Headquarters Daily report JUNE 21, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 21, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0084 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 06/19/95 Wiscasset,Maine Notified HOO Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: Followup of the loss of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) Reportable Event Number: 28964 Discussion: Follow-up of the loss of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) at the plant, which was reported to the NRC on June 19, 1995, at 6:59 p.m. (ET), revealed that two means of emergency communications were still available. They were: microwave, through Central Maine Power Company in Augusta; and radio. If necessary, they could have been used to communicate with the Maine Emergency Management Agency and the State Police. Local telephone service was not interrupted. The microwave system ultimately was used to notify the NRC in about fifty-five minutes after the ENS inoperability was identified. The long distance service was restored at 2:00 a.m., on June 20. A broken overhead fiber-optic cable in Freeport, Maine (about 25 miles southwest of the plant) caused the problem. Long distance telephone service was lost in about two-thirds of the state; however, local service remained available The licensee believes that the cellular network also was affected. The licensee indicated that the telephone carrier (NYNEX) is pursuing the reason(s) for the widespread loss of long distance service. The licensee will advise the NRC when additional information is available. Contact: J. Lusher (610)337-5078 R. Keimig (610)337-5255 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 21, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consumers Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0112 Palisades 1 Date: 06/21/95 Covert,Michigan CALL FRM ASST. SECURITY DIRECTOR Dockets: 50-255 PWR/CE Subject: LOAD PISTOL DISCOVERED IN SEARCH Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The licensee reported that a loaded 38 caliber semi-automatic pistol was found during an entry search at 7:45 p.m. on June 20, 1995. The pistol was in a bag among clothes carried by a contractor employee working on the unit's turbine. The individual stated the weapon was inadvertently put into the bag with some clothes in his haste to get to work. He produced a valid permit for the pistol. The individual's supervisor indicated he was a trusted employee; the drug results are pending. He was given a fitness-for- duty test and the alcohol portion was negative. Based on a review of his work history, the supervisor's statements and the shift supervisor's evaluation the individual was allowed to report for work after returning the pistol to his car. The licensee determined this not to be a credible threat and logged it as required. Regional Action: Information only. We notified the Information Assessment Team and NRR's Safeguards Branch. Contact: J.R. CREED (708)829-9857 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 21, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0113 Dresden 1 Date: 06/21/95 Morris,Illinois LICENSEE PRESS RELEASE Dockets: 50-010 BWR/GE-1 Subject: LICENSEE'S INTENTION FOR DRY STORAGE OF UNIT 1 SPENT FUEL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 20, 1995, the licensee announced their intention to develop dry storage for Unit 1 spent fuel as part of the unit's decommissioning process. Unit 1 has been shut down since 1980 and the decommissioning plan was approved by the NRC in 1993. The dry storage area will be adjacent to the Unit 1 fuel pool and consist of a reinforced concrete pad that will hold a series of vertical metal transportation overpacks. The Unit 1 spent fuel will be sealed inside steel containers which will then be placed in the metal overpacks. Regional Action: None. Contact: P.L. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 21, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0114 Dresden 3 Date: 06/21/95 Morris,Illinois MAY 28, 1995; ENS Dockets: 50-249 BWR/GE-3 Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILED MAIN TURBINE BLADE- (UPDATE) Reportable Event Number: 28859 Discussion: On May 28, 1995, the Unit 3 reactor tripped from full power due to a main turbine trip. The turbine tripped as a result of high vibration due to a failed turbine blade in the "C" low pressure (LP-C) turbine. Inspections of the LP-C turbine identified one blade on the last stage turbine missing an 8-inch section, and two additional bent blades. The licensee has completed non-destructive examinations (NDE) on the last stages of the LP-C turbine blades. Forty-seven of 208 last stage blades were found to have linear indications in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of the Stellite wear strip. In addition, a visual (VT) and liquid penetrant (PT) examination have been completed on 57 blades from the last stages of the LP-A turbine, and 16 of those blades had indications. The licensee is in the process of removing the LP-B turbine hood for inspection. The as-found penetrant test results will be compared with NDEs after the blades are cleaned in an attempt to qualify a simpler procedure to be used on Unit 2. The licensee's preliminary root cause for the cracked blade is fatigue failure originating in the Stellite wear strip. Chemical analysis of the Stellite material used in the majority of ABB supplied blades does not meet the "Haynes Alloy 6B" material specification. In general, the chromium content was low and the carbon content was high. In addition, ultrasonic tests indicated that ABB blades had thicker stellite material, thinner blade metal, and wider tolerances than the original supplier. Regional Action: Resident and regional inspectors are following the licensee's investigation. Contact: P.L. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 21, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0085 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 06/21/95 San Onofre 3 Phone Call from Resident Inspector San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-362 PWR/CE Subject: CRACK FOUND IN STAINLESS STEEL PIPE FROM BORIC ACID SYSTEM TO CHARGING SYSTEM Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 19, 1995, the licensee noted a 7/16-inch long crack, which was leaking, located on a 3-inch, schedule 10, stainless steel, code Class III pipe. The crack is on the section of pipe which runs from the Boric Acid Makeup pumps to the suction for the Charging Pumps, with the crack adjacent to a weld that secured a pipe support to the pipe. The cracked pipe is isolated from normal Charging Pump suction by a check valve. The crack is oriented approximately 45 degrees from parallel with the length of the pipe. The leak was approximately two drops/second with the only pressure on the pipe from back-leakage through an upstream check valve, thought to be approximately 50 psi. The normal system operating pressure is approximately 100 psi. The licensee plans on performing radiography to further define the crack and determine any other indications in the area. The licensee thinks the crack is due to fatigue caused by pipe vibration associated with the positive-displacement charging pumps. If conditions do not change and radiography does not raise additional concerns, the crack will not be repaired on line, but will be observed for propagation. The licensee plans on making a submittal to NRR per Generic Letter 90-05 justifying system operability and delaying the pipe replacement. The licensee intends to conduct a Unit shutdown on July 22, 1995, for the Cycle 8 refueling outage, and will replace the pipe at that time. Regional Action: The residents were onsite when the leak was discovered, have visually inspected the pipe, and will continue to monitor the leak rate, crack size, and licensee actions. In addition, the licensee discussed the details of their findings and planned actions during a telephone conference with Region IV and NRR personnel on June 20, 1995. Contact: J. Russell (714)492-2641 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 21, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-95-0086 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 06/21/95 Wintersburg,Arizona Phone Call from Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: POTENTIAL DEGRADED SPRINGS IN SOLENOID VALVES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During a routine review of an industry events bulletin, Arizona Public Service Company (APS) staff found that Target Rock Corporation, a vendor of solenoid operated valves, had identified that some valve springs had been provided to Entergy Operations for the River Bend site which did not meet Target Rock's spring force specifications. The APS staff contacted Target Rock and determined that the valve springs from the same lot had been delivered to Palo Verde. The valve springs, which assist solenoid valve closure, were provided by a sub-supplier for one and two inch valves. Target Rock had performed testing which identified that the lower spring forces did not affect the operations of the solenoid valves at River Bend. However, following the discussions with APS, Target Rock initiated site specific testing to determine whether the lower spring forces would have an impact on valves at Palo Verde. APS expected that this testing would be concluded by June 23. In the interim, APS identified 10 safety related valves which could potentially have the suspect springs and performed an operability determination. APS concluded that the installed valves were operable because they had either been satisfactorily tested at design basis pressures or did not have a safety-related function to operate. In addition, replacement springs in the warehouse were quarantined. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the licensee's review. Contact: K. Johnston (602)386-3638