisor (CRS) and verified by the shift manager (SM) on October 14, 1995. The CRS verified system operability on October 14 based on no outstanding limiting conditions of operation, no outstanding work requests, and a completed equipment checkoff list. The CRS erroneously assumed that steps later in the plant heatup procedure would specifically direct placing the control switches for these pumps in Auto. The licensee plans to hold the plant at the current conditions (220 degrees F) pending the completion of corrective actions. The control room boards have been walked down to verify equipment alignment. No other problems were found. Equipment checkoff lists will be reviewed to ensure that all equipment is properly aligned for plant startup. The plant heatup procedure will be reviewed to ensure that all steps have been properly performed as required. The licensee will evaluate the need for a procedure revision and/or additional operator training to prevent recurrence of this event. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to follow this event. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-95-0128 Cooper 1 Date: 10/16/95 Brownville,Nebraska Licensee notified SRI Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: UNANTICIPATED ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) ACTUATIONS DURING SHUTDOWN FOR SCHEDULED REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: 29457 Discussion: On October 14, 1995, two unanticipated ESF system actuations occurred during shutdown activities at the start of the 1995 refueling outage. The licensee reported each in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (Event Number 29457). At 1:24 a.m., during the scheduled manual scram from 22 percent power, the feed pump control system failed, causing the operating feed pump controller to lock to the current feed pump flow rate. This, coupled with the expected drop in reactor vessel level at the reactor scram, resulted in a drop in level from a normal 35 inches to approximately 10 inches. Initial reports from the licensee indicated that reactor vessel level did not drop below 10 inches. However, the reactor scram and Group II, III and VI isolation associated with a setpoint of 7.81 inches occurred. This resulted in isolating the reactor water cleanup system, the reactor building ventilation system, and the residual heat removal shutdown cooling system penetrations. This was the first ESF actuation. The licensee was not able to immediately recover the feed pump controller, so manually started the RCIC pump to add inventory to the vessel. At 1:55 a.m., the licensee noted that, due to the core decay heat being unexpectedly low, the cooldown rate was approaching the Technical Specification limit of 100 degree F per hour. To limit the cooldown, the licensee closed the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). As a result of the MSIV closure, the reactor level again dropped to approximately 10 inches, causing the same ESF actuations noted above. Subsequent to the event, the licensee determined that operations personnel erroneously understood that decay heat input would be approximately 6 percent of rated thermal power when the actual core condition provided for only approximately 4 percent of rated thermal power. Operators had the turbine bypass valves positioned for the higher expected heat load. After MSIV closure, the cooldown rate was limited, and RCIC continued to add inventory to recover level. One MSIV was then opened to allow continued cooldown using the turbine bypass valves. The licensee continued the cooldown without further incident. The licensee placed the plant on residual heat removal shutdown cooling at 4:04 p.m. and continued with the planned outage schedule. The refueling outage, scheduled to take 55 days, includes work on motor-operated valves, the main turbine, 10-year inservice inspection containment and piping testing and walkdowns, diesel generator air systems modifications, 125/250 volt batteries, safety relief valve vacuum breakers, high pressure core injection system vacuum breaker, and REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 OCTOBER 16, 1995 MR Number: 4-95-0128 (cont.) replacement of 500 feet of the steam extraction line. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are reviewing the control room crew actions and plant parameters associated with the event, as well as the licensee's outage activities and event analysis. Contact: Terry Reis (817)860-8185 _