Headquarters Daily report JULY 20, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION JULY 20, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0110 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT Subject: CONTAINMENT BYPASS PATH The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on July 18, 1995, classified the containment bypass path that existed at Braidwood, Unit 2, from November 1994 to February 1995, as a Significant Event. The classification was based upon a degradation of reactor coolant system containment. On November 9, 1994, the licensee completed a containment integrated leak rate test (ILRT). For this test, the 1/4 inch containment penetration hydrogen sensing lines for both trains were disconnected and a balloon placed on the end to identify any leakage. The procedure did not specify whether to disconnect the sensing line inside the hydrogen monitor cabinet or outside. The operators who lined up the test disconnected the lines inside the cabinet. The licensee's investigation concluded that when other operators restored the system from the test, they observed the exterior sensing lines were connected and assumed that the internal lines were reconnected. Therefore, the sensing lines remained disconnected inside the cabinet. On January 31, 1995, the operations department wrote a problem identification report to identify a growing difference in the H2 readings on the A and B trains which are taken on a shiftly basis. On February 15, 1995, during troubleshooting, the A train internal lines were found to be disconnected, approximately three months after being disconnected. Surveillance tests performed on December 11, 1994, and January 13, 1995, provided opportunities to detect the deficiency with the A train but were missed. It could not be conclusively determined when the B train was restored. Two maintenance workers had a recollection of discovering balloons on the sensing lines in a hydrogen monitoring cabinet in late 1994. Maintenance records indicate these individuals worked on the B train on December 19, 1995. However, computer and operator logs for the B train appear to have been accurately reading containment hydrogen following the ILRT. The H2 monitors are normally isolated. However, during a loss of coolant accident, the Emergency Operating Procedures direct the operators to put them in service to monitor containment hydrogen concentration. This would create an unfiltered release path from the containment to the auxiliary building. The licensee calculated that 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines would be exceeded within three hours with both monitors disconnected and within five hours with only one monitor disconnected. There are area radiation monitors near the H2 monitors and radiation monitors in the auxiliary building exhaust that would assist the operators in identifying that a leak was present. Escalated enforcement was exercised on this issue and the licensee was assessed a $100,000 civil penalty. Thus, the significance of the degradation of the containment, the length of time it existed, and the repetitive opportunities the utility had to discover this condition, provided the basis for the panel to determine that this was a significant event. CONTACT: John Tappert, NRR/DOPS/OECB (301) 415-1167 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JULY 20, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consolidated Edison Co. Of N.Y. MR Number: 1-95-0093 Indian Point 2 Date: 07/20/95 Buchanan,New York Dockets: 50-247 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: UNPLANNED RELEASE OF CONTAMINATED LIQUID Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On July 18, 1995, at 2:10 p.m., an unplanned radiological liquid discharge occurred through the Indian Point 2 discharge canal into the Hudson River. The liquid release was approximately 2400 gallons with a total radiological content of 2.5E-4 Curies. The sequence of events leading to the discharge is as follows. Following the removal of a protective tagout on the level control system for the water tank that supplies the diesel fire pump, a malfunction in this system caused the fill valve from the city water system to the water tank to automatically open. This caused the tank to fill up and overflow, a condition that lasted for 15 minutes until corrected by plant personnel. The tank overflow which was uncontaminated water, went into the site's storm drain system and some of the water entered the Unit 1 curtain drain system, which is currently contaminated. The drain path from the curtain drain system used to be to the discharge canal, but this path is currently isolated and instead, a temporary leakage path to a 55 gallon drum located in the annulus area (the area between the Unit 1 steel containment and concrete superstructure) is used. The water flowing into the curtain drain system caused the 55 gallon drum to overflow into the annulus area and then, through a series of drainage pathways, the water was discharged through the site's discharge canal. The initially uncontaminated water became contaminated as it flowed through this path. The release occurred for a period of 77 minutes. The licensee obtained and analyzed water samples taken during the discharge and performed an after-the-fact discharge permit. The licensee estimates that 2400 gallons of water were discharged to the canal with a total release of 2.5E-4 Ci, with Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137 as the primary contributors. The release was well below 10CFR20 release limits. The licensee is continuing to evaluate this event. Regional Action: The resident inspector is on-site performing followup investigation. A Region I Health Physics specialist has been dispatched to the site to perform an independent assessment of the radiological aspects of the release. Contact: Robert Temps (610)337-5387 Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JULY 20, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: (General License - 10 Cfr 31.5) MR Number: 2-95-0063 Thiokol Date: 07/20/95 Kennedy Space Center,Florida Subject: MISSING EXIT SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On July 19, 1995, representatives of NASA, Kennedy Space Center, reported that two exit signs containing 21 curies each of tritium were found to be missing from Building RPSF No. K6-495 at Kennedy Space Center. This building is occupied by Thiokol, a resident NASA contractor. The exit signs were possessed by Thiokol under the general license in 10 CFR 31.5. The items were discovered as missing during a routine survey conducted on or about June 27, 1995. NASA respresentatives reported that searches to locate the exit signs have been unsuccessful, and that Thiokol has initially determined that the signs may have fallen from their mounting during a rocket launch and been replaced by exit signs that do not contain tritium. The State of Florida has been informed. Region II will continue to monitor NASA and Thiokol's efforts to locate the signs. Contact: E. Wright (404)331-5617