Headquarters Daily report AUGUST 24, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST 24, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0116 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation," dated August 28, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to conditions that may degrade the ability of the steam generators to remove decay heat by natural circulation of the reactor coolant in Mode 5, cold shutdown. Technical Contact: Brian R. Bonser, RII (706) 554-9901 NRC Information Notice 95-36, " Potential Problems With Post-Fire Emergency Lighting," dated August 29, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to potential problems regarding emergency lighting for plant areas needed for operation of post-fire safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. Technical contacts: D. Oudinot, NRR (301) 415-3731 Neal K. Hunemuller, NRR (301) 415-1152 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 24, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-95-0107 Millstone 3 Date: 08/24/95 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-423 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MILLSTONE UNIT 3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PROBLEMS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Millstone 3 continues to pursue resolution of problems in their Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System. The system consists of 2 motor-driven and 1 turbine-driven AFW pumps. The turbine-driven pump has a history of either slow starts or overspeed trips. Excessive condensate has been present in the steam supply lines to the turbine due to valve leakage, and previous attempts to correct the steam drains have not been effective. The licensee has formed a review group to evaluate the problem, research industry experience, develop a testing program and a final resolution. System testing has demonstrated that system operability can be maintained by manually blowing down the steam and condensate lines at least once per shift. This interim corrective action is ongoing while plans are being developed to replace all the applicable steam traps (replacement scheduled to occur within the next 10 days). The second system problem has been persistent backleakage of the AFW check valves, resulting in heating of the AFW piping from the steam generators back to the containment penetration. The check valves are Anchor-Darling floating disc valves. Increased temperature monitoring, including installation of temperature readouts, has been implemented to ensure system operability. Additionally, frequent running of an AFW pump to cool the piping and penetrations (critical component) has at times been necessary. A recent repair of one of the discharge check valves has been successful at slowing the heatup rate and reducing the AFW pump start frequency to about once per week. The licensee has been tracking and evaluating the effects of additional AFW pump starts on the system. Additional interim corrective actions being evaluated include installation of a "metering pump" to provide a continuous low flow through the system and thus alleviate the need for increased starts on the AFW pump. Long-term actions involve replacing the check valves with a different design. Regional Action: Resident Followup Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II AUGUST 24, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: General Electric Co. MR Number: 2-95-0073 General Electric Co. Date: 08/24/95 Wilmington,North Carolina Dockets: 07001113 License No: SNM-1097 URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Subject: UPDATE - LOSS OF TWO CRITICALITY MONITORS Reportable Event Number: 29223 Discussion: The licensee's investigation determined several problems which contributed to the loss of the nuclear criticality monitors on August 20, 1995. First, the monitor input/output package was improperly wired into the electrical breaker which was used for superheaters in the chemical conversion area. This caused the monitors to drop off-line when the breaker position was moved by the operator while attempting to start the superheater. The licensee has corrected the wiring and is reviewing other work to look for potential problems. The licensee is also reviewing their configuration control modifications process to ensure adequate controls. The licensee believes this was an isolated case caused by the failure of an engineer to check the work of a contractor. Another problem was that the discharge valves opened without the monitors coming back on-line when power was restored to the system. There was a problem in the computer software that didn't hold the valves closed in this situation. To correct this, the licensee has installed and tested new breakers in the power circuits for six monitors in the fluoride waste systems and will install them for seven other monitors in the plant. These breakers lock open on loss of power, which causes the valves to remain closed. Positive operator action is required to close the breaker. The licensee has received revised software from the monitor vendor but will not install it until it has been reviewed and verified to be satisfactory. Even if the new software is installed, the breakers will remain in place as a positive physical control on the circuits. Also, the licensee prepared a new procedure for restarting the system anytime the breakers open. This is in addition to the existing procedure for the approval to restart a system after a monitor trips or fails. Based on the actions taken by the licensee and the independent review by a Region II inspector, Region II (with the concurrence of NMSS) advised the licensee on August 22 that there were no objections to restarting the chemical process lines. The licensee began startup operations on process line 2 on the midnight shift. Regional Action: A regional inspector is on site and is continuing to follow the licensee's actions and observe testing and startup operations. Contact: G. L. TROUP (404)331-5566