Headquarters Daily Report SEPTEMBER 05, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS SEP. 05, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0117 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 95-37, "Inadequate Offsite Power System Voltages during Design-Basis Events," dated September 7, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to circumstances that could result in inadequate offsite power system voltages during design-basis events. Technical contacts: James Lazevnick, NRR (301) 415-2782 Thomas Koshy, NRR (301) 415-1176 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-95-0074 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Date: 09/05/95 Columbia,South Carolina Dockets: 07001151 License No: SNM-1107 URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Subject: SMALL FIRE IN URANIUM CONTAINER Reportable Event Number: 29284 Discussion: At about 4:45 p.m. on September 1, while in the process of shutting down conversion operations, an operator noted a polypack located inside an enclosure on Line Number 2 was smoldering. A few minutes later a small flame-up occurred. (The polypack receives hot uranium dioxide powder from a calciner and fitzmill.) Operators used cleaning rags to smother the fire. No other polypacks were involved. There were no exposures to workers or releases to the environment. The level measuring device (criticality control) remained intact. After the uranium dioxide in the polypack had cooled, the operators removed it, repackaged it into different polypacks, and completed the Line Number 2 shutdown. The licensee has formed an investigation team to review the event and determine corrective actions. Initial indications are that oxygen (air) somehow entered the containment, possibly either through a faulty seal between the fitzmill and the polypack or through a hole in the fitzmill chute, causing the powder to oxidize and melt the polypack container. Line Number 2 will remain shutdown until the investigation team has determined the cause and corrective actions have been taken. Because the other conversion lines at the facility were not affected by this event, the licensee resumed operation of those lines during third shift on September 5. Regional Action: Region II will continue to followup on this event until the cause is determined and corrective actions are taken. Contact: Craig Bassett (404)331-5570 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-95-0150 North Star Steel Company Date: 09/01/95 Youngstown,Ohio TELECON FROM THE LICENSEE Dockets: 03018258 License No: 34-20328-01 Subject: GAUGE DAMAGED BY MOLTEN STEEL Reportable Event Number: 29277 Discussion: North Star Steel Company notified Region III on 9/1/95 of an incident involving a gauging device containing one curie (37 GBq) of cesium-137 used for measuring liquid steel levels at the licensee's facility. On 8/27/95, molten steel spilled over the top of the gauge, melting the lead shielding contained in the gauge. Licensee survey measurements near the surface of the damaged gauge indicated approximately 830 mRem/hr (8.3 mSv/hr). The radiation level at a distance of approximately 3 feet away from the gauge was 50 mRem/hr (0.5 mSv/hr). The licensee moved the damaged gauge to a secured area and roped off the area where radiation levels exceeded 2 mRem/hr (0.02 mSv/hr). On 8/31/95, the gauge manufacturer (Ronan Engineering Company) removed the cesium-137 source from the gauge and placed it in a 55 gallon drum filled with sand. The drum was secured in a locked and posted room. According to representatives from Ronan Engineering, the source was intact and there was no evidence of leakage or contamination. A licensed waste broker plans to retrieve the source on 9/5/95 for disposal. The licensee reported the event to the NRC Operations Center on 9/1/95. Regional Action: Region III dispatched an inspector to the licensee's facility on 9/5/95 to review the incident and the licensee's actions. NMSS and the State of Ohio were informed of this incident. Contact: B. J. HOLT (708)829-9836 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consumers Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0151 Palisades 1 Date: 09/05/95 Covert,Michigan RIII LAN Dockets: 50-255 PWR/CE Subject: UNIT TAKEN OFF LINE TO PEFORM SWITCHYARD REPAIRS Discussion: On August 29, 1995, while conducting thermography testing in the switchyard, the licensee identified high resistance or "hot spots" on two phases of a motor-operated disconnect (MOD). The hot spot temperature was 120 degrees C above ambient on one phase. The licensee initiated a power reduction to 50 percent on August 30, bringing the temperature to less than 53 degrees C above ambient (the vendor's recommended temperature limit for continuous operation). While at 82 percent power, governor valve No. 2 failed closed due to loss of feedback signal. Operators successfully responded to the power mismatch transient using control rod motion. Troubleshooting identified a broken connection at the lug in the terminal junction box. At 9:48 p.m. on September 2, the licensee continued to reduce power and at 2:08 a.m. on September 2 the licensee took the main generator offline to perform repairs to the MOD. The licensee completed the necessary repairs and returned the unit to service on September 2, 1995. Regional Action: The resident inspectors were onsite to monitor the power reduction, repairs, and power escalation. Contact: M. E. PARKER (616)764-8971 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0105 Arkansas Nuclear 1 2 Date: 09/05/95 Russelville,Arkansas Telecon with SRI Dockets: 50-313,50-368 PWR/B&W-L-LP,PWR/CE Subject: LOSS OF POWER TO THE POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM Discussion: During a thunderstorm, an individual observed that smoke was coming from the PASS building. The fire brigade responded and identified that the source of the smoke was the breaker that supplies power to the motor-control center (MCC) in the PASS building. Subsequent investigation by the licensee determined that a roof leak allowed water to seep into the breaker cubicle and cause a short. The MCC is normally supplied power from Unit 1 and, when the fault occurred, the power supply for the MCC automatically shifted to Unit 2 and the supply breaker also failed because the electrical fault in the MCC still existed. As a result of the loss of all power to the MCC, power was lost to: (1) all PASS components, (2) four radiation monitors (grab sampling was initiated as specified by the Technical Specifications), (3) Unit 1 seismic monitor, (4) hydrogen/ oxygen analyzer for the waste gas system, and (5) the solonoid-operated valve used for sampling the reactor coolant system. The licensee implemented a temporary modification to provide alternate power to the solenoid-operated valve so sampling of the reactor coolant system could be performed as required by the Technical Specifications. The licensee is in the process of permanently repairing and/or replacing the defective and/or damaged equipment. Regional Action: Routine followup will be performed by the resident inspectors. Contact: P. H. Harrell (817)860-8250 T. Reis (817)860-8185 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0106 Arkansas Nuclear 2 Date: 09/05/95 Russelville,Arkansas Phone Call from Senior Res. Insp. Dockets: 50-368 PWR/CE Subject: REACTOR TRIP Reportable Event Number: 29289 Discussion: This morning report provides an update to Event Notification Number 29289. During a reactor startup, an auxiliary reactor trip is enabled at 17 percent reactor power such that, if axial shape index exceeds plus/minus 0.5 on two of the four core protection calculator (CPC) channels, a reactor trip will occur. The licensee determined that during the reactor startup on September 2, an automatic trip occurred because the axial shape index was greater than -0.5 on two of four CPC channels when reactor power reached 17 percent. The licensee's posttransient review report indicated that during the startup, operators maintained reactor power too close to the enable setpoint for the auxiliary trip, did not place enough emphasis on monitoring the power indication that enables the trip, and were not aggressive enough in controlling axial shape index. The licensee recommenced the reactor startup and achieved criticality on September 3. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are continuing to followup on this event. Contact: P. H. Harrell (817)860-8250 _