Headquarters Daily report JUNE 23, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION JUNE 23, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0107 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT Subject: VALVE OPERATION CONTRARY TO SYSTEM PROCEDURES The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel meeting on June 6, 1995, classified an event that occurred at Washington Nuclear Project 2 on April 8, 1995, as a Significant Event for the Performance Indicator Program. The significant event classification was based on the event when considered in the context of prior NRC concern over programmatic weakness in operator performance. On April 8, 1995, during plant startup and heatup, a senior reactor operator on shift as the control room supervisor operated a bypass valve in the reactor water cleanup system contrary to system procedures. The reactor operators on shift questioned the appropriateness of this action relative to procedural compliance. The control room supervisor obtained shift manager concurrence of his actions a short time later based on the shift manager's recollection of the procedure being an optional step rather than his verification that it was a requirement. On or about April 14, 1995, the control room supervisor and the shift manager were removed from licensed duties. On April 23, 1995, an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was dispatched to the site. The purpose of the AIT was to better understand the actions of the operators involved, the procedure requirements, the safety significance of the event, shift crew attitudes and practices regarding plant operating procedures, and management expectations for following those procedures. The event heightened existing NRC concerns regarding procedure compliance at WNP-2. The AIT found that, contrary to a procedure caution, a control room supervisor partially opened a bypass valve for the reactor water cleanup system and then returned it to a nearly closed position. This was apparently done in an attempt to reduce reactor coolant inventory which had increased during reactor heatup. The procedure caution prohibited opening the valve if reactor coolant system pressure was above 125 psig. At this time, the pressure in the reactor coolant system was approximately 215 psig. The licensee told the AIT that a pressure switch in the reactor water cleanup piping would have actuated and caused another valve to close and isolate the blowdown portion of the system if the pressure in the downstream piping reached 140 psig. The AIT reviewed the system design and determined that the piping downstream of the bypass valve was not overpressurized and that other means existed to isolate the piping if needed. However, the significance of this event lies not in the configuration the plant was put in but rather the lack of care demonstrated by operations management and supervisory personnel in conducting plant activities. The AIT completed its inspection and exited April 26, 1995. The AIT report number is 50-397/95-13. The report was issued June 12, 1995. NRC evaluation of the control room supervisor's actions and the circumstances of the event is ongoing. CONTACT: Joe Birmingham, NRR/DOPS/OECB (301) 415-2829 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 23, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0085 Indian Point 3 Date: 06/23/95 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANNED PROTEST MARCH TO CLOSE INDIAN POINT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: A local group plans to march from downtown Peekskill to the Indian Point plants on June 24. The march is expected to be similar to one conducted on April 1, 1995, which was peaceful and consisted of approximately 20 people. The licensee and local enforcement officials are aware of the planned march. Currently Indian Point 3 is resolving final maintenance issues prior to restarting the facility. Regional Action: Information Item Only Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 23, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-95-0086 Millstone 1 Date: 06/22/95 Waterford,Connecticut Licensee Notification Dockets: 50-245 BWR/GE-3 Subject: Unexpected High Temperatures During Dewatering of Spent Resin Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During dewatering of Unit 1 condensate demineralizer spent resin at about 1:30 p.m. on June 22, 1995, a thermocouple in about the center and two feet from the bottom of the liner indicated a temperature increase from 90 degrees F to 311 degrees F over a period of several minutes. The licensee believed that a localized exothermic reaction occurred because no steam, unusual smell or other abnormal condition was detected. Additionally, no airborne radioactivity was detected. Normal resin temperatures typically do not exceed about 100 degrees F. The licensee became aware of the problem as a result of an installed temperature alarm (135 degrees F) on the Pacific Nuclear (now Vectra) dewatering system. The cask was immediately flooded, which stabilized the exothermic reaction and reduced the temperature to 100 degrees F. The licensee has placed a hold on handling the liner until the problem is evaluated. The liner dose rates are about 4-5 R/hr, which is typical. The resident inspectors are following the licensee's actions. Region I and NMSS LLW staff discussed the event with licensee personnel on June 23, 1995. The temperature of the resin on June 23, 1995, was 68 degrees F. The licensee does not yet know the cause of the high temperature but is establishing an event review team to evaluate the event. Regional Action: Resident Inspectors are following the licensee's actions. Contact: Ronald L. Nimitz (610)337-5267 Richard R. Keimig (610)337-5255 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 23, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-95-0088 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 06/23/95 Richland,Washington Resident Inspectors Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: CUTBACKS TO WNP-2 ORGANIZATION ANNOUNCED Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 22, 1995, the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) Executive Board approved a proposal, by Mr. William Counsil, the WPPSS Managing Director, to reduce the WNP-2 staff to 1300. Many of the cuts will occur by July 31. Other reductions will occur no later than December 1995. Excluding Raytheon, WNP-2's largest contractor, the current WNP-2 organization consists of approximately 1620 positions, of which approximately 80 are currently not filled. Consequently, the current WNP-2 staffing will experience a cut of approximately 240 individuals. The largest of the staff cuts will involve the Engineering organization, which will cut approximately 100 of 295 individuals. The licensee's procurement staff will also experience significant cuts under the plan, a reduction to 98 individuals from the current level of 150. The remaining cuts will be spread across the WNP-2 plant and corporate organization. The small staff currently supporting WNP-1 and WNP-3 will not be affected. The WPPSS estimates that the cuts in plant work force along with the elimination of some capital projects and other activities will save approximately $30 million overall from the 1996 fiscal year operating budget. Assuming a 72 percent capacity factor for WNP-2, the WPPSS estimates that all of these cost cutting measures should result in an energy production cost of about 2.7 cents per kilowatt, the estimated figure for WNP-2 to be competitive in the energy market of the Northwest. This information was discussed with WPPSS employees and has generated local media interest. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: R. Barr (509)377-2627 D. Proulx (509)377-2627 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319