Headquarters Daily report JUNE 28, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 28, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0108 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Administrative Letter 94-13, Rev. 1, "Access to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletin Board Systems," to be issued June 29, 1995. The NRC is issuing this administrative letter revision to give addressees updated information concerning the availability of NRC bulletin board systems (BBSs). Technical contacts: Andrew J. Kugler, NRR (301) 415-2828 Kevin Ramsey, NMSS (301) 415-7887 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-95-0116 Lacrosse 1 Date: 06/28/95 Lacrosse,Wisconsin 06/26/95 CALL TO REGION III Dockets: 50-409 BWR/AC Subject: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATIONS AT LACROSSE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 26, 1995, at 2:00 p.m. (CDT), Dairyland Power Cooperative (LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor) reported to Region III that on one occasion during May 1995, the fire hose station located in containment was inadvertently left isolated for approximately four days after conducting the 18 month undervoltage diesel surveillance test. Although the Control Room has open and shut indication lights for determining valve status, they were not recognized during control room operator panel rounds. In addition, they reported that the same fire hose station located in containment was inadvertently left isolated for approximately four hours after some grid electrical perturbations affected other valves at the facility on June 16, 1995. Compensatory measures were not established as required by Technical Specifications. Fire extinguishers are available to mitigate any potential fire hazards in containment, also the operator can locally reset and open the affected valve to the fire hose station in containment in a timely manner. In addition, the licensee reported that the control room was left unattended on June 16, 1995, for approximately 60 seconds when an misunderstanding occurred between the control room operator (CRO) and the Shift Operator (SO). The SO left the control room to attend a plant meeting when he realized that he neglected to tell the CRO, who was out of the control room checking on a valve tagout, to return to the control room for proper shift coverage. The plant is decommissioned and in a SAFSTOR mode with fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool. Technical Specification required the control room to be manned by either the on-duty CRO or SO. The facility conducted remedial training for the staff concerning control room staffing and surveillance performance, and revised several steps in a procedure to provide additional guidance to operators when conducting surveillance testings, also additional training was provided to operators to heighten control room awareness in attending to valve status during unusual plant evolutions or plant perturbations. Regional Action: The regional inspection staff will follow up on the events and licensee corrective actions. Contact: T.D. REIDINGER (708)829-9816