Headquarters Daily Report SEPTEMBER 12, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEP. 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0115 Fitz Patrick 1 Date: 09/08/95 Lycoming,New York SRI/PC Dockets: 50-333 BWR/GE-4 Subject: FOLLOWUP ON REACTOR SCRAM, PN1-9534 Reportable Event Number: 29294 Discussion: On September 5, 1995, at 1:03 p.m., a reactor scram and group II isolation occurred from 100 percent power due to low reactor water level. The low reactor water level occurred when the speed of both reactor feedwater pumps began decreasing due to a personnel error. In preparation for replacing a primary containment isolation system switch, licensed reactor operators pulled the wrong fuse resulting in the reactor feedwater control system malfunction, and subsequent lowering of reactor vessel water level. Initial information reported in Preliminary Notification 1-95-34 was that a valve in one train of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system did not operate. Subsequent review showed that the SBGT system initiated as designed; however, an operator isolated, one train subsequent to SBGT initiation. The reasons for the operator's actions are under review. As a result of the scram, in conjunction with the recirculation pump trips, temperatures in the bottom head of the reactor dropped low enough such that the non-nuclear heatup and cooldown pressure - temperature (P-T) curve in the technical specifications (TS) was exceeded. Analysis indicates that the P-T limits for the bottom head were not exceeded because the bottom head curve is less restrictive than the more conservative P-T curves included in TS, which were developed to bound the conditions for the entire reactor vessel. The licensee also concluded that the 100 degree per hour heatup and cooldown limits for the bottom head were exceeded during recovery from the scram. The heatup rates observed during the event are bounded by previous analysis. The plant went critical late in the evening on September 11, 1995, and is currently in power accension. Outage maintenance has been completed including replacement of one of two station batteries and three safety relief valve assemblies. Analysis of the event by the licensee is continuing. Regional Action: Resident inspectors are continuing their review and following outage related activities. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 Gordon Hunegs (914)739-9360 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 SEPTEMBER 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0117 Three Mile Island 1 Date: 09/12/95 Middletown,Pennsylvania SRI PC Dockets: 50-289 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: SHUTDOWN PROBLEMS OF INTEREST Discussion: The Three Mile Island 1 plant was shutdown for its scheduled refueling and maintenance outage on September 9, 1995. Two problems of interest have occurred as discussed below. As reported in EN 29312, the licensee discovered a nonisolable leak in the RCS, located on one of the 2-inch cold legs drain lines of the A steam generator. The leak was originally thought to be in the heat affected zone of a weld on an elbow of a drain line. Further investigation has revealed that the leak was in the weld material, and resulted from thermal induced cycle fatigue. The licensee reported a 9/16-inch crack on the outside of the pipe and a 2-inch crack on the inside of the drainline. Both welds on the elbow for the similarly designed drain line locations were radiographed, no other cracks were identified. The licensee is continuing to review and develop corrective actions for this problem. Following the control rods drop time testing during reactor shutdown, seven control rod drives exceeded the TS drop time criteria of 1.66 seconds. The licensee had previously identified that this problem was caused by corrosion deposits on the thermal barrier ball check valves. Of the seven rods exceeding the TS criteria, four had exceeded the criteria in March 1994, the other three had never exceeded the criteria. An additional 15 rods had times equal to or greater than 1.45 seconds, which is a cut off drop time for the licensee to consider replacement of the thermal barrier. The licensee had planned to replace up to 24 thermal barriers this outage as part of their long term corrective actions program. Regional Action: The residents are following these issues as well as other outage activities. Contact: Eben Conner (610)337-5399 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 SEPTEMBER 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0112 Arkansas Nuclear 1 Date: 09/12/95 Russelville,Arkansas Phone Call from Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-313 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: SERVICE AIR SYSTEM CONTAMINATION Discussion: At approximately 8 p.m. (CDT) on September 11, 1995, a Unit 1 auxiliary operator noted that an unusually large amount of water was discharged while draining the service air system receiver. Health physics personnel sampled the water and noted that the water was contaminated to approximately 1,000 dpm. Chemistry samples indicated that isotopes associated with spent resin (e.g., Co-60, Cs-134) were present in the water. The licensee determined that earlier in the day, the Unit 2 operators were transferring resin and the transfer line became clogged. The operators attempted to clear the line using Unit 1 service air system pressure and the resin sluice pump. Water was injected into the service air system when the sluice pump was used because the discharge pressure of the pump was greater than the pressure in the service air system. The licensee estimated that approximately 25 percent of the service air system became contaminated. The service air system is presently depressurized and the licensee is installing tags to prevent use of the system. The licensee is performing surveys to determine the extent and magnitude of the contamination. The instrument air and breathing air systems were not affected since the crosstie valve between these systems and the service air system was closed. The licensee is developing a plan to purge and flush the system. No personnel contaminations have occurred due to this event and the licensee posted the areas known to be contaminated. Regional Action: Region Action: A radiation specialist, currently on site performing a routine inspection, will followup on this issue. Contact: P. Harrell (817)860-8250 T. Reis (817)860-8185 _