Headquarters Daily report JUNE 12, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0108 Dresden 3 Date: 06/12/95 Morris,Illinois MAY 28, 1995; ENS Dockets: 50-249 BWR/GE-3 Subject: TURBINE BLADE FAILURE - SECOND UPDATE Reportable Event Number: 28859 Discussion: On May 28, 1995, Unit 3 reactor tripped form full power due to a main turbine trip. The turbine tripped on high vibration due to a failed blades in the last stage of the "C" low pressure turbine. One of the blades had fractured about 8 inches from the blade's tip and two additional blades were bent, apparently as a result of the fractured blade impacting the casing. Initial blade failure mechanism appears to be fatigue cracking initiated in the Stellite surfaced wear material on the leading edge and propagated transversely through the Stellite-to-base metal weld joint and then through the base metal. The subject turbine blading was "reverse engineered" by ABB and manufactured in the UK by Turbine Blading Ltd. in the mid 1980s. Dresden Units 2 & 3 and Quad Cities Units 1 & 2 all utilize the reverse engineered blades in combination with original GE supplied blades. No other Nuclear plants utilize the ABB reverse engineered blades with the Stellite wear material on the leading edge. There is no indication that the blades were improperly designed or manufactured. Over the weekend, liquid penetrant examinations of the Dresden Unit 3 turbine blading identified numerous indications in the leading Stellite edge. A total of 47 blades exhibited indications. The licensee is still evaluating the significance of these indications. Routine Dresden inspections of the turbine blading did not include a penetrant examination of the Stellite edge. A mag- particle inspection of the entire blade was done; however, the non-magnetic Stellite would not reveal indications using that method. Regional Action: The resident inspectors and a Region III specialist have been monitoring the licensee's investigation. On-site followup and observation of the licensee's efforts by the regional specialist will continue. Contact: PAT HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Detroit Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0109 Fermi 2 Date: 06/12/95 Newport,Michigan RESIDENT OFFICE PC Dockets: 50-341 BWR/GE-4 Subject: UNDERSIZED CRDM FLANGE CHECK VALE BALLS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: ON JUNE 11, 1995, THE FERMI 2 STAFF COMPLETED PRELIMINARY INSPECTION OF THREE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS (CRDMs) THAT WERE REMOVED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCRAM TIME PERFORMANCE. CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS 10-31, 26- 31, AND 34-31 WERE FOUND TO HAVE IMPROPERLY SIZED BALLS IN THE CRD FLANGE CHECK VALVE. 3/4 INCH BALLS WERE INSTALLED VICE THE REQUIRED 7/8 INCH BALL. THE UNDERSIZED BALLS WERE FOUND STUCK IN THE FLANGE CHECK VALVE SEAT. THE THREE SUBJECT CRDMs WERE REPLACED BY REBUILT CRDMs. IN ADDITION TO CRDM WORK, THE LICENSEE INVESTIGATED CRD POSITION INDICATION PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED DURING POWER OPERATION. SEVERAL POTENTIAL CAUSES FOR INDICATION PROBLEMS THAT WERE IDENTIFIED INCLUDED DEFECTIVE J-LOOPS, IMPROPER GASKETS, AND LOOSE CONNECTORS. THESE PROBLEMS WERE RESOLVED DURING THE CURRENT PLANT OUTAGE, AND THE LICENSEE PLANS TO MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CRD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM DURING STARTUP AND PLANT HEATUP. LICENSEE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THE POSITION INDICATION PROBLEMS IS CONTINUING. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO RESTART POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS JUNE 13. Regional Action: THE RESIDENT STAFF IS MONITORING THE UNIT STARTUP ACTIVITIES. Contact: M. PHILLIPS (708)829-9637 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-95-0082 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 06/09/95 Richland,Washington Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: WNP-2 STARTUP FROM REFUELING OUTAGE R10 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At approximately 10:30 a.m. (PDT) on June 9, 1995, WNP-2 operators began pulling control rods, which concluded Refueling Outage R10. Major accomplishments during Refueling Outage R10 included refueling, completing the power uprate modifications, inspecting and refurbishing the high pressure turbine, replacing selected containment electrical penetrations, and replacing selected containment supply and exhaust purge valves. At 2 p.m., on June 9, 1995, operators declared the reactor critical. WNP-2 entered Mode 1, greater than 5 percent power, at 7 p.m., on June 11, 1995. Due to the abundance of hydroelectric power and mild weather conditions in the Pacific Northwest, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) has notified the Supply System that WNP-2 electric power will not be needed until approximately July 1, 1995. Therefore, the Supply System plans to increase power to approximately 20 percent, conduct rod testing, test the main turbine, and then shutdown. The shutdown is planned for the evening of June 13, 1995. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to monitor plant startup. Contact: D. Proulx (509)377-2627 R. Barr (509)377-2627 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Texas Utilities Electric Co. MR Number: 4-95-0083 Comanche Peak 1 Date: 06/11/95 Glen Rose,Texas Senior Resident Insp. Phone Call Dockets: 50-445 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MANUAL TRIP OF COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) UNIT 1 Reportable Event Number: 28927 Discussion: On June 11, 1995, at 12:02 p.m. (CDT) a manual trip of CPSES Unit 1 was initiated following a loss of both main feedwater pumps during SSPS Slave Relay K601 testing. For unknown reasons, non-safety related 118 VAC Inverter IV1C2 transferred to motor-control center 1EB1-3, which was deenergized as a result of the slave relay test, and subsequently lost output which de-energized the main feedwater pump lube oil pressure relays. The loss of main feedwater pump lube oil signal to the main condensate pump interlock circuit, designed to prevent operating the condensate pumps without lube oil pressure to the main feedwater pumps, caused a trip of both condensate pumps. The loss of condensate pumps resulted in a low suction pressure trip of both main feedwater pumps. The reactor was manually tripped by the operators in anticipation of a low steam generator water level reactor trip. The A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump was in a test lineup as part of the slave relay testing, the B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump started as required, and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump started and subsequently tripped on overspeed. The A train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump was realigned and feedwater flow was reestablished to all four steam generators. The lowest observed steam generator level was approximately 23 percent on steam Generators 1 and 2 (normally supplied by the A train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump). Intermediate range nuclear instrument Channel B, N-36, failed low and was subsequently found to be overcompensated. Pressurizer Heaters B and D did not automatically energize as a result of the loss of 118VAC Bus 1C2 and were manually energized by operators. The lowest indicated RCS pressure was 1890 psig. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 with normal steam generator levels. The licensee is investigating the causes for the loss of inverter output and the overspeed trip of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Regional Action: The resident and senior resident inspectors responded to the site and will monitor the licensee's corrective actions and preparations for restart. A regional based inspector has been dispatched to the site to review the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: A. T. Gody (817)897-1500