Headquarters Daily report JUNE 08, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 8, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0105 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-29, "Oversight of Design and Fabrication Activities for Metal Components Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems," issued June 7, 1995. The NRC issued this information notice to alert addressees to observed shortcomings in oversight of design and fabrication activities for metal components used in spent fuel dry storage systems. Technical contacts: Stephen C. O'Connor, NMSS (301) 415-7878 Stephen S. Koenick, NRR (301) 415-2841 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. MR Number: 1-95-0081 Susquehanna 2 Date: 06/08/95 Allentown,Pennsylvania RI PC Dockets: 50-388 BWR/GE-4 Subject: SUSQUEHANNA UNIT 2 NON-VITAL INSTRUMENT UPS FAILURE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 6, 1995, at 9:20 a.m., Unit 2 was at 100% power when a loss of instrument AC at panels 2Y218 and 2Y219 occurred due to the failure of uninterruptable power supply (UPS) 2D240. Loss of power to these panels resulted in the following: RWCU system isolation; 'A' Reactor Recirc scoop tube lockup; CRD flow control to minimum; reactor building Zone II and III HVAC tripped; area radiation monitors alarmed; 'B' reactor building chiller tripped and reactor building closed cooling water swapped to cool the drywell; service air tripped; rod drive control system tripped; 'B' feedwater heater string emergency dump valves opened; main steamline, offgas, and RHR service water rad monitors failed downscale; computer generated reactor power calculations became invalid; and position indication for some control rods was lost on full core display. The 'A' reactor recirc control system began to run-back due to the loss of control power, and reactor power decreased to approximately 98% before the scoop tube locked-up. Operators entered off- normal procedures and confirmed the stable condition of the reactor. The affected plant systems were returned to their normal alignment following power restoration via the UPS maintenance bypass switch at 9:50 a.m. The licensee is currently pursuing the root cause(s) for this UPS failure. Previously, UPS 2D240 failed during recovery from the Unit 2 scram on April 15, 1995. Following that event, the UPS battery was replaced and the unit tested satisfactorily. NRC Inspection Report 95-08 reviewed the April UPS failure and concluded that it was caused by a non-functional battery. There is no indication at this time that the current failure is the result of a similar battery issue. Regional Action: Resident inspector review of this event will continue. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Gene Barber (610)337-5232 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0082 Hope Creek 1 Date: 06/08/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: APPOINTMENT OF NEW SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR ENGINEERING, NUCLEAR BUSINESS UNIT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 5, 1995, PSE&G announced Elbert Simpson will join the Nuclear Business Unit (NBU) on June 30 as Senior Vice President-Nuclear Engineering, replacing Stanley LaBruna. Simpson has worked since 1990 for Arizona Public Service Co., which operates the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. For the past two years, he has served as Vice president-Nuclear Support for Arizona Public Service Co. Prior to joining the Arizona utility, he held various positions at Florida Power Corp., where he began his career as an engineer at the Crystal River Nuclear Station. Simpson is a graduate of the University of Florida. Regional Action: Information only. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Robert Summers (609)935-5373 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-95-0053 Brunswick 1 2 Date: 06/08/95 Southport,North Carolina Dockets: 50-325,50-324 BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4 Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES AT BRUNSWICK Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Recently several management reassignments were announced at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. The licensee is restructuring part of the Brunswick organization to include a single Plant Manager, Operations Manager, and Maintenance Manager instead of one for each unit. The changes are as follows: Bill Levis from Plant Manager Unit 1 to Plant Manager (Both Units); Clay Warren from Plant Manager Unit 2 to an as yet unannounced position; Ralph Schlicter from Acting NAS Manager to SRO Certification Class; Neil Gannon from Mantenance Manager Unit 1 to Maintenance Manager (Both Units); George Barnes from Maintenance Manager Unit 2 to Training Manager; Denny Hicks from SRO Certification Class to Regulatory Affairs Manager; Rich Lopriore from Regulatory Affairs Manager to Acting Nuclear Engineering Section Manager - BNP; Greg Gibbs from Nuclear Engineering Section Manager - BNP to SRO Cetification Class; Jeff Lyash from Operations Manager Unit 2 to Operations Manager (Both Units); Ralph Mullis from Operations Manager Unit 1 to Staff Assistant to the Site Vice President; Keith Ahern from Acting Training Manager to Plant Evaluation Section - BNP (Added Position) Regional Action: For Information. Contact: J. STAREFOS (404)331-5568 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-95-0054 Eye And Ear Clinic Date: 06/08/95 Charleston,West Virginia Subject: RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 7, 1995, Region II received notification from a health physics consultant for The Eye and Ear Clinic, Charleston, WV, that a strontium 90 eye applicator had been found in the basement of a building owned by the Clinic. The building was being cleaned out prior to demolition and had not been used for several years. A physician previously employed at the Clinic held an NRC license for an eye applicator until his death in 1987. In 1988, The Clinic transferred the eye applicator physically located at the Clinic to an NRC licensee in Puerto Rico and terminated the license. Clinic management indicated that they were not aware that the authorized user possessed a second device. The Clinic has relocated the device to a locked storage area awaiting transfer to an authorized recipient. Radiation levels are less than 1 milliroentgen/hour at one meter from the device. Regional Action: The State of West Virginia has been informed. The Region will conduct a followup inspection. Contact: C. Hosey (404)331-5614 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0106 Zion 1 2 Date: 06/08/95 Zion,Illinois SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-295,50-304 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PERSONNEL CHANGES. Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The following personnel changes were announced today and will be effective Monday, June 12, 1995. Dave Wozniak, currently the Operations Manager, will report to Bryon Station as the Engineering Manager. The position of Operations Manager will be temporarily filled by Bob Cascarano, Support Services Director, until a permanent replacement is found. Dale St. Clair, currently the Engineering Manager at Byron Station, will report to Zion as the Work Control Superintendent replacing Jim LaFontaine. Mr. LaFontaine will become part of Zion's long range planning group. Regional Action: Information Only. Contact: L.F. MILLER, JR. (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0107 Dresden 3 Date: 06/08/95 Morris,Illinois MAY 28TH, 1995; ENS Dockets: 50-249 BWR/GE-3 Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILED MAIN TURBINE BLADE- (UPDATE) Reportable Event Number: 28859 Discussion: On May 28, 1995, the Unit 3 reactor tripped from full power due to a main turbine trip. The turbine tripped as a result of high vibration. Initial indication of the event was a high vibration alarm (12 mil high vibration trip) followed immediately by a turbine and reactor trip. Inspections of the main turbine have identified one blade on the last stage of the "C" low pressure (LP-C) turbine missing an 8 inch section, and two additional bent blades. There is minor damage to the turbine casing and stationary blades. No damage to the main condenser is suspected. No other damage to plant equipment has been found. Plant systems responded as expected to the trip. During the event, a dual indication on the "1A" main steam isolation valve (MSIV) was present. The valve was manually closed using the control switch in response to the dual indication. After further evaluation, the most likely cause for dual MSIV indication was due to a misadjusted limit switch coupled with vibration. The limit switch will be recalibrated during this forced outage. The licensee removed the LP-C exhaust hood, inner casing, upper stationary blades, and rotor. Non-destructive examinations (NDE) including visual, liquid penetrant, and wet fluorescent magnetic particle, are being performed on the rotor. The licensee planned to replace the blades which fail the NDE and to search for the missing 8-inch blade tip in the condenser. The broken blade and associated blade tie-wire were sent to Argonne National Laboratory for root cause analysis. The licensee's preliminary cause of the failed blade is fatigue failure at the stellite-to-blade interface weld on the blade leading edge. Foreign material and corrosion do not appear to be contributing factors. Regional Action: Resident and regional inspectors are following the licensee's investigation. Contact: P.L. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. MR Number: 4-95-0080 Diablo Canyon 1 Date: 06/07/95 Avila Beach,California Licensee to SRI Dockets: 50-275 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: FAILURE OF 480 VOLT MAGNETIC CONTACTOR Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 6, 1995, when performing a surveillance test of Turbine Driven AFW Pump 1-1, the AFW discharge header Steam Generator 2-3 level control valve (AFW-2-LCV-108) failed to close when attempting to remotely close the motor-operated valve. Investigation revealed that the associated 480 volt circuit breaker thermal overload device tripped. The licensee completed the surveillance by manually positioning Valve AFW-2-LCV-108. Following completion of the surveillance, troubleshooting was conducted which revealed that the Phase C contact of the magnetic contactor (AC line starter) failed to close, interrupting power to the associated motor phase and preventing motor rotation. Further inspection revealed that the "close" contactor plastic arc box phase barrier was chipped adjacent to the Phase C contact. The licensee determined that the cause of the thermal overload trip was due to a small piece of the plastic arc box breaking off and becoming wedged in Phase C of the contactor, effectively single phasing the motor and causing the thermal overload device to actuate. The failure potentially affects Westinghouse Model A201K1CA, size 00, 0, and 1 magnetic contactors. The damage to the plastic arc box has been determined to be caused during terminal tightening at the vendor recommended torque specification. The upper right stationary contact can be rotated during terminal tightening to contact the phase barrier material with enough force to crack and break the plastic. The plastic chip can then potentially fall between the stationary and moving contact and prevent the contact from closing. The close contactor for Valve AFW-2-LCV-108 has been replaced with a newer version of the same model Westinghouse magnetic contactor. The licensee has determined that this type of magnetic contactor is installed in 169 safety-related applications. The licensee is performing a 100 percent inspection of these magnetic contactors. The licensee plans to contact the manufacturer on this issue and considers it to be a potential generic problem for this model contactor. Regional Action: The Resident Inspector is following the licensee's actions and a conference call is being arranged with the licensee to discuss site specific and generic concerns. Contact: Rob Barr (817)860-8249 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-95-0081 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 06/08/95 Richland,Washington Licensee's Plant Status Line Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: BLOCKAGE OF RCIC VACUUM BREAKER LINE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 7, 1995, with the plant in Mode 4 in Refueling Outage R10 and while performing local leak rate testing (LLRT) of a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) valve (RCIC-V-113) on the 2-inch vacuum break piping (for pressure equalization) from the wetwell, the licensee discovered a rag in the piping and a 2-inch to 1-inch flange on the end of the piping. The licensee believes the 2-inch to 1-inch flange had been left on the piping during hydrostatic testing that had been performed during preoperational testing in 1982. The licensee is assessing the cumulative affects of the rag and flange on the past operability of the RCIC system. The welded flange and the rag have been removed. The licensee is investigating the cause of this incident and evaluating the potential for having similar flanges in other systems. Regional Action: The resident inspectors and regional management are monitoring the licensee's investigation. Contact: R. Barr (817)860-8249 D. Proulx (509)377-2627 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319