Headquarters Daily report AUGUST 10, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST 10, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0113 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-32, "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame Spread Test Results," dated August 10, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the results of the NRC flame spread tests of Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier panels. Technical contact: Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 NRC Information Notice 95-10, Supplement 2, "Potential for Loss of Automatic Engineered Safety Features Actuation," dated August 11, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice supplement to alert addressees to the changes that the licensee for the Salem nuclear power plant has made to surveillance and maintenance practices for the solid-state protection system (SSPS) logic matrix power supplies. These modifications were made in response to problems the licensee encountered while attempting to alter an aspect of the design of the SSPS for both units. The modifications were being made to correct a design deficiency that had the potential for causing the loss of the automatic actuation function of the engineered safety features (ESF) as a result of electrical faults in non-Class 1E input signals. Technical contacts: Cliff Doutt, NRR (301) 415-2847 E. Nick Fields, NRR (301) 415-1173 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-95-0100 Millstone 2 Date: 08/10/95 Waterford,Connecticut Dockets: 50-336 PWR/CE Subject: MILLSTONE UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIP AND HEATER DRAIN TANK RECIRCULATION LINE RUPTURE Reportable Event Number: 29169 Discussion: On August 8, 1995, while the plant was operating at 80% power, seal leakage on the "A" heater drain pump was experienced, with some leakage on the "B" pump seal. The "A" pump was removed from service for repair. The decision was made to reduce power to 60% and take both pumps out of service for repair. At 60% power, the "B" pump was secured, and concurrent with loud noises believed to be check valve cycling, a rupture in the "A" heater drain tank recirculation line occurred. A plant equipment operator reported the line failure and the decision was made to trip the unit and close the MSIV to stop the steam. No personnel injuries occurred during this event. Resident inspector observation of the event recovery noted no operator performance issues. The rupture is approximately 15" in length and axially oriented in an 8" diameter vertical run of carbon steel pipe. The nominal wall thickness of the pipe is .322"; in the area of the rupture, the minimum value measured was .041". The piping is in the erosion/corrosion program, yet its wall thickness never verified since its predicted average wear rate was 4.9 mils/yr with a flow rate of 1.6 ft/sec. The design pressure is 150 psig at 400F; normal operating pressure is 95 psig at 336F. The failure occurred a few inches downstream of a normally closed block valve. When the reactor was tripped and the MSIV closed, the steam generator dump valves opened and one steam generator safety valve popped and remained open for about 5 minutes. The licensee is evaluating performance of the safety valves. About 12 hours after the trip, the plant was in mode 3 and controlling pressure by modulating the atmospheric steam dump valves. The dump valve on the No. 2 steam generator went from partially open (about 25%) to full open for no apparent reason. Initial troubleshooting indicated an instrument controller problem. The primary system was at 534F and cooled to 484F, which is well within the 80F TS cooldown limit. The operators initiated an emergency boration to ensure adequate shutdown margin. NNECo initiated a post trip review team and a comprehensive root cause analysis to evaluate the event. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will cover the resolution of these problems, and NNECo has committed to hold a conference call with the NRC staff before returning to power. A region based specialist has been dispatched to monitor the possible erosion/corrosion aspects of this event. Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II AUGUST 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: General Electric Co. MR Number: 2-95-0069 General Electric Co. Date: 08/10/95 Wilmington,North Carolina Dockets: 07001113 License No: SNM-1097 URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Subject: URANYL NITRATE PERMEATED FLOORING MATERIAL Reportable Event Number: 29176 Discussion: On August 9, 1995, General Electric Co. reported, pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01, that uranyl nitrate had penetrated into the "Corocrete" drainage berm underneath each of three cross flow filters in the Uranium Recovery Unit (URU) area. This was noted when the licensee was resurfacing the floor in that area. Preliminary sample analysis indicated that the uranium content of the corocrete material was approximately 9.3 percent by weight in the worst affected areas. The area of the drainage berm was approximately 3.5 feet wide by 27.7 feet long under each filter. Average thickness of uranium contamination was estimated to be 2.5 inches which is significantly less than the critical infinite slab thickness for the maximum authorized enrichment of 5.0 percent. The licensee's initial estimate of less than 75 kilograms (kgs) of uranium in each drainage berm was later revised to approximately 45-50 kgs based upon further analysis. All the corocrete which showed the presence of uranyl nitrate (yellow color) was placed in 3-gallon cans and stored in a specified location. The corocrete which was not yellow in color was placed in a large wooden box which was surveyed as it was filled. The licensee is in the process of determining other areas where corocrete and similar materials were used in the facility. Those areas will be sampled and analyzed to determine whether any intrusion of uranium has occurred. The licensee will prioritize the removal of affected material and will install the appropriate concrete or other material. The licensee plans to remove all the corocrete found. Regional Action: Region II will followup on the incident during the next inspection. Contact: Craig Bassett (404)331-5570 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Illinois Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0134 Clinton 1 Date: 08/10/95 Clinton,Illinois SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-461 BWR/GE-6 Subject: CORPORATE MANAGEMENT CHANGES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 9, 1995, company Chairman Larry Haab announced several reassignments among corporate management due to early retirements of Charlie Wells and Larry Idleman. To NRC, the most relevant change is Mr. Wells' replacement because the onsite Vice President, John Cook, reports to that position. Effective September 1, 1995, Larry Brodsky will replace Mr. Wells as Senior Vice President and Business Group Leader for Energy Supply. Mr. Brodsky was Clinton Plant Manager during early construction days and was a Navy Officer prior to joining the company. David W. Butts will become Senior Vice President and Business Group Leader for Support Services (Mr. Brodsky's previous position). Alec G. Dreyer will become President of Illinova Generating, replacing Mr. Butts. The retirements will be effective January 1, 1996. Regional Action: N/A Contact: B. CLAYTON (708)829-9602