Headquarters Daily report JUNE 09, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 9, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0079 Fitz Patrick 1 Date: 06/06/95 Lycoming,New York Dockets: 50-333 BWR/GE-4 Subject: UPDATE TO MR 1-95-0074 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 1, during unit startup, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the James A. FitzPatrick plant staff decided to discontinue the startup after several control rods "double notched" in the outward direction. Sixteen of the 137 control rods had been withdrawn from the core when the licensee observed the third control rod moving two notches vice the standard one notch. The plant was taken to a cold condition with all rods inserted. During the shutdown, the licensee conducted troubleshooting of the control rod drive (CRD) system. The majority of the post shutdown testing included rod movement timing and stall flow testing on all rods; rod speed adjustment (via four way valves) on some rods; removal and inspection of directional control valves for foreign material on a few rods; and diagnostic testing utilizing vendor test equipment. The licensee concluded that air, and in some cases, sticky directional control valves, were the cause of the double notching phenomenon. The licensee, through replacement of sticking directional control valves and additional system venting was able to achieve rod timing repeatability for the affected rods. The licensee could not positively identify the source of air entry into the CRD system. Potential sources of air have been identified including, air intrusion during system maintenance, incomplete venting of drives prior to unit start-up, and utilization of air saturated water. Air intrusion is not a new phenomenon in boiling water reactors (BWRs); however, the licensee has not seen the problem of this magnitude in the past. Testing of all but one control rod has been completed satisfactorily and the licensee has been able to demonstrate rod speed repeatability. For this one control rod, the licensee believes that the fast withdrawal time is caused by a problem with the drive ball check valve. The licensee's safety evaluation concluded that the faster rod speed was not a safety concern. The unit was made critical at approximately 5:30 a.m. on June 7, and as of June 9, 1995 is at 45 percent power conducting control rod scram time testing. Two control rods double notched during the startup one because of high drive pressure to move the rod intially and the second one was the control rod discussed above with the faster rod speed. The licensee identified that a difference in the withdrawal methodology of the control rods led to the discovery of the double notching on startup. Previously, rods were continuously withdrawn to the full out position. During this startup an operator notched each rod one step prior to fully withdrawing a control rod. In addition to the repairs stated above the licensee modified its control rod venting procedure and plans additional long term action to prevent this problem in the future. Regional Action: The resident inspector is continuing to monitor licensee activities. Contact: Ricardo Fernandes (315)342-4907 Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 9, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Freohling & Robertson MR Number: 2-95-0055 Freohling & Roberston Date: 06/09/95 Richmond,Virginia Subject: DAMAGED MOISTURE AND DENSITY GAUGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 8, 1995, the NRC received a call from Froehling & Robertson, a Richmond, Virginia licensee. The licensee reported an event in which a moisture and density gauge was damaged by a front-end loader at a construction site in Leesburg, Virginia. The gauge contained approximately 10 mCi of Cesium-137 and 50 mCi of Americium-241. At the time of the accident, the sources were in the safe storage position inside the gauge. The licensee personnel on site, cordoned the area and contacted the gauge manufacturer for assistance. With the help of the gauge manufacturer, the licensee was able to determine that the gauge case was damaged, but the gauge source rod and internal sources were not damaged. The licensee conducted radiation surveys around the gauge. The results indicated normal levels (approximately 1mR/Hr @ 30 cm) for this type of device. The gauge was subsequently packed into the normal transportation case and transported to the licensee's facility. The gauge has been secured there pending return to the manufacturer. Regional Action: The Commonwealth of Virginia has been informed. The Region will followup with an inspection. Contact: J. Diaz Velez (404)331-7438