Headquarters Daily report AUGUST 17, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consolidated Edison Co. Of N.Y. MR Number: 1-95-0103 New York Power Authority Date: 08/17/95 Indian Point 2 3 SRI/PC Buchanan,New York Dockets: 50-247,50-286 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: SHARING OF CON EDISON AND NYPA RESOURCES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Con Edison and NYPA have issued a notice to all site and corporate support personnel associated with the Indian point Station directing them to carry out a consolidation of resources and functions in the following areas: Security General Employee Training Access Control Fitness for Duty Warehousing and Materials Management Quality Assurance Audits Radiation Dosimetry Maintenance of portable radiation monitors Training Emergency Preparedness The memo further states that efforts have been initiated to collocate the engineering organizations in a common facility at the site, and that management information system specialists have been directed to open up communication and information channels between the two facilities. The memorandum was signed by L. M. Hill, NYPA Site Executive Officer and S. E. Quinn, Con Edison Vice President of Nuclear Power. Regional Action: Region I will follow the consolidation activities through the routine inspection program. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0140 Dresden 2 3 Date: 08/16/95 Morris,Illinois RESIDENT INSPECTOR VIA LAN. Dockets: 50-237,50-249 BWR/GE-3,BWR/GE-3 Subject: PERSONNEL CHANGES IN RADIATION PROTECTION (RP) AND ENGINEERING DEPARTMENTS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 16, 1995, the licensee announced that all six of the first line RP shift supervisors were replaced. The supervisors were replaced by contractors and utility loanees until permanent replacements were found. This change was due to a series of recent RP events which illustrated low performance standards within the current RP organization. The licensee also announced that all ten system engineering first line supervisor positions were being opened for "rebid." Although this does not preclude the incumbents from being reselected, the intent is to select the most qualified candidates. The incumbents will continue to act as supervisors until the changes are completed. The licensee plans to provide management overview during the radiation protection department transition. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's overview of the transitions. Contact: P.L. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0141 La Salle 1 Date: 08/16/95 Marseilles,Illinois SIR VIA TELEPHONE Dockets: 50-373 BWR/GE-5 Subject: MSIV ISOLATION AND REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION Reportable Event Number: 29206 Discussion: At 8:06 pm on 8/16/95, with the reactor at 100 percent power, an out put breaker for the 1B RPS MG set tripped open when the Electrical Power Monitoring Assembly (EPMA) tripped for unknown reasons. This caused several half scram signals, half containment isolation signals, and some full containment isolation signals. The significant isolation was on reactor building ventilation (VR). Operators immediately installed jumpers in the MSIV room high temperature isolation circuit per their abnormal operating procedures to prevent a high temperature isolation. However, at 8:13 pm an MSIV isolation on high room temperature and subsequent reactor scram occurred. All rods fully inserted, four SRVs lifted, and vessel level dropped to -30 inches before the reactor was stabilized shortly thereafter. Operators entered three EOPs on reactor level and pressure, primary containment (suppression pool level and temperature) and secondary containment (room temperatures). Several components did not function as designed or complicated the event. One SRM channel failed at the time of the scram. Another failed four hours after the scram. Combined with a third channel previously out for maintenance, only one SRM was available. The SRM out for maintenance was returned to service at 3:00 am, and currently two SRMs are available. The ATWS and ARI (alternate rod insertion) systems for DIV I actuated and tripped off the reactor recirculation pumps. However, neither reactor pressure nor level reached the trip setpoints for those systems. Four IRMs were inoperable before the event and upon entry into Mode 3 required that the A RPS channel remain tripped. Two of those IRMs have been returned to service. The operators subsequently started a cooldown to 400 psig. As of 7:00 am on 8/17/95 the reactor was at 590 psig. The length of time the unit will remain shutdown has not been determined. Initial troubleshooting indicated that a slave relay downstream of the VR jumper may have been already tripped when the jumper was installed. This combined with a second temperature channel, which may have tripped early, to cause the MSIV isolation. The abnormal operating procedure did not contain any guidance to verify that the slave relay was reset after the jumpers were installed. The SRI was notified of this event at 11:00 pm, responded to the site, and monitored recovery actions. During discussions with the SRI, the licensee concluded that the ATWS trip of the recirculation pump should not have occurred and that the statement in the 50.72 report, that no other unusual problems were noted during the trip, was incorrect. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the licensee's investigation. The Region will coordinate agency response with Headquarters. Contact: B. CLAYTON (708)829-9602 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Union Electric Co. MR Number: 3-95-0142 Callaway 1 Date: 08/16/95 Fulton,Missouri RI BY PHONE Dockets: 50-483 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANT TRIP Reportable Event Number: 29205 Discussion: At 9:43 a.m. on August 16, 1995, the main turbine tripped on condenser low vacuum. Since the unit was above 48 percent power, the reactor also tripped. All systems responded as required. The "A" circulating water pump tripped when a rheostat in its exciter failed. This resulted in the low vacuum condition. The turbine has an automatic runback feature on a loss of a circulating water pump. When this occurred, the main steam dumps to the condenser opened. The steam dumps should have closed when back pressure in the condenser reached seven inches Hg absolute. However, the two pressure switches that controlled this function had drifted high. This allowed condenser back pressure to continue to increase towards the turbine trip setpoint of 7.5 inches Hg absolute. There were three pressure switches in the main turbine's condenser high back pressure trip circuit. One of them had failed, which reduced the number required to trip the turbine from two to one. The open steam dumps, loss of a circulating water pump, and failed pressure switch all contributed to the turbine trip. The licensee repaired and recalibrated the various pressure switches and replaced the rheostat for the circulating water pump. At 3:39 a.m. on August 17, 1995, the unit was returned to service. Regional Action: Information only. Contact: T.M. TONGUE (708)829-9613 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: United States Enrichment Corporation MR Number: 3-95-0143 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Date: 08/16/95 Paducah,Kentucky TELEPHONE CALL FROM SRI Dockets: 07007001 Subject: UNPLANNED MAJOR LOAD DROP Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 1:40 p.m. (CDT) on 08/16/95, the Paducah plant was notified that its two major power suppliers had declared a power system emergency. As a result, the plant was given 20 minutes within which to drop its load from 850 to 575 megawatts. The plant tripped off approximately one third of its operating cascade equipment in order to accomplish the power reduction. This action was necessitated by the time limits for the load shed and due to the plant's inability to shift inventory as a result of previous planned load reductions. Issues raised by the prompt and potentially long lasting load reduction included criticality safety of the material in the isolated portions of the cascade, long term stability of the cascade, and out-gassing of the isolated equipment over time due to air in-leakage. Plant management was aware of each of the issues as the load reduction was implemented and had begun development of action plans to ensure continued safe operations. The gaseous diffusion plant is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy. The NRC has resident inspectors at the Paducah facility in preparation for the NRC assuming regulatory jurisdiction over the site. Regional Action: The NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards and Region II have been notified. The Senior Resident Inspector was onsite and following management's response actions in cooperation with the Department of Energy Site Safety Representatives. Contact: GARY L. SHEAR (708)829-9876 KEN O'BRIEN (502)442-7118