Headquarters Daily report JUNE 07, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 7, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-95-0052 Robinson 2 Date: 06/07/95 Hartsville,South Carolina Dockets: 50-261 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: EXTENSION OF REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During the plant restart following Refueling Outage 16, the licensee detected Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage from the main flange ofReactor Coolant Pump (RCP) C. At 4:16 a.m., on June 6, 1995 a plant cooldown was initiated to conduct repairs to the RCP. This repair will require that the RCS be drained to approximately -40" below the vessel flange. Current estimates are that this repair will take approximately 10 days to complete. Also, during the plant restart and heatup, as a result of an improper valve lineup Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump A was operated for approximately 66 minutes at or near shutoff head. Based on vendor recommendations, the pump was disassembled and inspected on June 6, 1995. No pump damage was noted. Pump reassembly is in progress and the pump should be returned to service later today. In addition, the licensee has indicated their intentions to replace a leaking mechanical seal on RHR pump B once the RCP repairs are accomplished. Regional Action: Resident Inspectors are following licensee actions. Contact: J. STAREFOS (404)331-5568 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 7, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0078 Waterford 3 Date: 06/07/95 Killona,Louisiana Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 25 and June 2, 1995, Waterford-3 made immediate notifications to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) for conditions that were identified as being outside the design basis of the plant. Both notifications involved inadequacies in the Essential Chilled Water (ECW) system that the licensee has identified during comprehensive system testing. The licensee has been troubleshooting operational problems with the ECW system and had elected to reperform preoperational flow testing of the system and loads to ensure proper operation. During the performance of the Train AB ECW system flow balance test on May 25, 1995, the licensee determined that the capacity for each of the two Train B Safeguards Pump Room Coolers were 50 percent instead of the assumed design value of 100 percent. One or both coolers may have been unavailable in the past; however, they were both currently inservice. The two A Safeguards Pump Room Coolers in Train A were also 50 percent capacity instead of the assumed design value of 100 percent. The licensee determined that the single Train AB room cooler had a capacity of 100 percent. The licensee made the one-hour notification because the capacity of the room coolers was outside the assumed design basis of the plant. The licensee was evaluating past operability of the coolers to determine if there were any periods when a room cooler was unavailable. The licensee also determined that the total system flow (480 gpm) was less than the required minimum design flow (510 gpm), but above the minimum accident flow (430 gpm) with ECW Pump AB discharge valve throttled to one notch from the closed position and all flow control valves on Train B failed open. This throttle position had been set during the original preoperational test in 1983. After the ECW pump discharge valve was repositioned to the full open position, the required minimum flow rate was achieved. During the performance of the Train B ECW system flow balance test on June 1, 1995, the licensee determined that the total system flow (320 gpm) was less than the required minimum design flow (510 gpm) and less than the minimum accident flow (430 gpm) with the ECW Pump B discharge valve throttled to one notch from the closed position and all flow control valves on Train B failed open. This throttle position had also been set during the original preoperational test in 1983. After the ECW pump discharge valve was repositioned to the full open position, the required minimum flow rate (510 gpm) was achieved. The licensee made the one-hour notification because the flow rate of the chilled water system Train B had been outside the design basis of the plant for an indeterminate period of time. During the performance of the Train A ECW system flow balance test on May 5, 1995, the licensee determined that the total system flow was above the minimum design flow and minimum accident flow with the chilled water pump discharge valve in the throttled position. The licensee plans to perform an evaluation to determine why the Train A and Train B system flows were different with the same throttle valve positions. Additionally, the licensee plans to perform an evaluation to determine the past operability of the ECW system. A flow test with the AB chiller aligned to Train A has been scheduled for the next refueling outage. This testing cannot be performed until then due to the alignment of the electrical buses. Regional Action: The resident staff will continue to monitor the licensee's troubleshooting and testing activities. Contact: C. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 7, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0079 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 06/07/95 San Onofre 2 Phone Call from Resident Inspectors San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-361 PWR/CE Subject: SPILL IN CHEMISTRY LABORATORY Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 6, 1995, a spill of reactor coolant diluted with nuclear service water occurred in the chemistry laboratory during routine primary coolant sampling in Unit 2 (from the letdown system). The spill of about 100 gallons covered approximately 200 square feet of the sampling area and resulted in about 1.5 inches of water on the floor in the deepest areas. A berm at the entryway of the sampling area minimized the spread of water. The area was subsequently posted as a high contamination area but was downgraded to its normal contaminated area status after the water was vacuumed up. The dose rates in the area were less than 2 mrem/hr. The spill occurred during purging of the sample lines when the sample sink drain plugged, and the sink overflowed. The sample lines were being purged for about two hours at a rate of approximately one gallon per minute. In addition to the sample line purge, nuclear service water was also draining to the sample sink and diluted the spill. A chemistry technician was in the laboratory, but not near the sample sink, after the purge was initiated. Normally, the licensee purges sample lines at one gallon per minute for 30 minutes. The longer purge was performed to achieve better lithium analysis results. Unit 2 is operating at 99 percent power and is at the beginning of its fuel cycle. The licensee is conducting a divisional investigation into the event. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will follow the licensee's actions to determine the cause of the event. Contact: B. Olson (510)975-0295 J. Sloan (714)492-2641