Headquarters Daily report JUNE 16, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 16, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0106 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 94-66, Supp. 1, "Overspeed of Turbine-Driven Pumps Caused by Binding in Stems of Governor Valves," to be issued June 16, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice supplement to alert addressees to a potential problem with some licensee actions taken to prevent binding of the valve stems of turbine governor valves and the resulting overspeed trips of the associated turbine-driven pumps. Technical contacts: James Davis, NRR (301) 415-2713 David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0083 Oyster Creek 1 Date: 06/16/95 Forked River,New Jersey Resident E-Mail Dockets: 50-219 BWR/GE-2 Subject: Structrual Failure of Fuel Assemble Reportable Event Number: 28954 Discussion: On 6/15 at 2:17 p.m., spent fuel assembly UD003Y structurally failed while being transferred from one cell location in the spent fuel pool to another cell. Fuel moves had been in progress for about 2-3 weeks in order to rearrange the fuel in the pool. The failure occurred as the assembly was being lowered into its new location, and had been inserted about 2-4 feet. The lower tie plate, along with 41 of the 49 individual fuel pins, separated from the fuel bundle and fell about 6-8 feet to the bottom of the storage cell. The fuel assembly was unchanneled. The refueling bridge operator observed a cloudy condition in the fuel pool when the failure occurred, apparently due to the release of corrosion products from the exterior surface of the assembly. The operator subsequently lifted the fuel assembly above the top of the fuel cell (rack) and observed the damage. He saw the bail handle and upper tie plate that were latched to the refueling mast grapple, and there appeared to be only about eight fuel pins connected. All activities on the refuel floor promptly stopped. There were no releases of radiation detected. Samples from the fuel pool water indicated some increase in activity due to the corrosion product release. There was no indication of fuel pin damage. The assembly is a 7 X 7 array, manufactured by Exxon. It was first installed in the reactor on 4/30/73, and placed in the spent fuel pool on 4/21/80. A similar fuel assembly failure occurred with Exxon fuel in 1986, however, the circumstances were different. The assembly was being lifted when only the bail handle, upper tie plate and the eight tie rods were raised. While the failure mechanism appears to be similiar, the 1986 assembly had been dropped earlier to the bottom of a storage location. The fuel pins from that assembly were subsequently retrieved and stored by a contractor (neither GE nor Exxon). The licensee issued a press release, and informed the public in attendance at the beginning of the spent fuel dry storage facility hearing on 6/15 at 7:30 p.m. The licensee completed a video inspection of the failed assembly. The top of the pins in the cell appeared to be intact, and remained in a 7 X 7 type array (due to the grid spacers). There were, however, several springs located in the adjacent cells. The springs rest on top of the fuel assemblies between the individual pins and the upper tie plate. The licensee confirmed eight tie rods connected to the upper tie plate. The lower end plug for all eight tie rods were intact relative to maintaining the integrity of the fuel pins. However, they were all damaged (broken) at the bottom where a threaded portion engages the lower tie plate. The licensee is developing a recovery plan. The licensee will discuss their plan with Region I on Friday 6/16 prior to initiating any recovery actions. There are currently about 2048 (2645 storage locations) spent fuel assemblies in the SFP. Nearly half of them (estimate = 800) are Exxon fuel; some are 7 X 7, some are 8 X 8. For the currently scheduled spent fuel rearrangement activities, about 100 more Exxon fuel assemblies are expected to be moved. Regional Action: Resident Inspector are following licensee recovery actions. Conference call to discuss recovery with Region and NRR prior to moving the assembly on 6/16/95. Contact: John Rogge (610)337-5146 Larry Briggs (609)474-3589 Jacque Durr (610)337-5224