Headquarters Daily Report NOVEMBER 14, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I NOV. 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0141 Hope Creek 1 Date: 11/13/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN Discussion: On November 10, 1995, at about 1:45 p.m., operators determined that the primary containment was inoperable during a surveillance test of the drywell to suppression chamber bypass leakage in accordance with technical specification 4.6.2.1 (e). During the conduct of the test, operators noticed that one of the drywell-to-torus vacuum breakers momentarily indicated partially open, which plant operators suspect as the cause of the differential pressure test failure. At 2:40 p.m. operators commenced a shutdown of the reactor from about 85 percent power. An Unusual Event was declared in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan due to the technical specification required shutdown. Reactor power was reduced to about 18 percent power and a manual scram was initiated to complete the reactor shutdown at 1:47 a.m. on November 11. The Hope Creek unit was scheduled to begin a plant shutdown to commence the sixth refueling outage at 3:00 p.m. on November 10, 1995. As a result of this planned activity, facility operators commenced cooling down the reactor following the reactor scram in order to commence the refueling outage. The Cold Shutdown condition was achieved at 8:08 p.m. on November 11, at which time the operators terminated the Unusual Event. During the ensuing plant shutdown some problems occurred with plant equipment, such as the Rod Worth Minimizer and neutron monitoring systems; however, operators successfully responded to these conditions. Due to recent poor operating experience at the Hope Creek station, additional management oversight of the control room operators was conducted by station management during the shutdown. Regional Action: The resident inspectors provided around-the-clock coverage during the plant shutdown until a steady-state cold shutdown condition was achieved. The resident inspectors are following licensee actions regarding the equipment problems that occurred during the shutdown. Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 Robert Summers (609)935-3850 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-95-0094 Turkey Point 3 4 Date: 11/14/95 Miami,Florida Dockets: 50-250,50-251 PWR/W-3-LP,PWR/W-3-LP Florida Power & Light Co. Saint Lucie 1 2 Florida Dockets: 50-335,50-389 PWR/CE,PWR/CE Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES Discussion: Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) Chairman and CEO, Mr. J. L. Broadhead announced yesterday, November 13, 1995, that Mr. T. F. Plunkett, will become President of FPL Nuclear Division effective March 1, 1996, upon the retirement of Mr. J. H. Goldberg. Mr. Plunkett will oversee both the Turkey Point and the St. Lucie Sites and the corporate (Juno Beach) nuclear offices. Mr. R. J. Hovey has succeeded Mr. Plunkett as the Turkey Point Site President, effective immediately. The licensee issued a press release. There has been media interest. Regional Action: Resident Inspector followup. Contact: E. LEA (404)331-3641 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duke Power Co. MR Number: 2-95-0095 Catawba 2 Date: 11/14/95 York,South Carolina Dockets: 50-414 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: CATAWBA INVENTORY REDUCTION Discussion: On November 7, 1995, after refueling Unit 2, the reactor coolant system was being maintained in reduced inventory at 8.5 percent level (approximately 5 inches above the top of the hot leg) for steam generator nozzle dam removal and reactor coolant pump seal work. In addition, two check valves in the alternate charging line were scheduled for repair of bonnet leaks identified during the current refueling outage inspections. The check valves are unisolable from the reactor coolant system. A high point vent exists in the line between the check valves and the reactor coolant system penetration into the top of the "D" cold leg. The high point vent valve was opened and its associated pipe cap was removed, then the bonnet of the check valve adjacent to the reactor coolant system was opened with four bolts remaining in place to control expected drainage. The high point vent did not break the siphon effect as expected (damaged vent valve internals and/or sealant material in vent line from previous pipe cap leak repair) and draining of the reactor coolant system was inadvertently initiated at approximately 1 to 2 gpm. Control room operators recognized the reduction in inventory. In response, the operators controlled level by inventory additions and initiated actions to back out of the valve work in a timely fashion. The licensee estimated that a total of approximately 500 gallons of reactor coolant was drained. This event did not result in a challenge to maintaining residual heat removal. Had the operators not made inventory additions, the drain path would have terminated itself when the level in the reactor coolant system had dropped below the top of the loop piping, allowing air into the line, and breaking the siphon. Recognizing the importance of positive inventory control during reduced reactor coolant system operations, licensee management initiated a Significant Event Investigation Team (SEIT). The team was led by the Manager, Nuclear Assessment and Issues, and had members from Catawba, McGuire and the General Office. Preliminary recommendations of areas for improvement included the following: emergent work control process; shutdown risk programs for activities which can affect risk other than systems availability; management expectations to foster a culture which supports a questioning attitude; strengthening of operations ownership and control (including status of leak repaired components); and addition of this event to operations continuing training. REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 NOVEMBER 14, 1995 MR Number: 2-95-0095 (cont.) Regional Action: Followup: The licensee is conducting SEIT. The Resident Inspectors are reviewing the results. Contact: R. V. Crlenjak (404)331-5506 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 NOVEMBER 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-95-0171 Advanced Medical Systems (Ams) Date: 11/08/95 Cleveland,Ohio AND 11/14/95 BY TELEPHONE Dockets: 03016055 License No: 34-19089-01 Subject: WATER PROBLEMS AT ADVANCED MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. Discussion: On November 8, 1995, an attorney for the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (NEORSD) contacted Region III to inform NRC that AMS planned to release 3,000 gallons of run-off water, collected from underground drains and retained in a holding tank, onto AMS' parking lot. The attorney from NEORSD requested that NRC take action to block AMS' release of the water to the parking lot, arguing that the water would eventually enter the NEORSD sewer system. It is AMS' responsibility to sample and document the results of sample analysis to demonstrate compliance with Part 20 limits. According to AMS, a sample of the water was analyzed by their contract laboratory and cobalt-60 was not detected in the sample. The minimum detectable activity for the sample analysis was 6 picocuries per liter, which is orders of magnitude less than the Part 20 limits. Therefore, AMS' release of this water is not prohibited by NRC regulations, and, following discussions with NMSS and OGC, NRC staff does not intend to take action to block the release. However, on November 13, 1995, attorneys from the NEORSD went to court and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order which prohibits AMS from releasing the 3,000 gallons of water onto its parking lot. On November 9, 1995, AMS requested that the City of Cleveland restore its water service, which was shut off months ago. Initially, this request was denied, but later AMS was told that the service would be restored by Monday, November 13, 1995. As of Tuesday, November 14, 1995, the service has not been restored. According to AMS, the water service is necessary in order for the building heating system to operate, which is needed to prevent pipes for the fire suppression system, etc., from freezing. This information is current as of 8:00 a.m. (CDT) November 14, 1995. Contact: JOHN MADERA (708)829-9834 MICHAEL WEBER (708)892-9825 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 NOVEMBER 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-95-0141 Cooper 1 Date: 11/14/95 Brownville,Nebraska Licensee Notified Senior Resident Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: CONFIGURATION CONTROL CONCERNS WITH SAFETY RELATED MOTOR OPERATED VALVES SUPPLIED BY ANCHOR DARLING Discussion: On November 9, and in a teleconference on November 14, 1995, the licensee informed the NRC of a developing issue concerning configuration control of safety-related valves supplied by Anchor Darling. As the result of valve modification and refurbishment work occurring during the ongoing outage, the licensee noticed a number of instances in which parts supplied by Anchor Darling did not conform with the existing valve configurations installed in the plant. The licensee began an investigation into these discrepancies by inspecting in-house documentation and auditing records held by Anchor Darling. Anchor Darling maintains the QA records for configurations and limiting component calculations for the valves they supply to Cooper. In its investigation, the licensee identified that records retained by Anchor Darling did not reflect the installed configurations at Cooper. Examples of discrepancies found were (1) general arrangement drawings that did not agree with "piece-parts" drawings; (2) limiting component analyses that did not represent installed component sizes; and (3) material strength assumptions used in limiting component analyses with no material traceability documentation. The discrepancies appear to be limited to fasteners associated with the yoke to bonnet configuration. Anchor Darling valves are not limited to Cooper's GL 89-10 program; however, 38 of 84 valves in that program are Anchor Darling valves. To date, the licensee has completed a walkdown of all but five Anchor Darling Division 1 valves. The remaining five will be completed by Friday. The licensee plans to perform a walkdown of all Division 2 valves, as well. Anchor Darling is reviewing the as-built field data from the CNS walkdown, the general arrangement drawings, "piece-parts" drawings, shop drawings, and limiting component analyses of all valves for which they maintain QA records for Cooper, to identify any other discrepancies. The licensee is evaluating this issue for 10 CFR Part 21 reportability. Anchor Darling has initiated an internal review for identifying and correcting potential safety issues. Regional Action: Region IV will review the licensee's corrective actions to ensure the licensee has sufficiently bounded the configuration control concerns and their impact on component operability. Contact: T. Reis (817)860-8185 _