Headquarters Daily report JUNE 05, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 5, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0104 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-28, "Emplacement of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites," to be issued June 5, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the importance of complying with all conditions and requirements specified in Section 72.212(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 72.212(b)) and other applicable NRC regulations before using certified casks under the provisions of the general license under 10 CFR Part 72 for the dry storage of spent fuel. Technical contacts: F. Sturz, NMSS (301) 415-7278 M. Gamberoni, NRR (301) 415-3024 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0075 Salem 1 2 Date: 06/05/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-272,50-311 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: CONFIGURATION CONTROL OF HAGAN MODULE FUSES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Between May 20 and May 21, 1995, Unit 1 Instrument and Controls technicians identified at least six incorrect fuses installed in Hagan instrumentation and control modules. Salem uses Hagan modules in safety-related and non-safety related applications. The fuses in question provide fault protection for the module or protection for the load downstream of the module. The licensee identified two types of general misapplications: 1) incorrect fuse voltage ratings (installed 32 V or 125 V ratings vs. specified 250 V), and 2) incorrect fuse current ratings (installed 0.2A vs. specified 5.0A, and installed 5.0A vs. specified 0.2A). On May 23 the licensee commenced a program to inspect all Hagan module fuses, to include both units. The inspection is in progress on safety-related modules; they will inspect non-safety modules after completion of safety-related modules. As of 4:30 p.m. on May 31, 1995, Unit 1 technicians had inspected 189 of 1139 module fuses. Of the 189, approximately 10 percent had wrong size (current) fuses. Unit 2 technicians had inspected 233 of 1133 fuses; approximately 5 percent had wrong size (current) fuses. Salem management intends, as a minimum, to complete all inspections of Unit 1 safety-related modules prior to restart (Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5). They currently anticipate completing inspection of all non-safety systems as well. Management expects to complete inspection of Unit 2 (currently operating at 100 percent power) safety-related fuses within the next three weeks. They based the schedule on Unit 2 technicians inspecting modules in one of the four protection channel per week. The remaining non-safety system module will be completed by a schedule still to be determined. The licensee has reviewed the type and scope of the Unit 2 fuse non-conformances and has documented them in an operability determination that justifies continued operation of Unit 2. Regional Action: Resident inspectors will continue to monitor fuse inspection progress and review the adequacy of the licensee's operability determination. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Charles Marschall (609)935-5373 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-95-0076 Millstone 1 2 3 Date: 06/05/95 Waterford,Connecticut SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 50-245,50-336,50-423 BWR/GE-3,PWR/CE,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: Northeast Utilities, John Opeka announced retirement Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 2, 1995, John F. Opeka, Executive Vice President, Nuclear; announced that he plans to retire December 1, 1995. His retirement effects Northeast Utilities sites, Millstone, Haddam Neck, and Seabrook. His successor has not been announced. Regional Action: Informational Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-95-0050 Sequoyah 2 Date: 06/05/95 Soddy-Daisy,Tennessee Dockets: 50-328 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: UPDATE - AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO GENERATOR STATOR COOLING SYSTEM (SCS) HIGH TEMPERATURE Reportable Event Number: 28737 Discussion: On May 31, at 6:09 pm, Unit 2 experienced an automatic turbine trip followed immediately by a reactor trip from approximately 100 percent power. The cause of the turbine trip was high stator cooling temperature. Shortly before the transient, operators were manipulating raw cooling water supply valves to the SCS as part of a monthly chlorination flush of a stagnant temperature control bypass line. The licensee has not identified an equipment or personnel performance problem but is continuing to investigate weaknesses in the flush procedure in that stator temperature cannot be continuously monitored during the evolution and the response characteristics of the temperature control valve may not have been fully understood. Contrary to the original 10 CFR 50.72 report, no pressurizer PORVS lifted during the trip. Regional Action: The Resident Inspector was onsite for the event and is conducting a followup. Contact: S. SPARKS (404)331-5619 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Detroit Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0103 Fermi 2 Date: 06/04/95 Newport,Michigan RESIDENT OFFICE TELECON Dockets: 50-341 BWR/GE-4 Subject: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO SPURIOUS MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP OF TURBINE. Reportable Event Number: 28886 Discussion: AT 4:36 P.M. EDT ON JUNE 2, 1995, THE TURBINE TRIPPED FROM 95 PERCENT POWER DUE TO SPURIOUS TRIPPING OF BOTH CHANNELS OF THE MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP. AT NO TIME DID THE TURBINE ACTUALLY EXPERIENCE AN OVERSPEED CONDITION. OPERATORS HAD JUST BEGUN TO TEST THE #1 MECHANICAL OVERSPEED CIRCUIT WHEN THE TRIP CAME IN ON BOTH #1 AND #2 CIRCUITS. THIS TEST HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY SINCE THE LAST STARTUP, AND LICENSEE'S PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION HAS DETERMINED THAT THE TESTING WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE ACTUAL TRIP. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATING SYSTEM, ALL POST-SCRAM RESPONSES OF THE PLANT WERE NORMAL. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED AND THE CONDENSER CONTINUED TO BE AVAILABLE AS THE HEAT SINK. SEVERAL PROBLEMS WERE NOTED WITH THE ROD POSITION INDICATING SYSTEM (PIP). BOTH RODS 34-11 AND 46-51 DID NOT GET BOTH POSITION INDICATIONS OF 00 AND CORRESPONDING FULL IN LIGHTS. THE LICENSEE SUBSEQUENTLY PULLED ROD 46-51 FIVE NOTCHES, BUT THE POSITION INDICATION DID NOT CHANGE. THE ROD WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-INSERTED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE FULL IN LIGHT FOR THIS ROD WENT OUT, RESULTING IN NO ROD POSITION INDICATION. IN ADDITION, ROD 10-11, HAD BOTH FULL OUT AND FULL IN LIGHTS, WITH A POSITION INDICATION OF 00 (FULL IN). THE LICENSEE HAS HAD SEVERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM DURING THIS CYCLE, AND IS CONTINUING TO EVALUATE THE PROBLEM AND DEVELOP A COURSE OF ACTION. THE LICENSEE EXPECTS TO REMAIN SHUTDOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS TO PERFORM TROUBLESHOOTING AND REPAIRS. DURING THE TURBINE COASTDOWN FROM THE SCRAM, MAXIMUM VIBRATION LEVELS AT THE CRITICAL SPEED OF APPROXIMATELY 860 RPM WERE 20.3 MILS (ON BEARING #5). Regional Action: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE INSPECTION COVERAGE OF THE LICENSEE'S INVESTIGATIVE AND ASSESSMENT EFFORTS. Contact: M. PHILLIPS (708)829-9637 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 5, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Department Of The Army MR Number: 3-95-0104 Ft. Campbell, Ky Date: 06/02/95 Rock Island,Illinois TELECON/RPO ROCK ISLAND IL ARSENAL Dockets: 03013027 Subject: BROKEN M1A1 COLLIMATOR Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 2, 1995, Region 3 was notified by the Radiation Protection Officer (RPO), Department of the Army, Rock Island Arsenal that a M1A1 collimator containing 10 curies of tritium and used as an aiming device in field artillery pieces was broken while attempting to purge the unit of internal moisture using a nitrogen pressure gauge. The incident occurred on April 7, 1995 at Ft. Campbell, KY. According to the Rock Island, Illinois RPO, the device was not bagged and placed in storage until approximately May 31, 1995. In addition, the device was apparently moved several times between April 7,1995 and May 31, 1995. Subsequent wipe tests of the area (bag and floor where the device was ultimately placed) revealed removable contamination of 76,000 dpm and 41,000 dpm respectively. Bioassays were performed on individuals suspected of being involved in the initial incident and in areas where the device may have been placed. Results of these tests are pending. The RPO at Rock Island, IL stated that offsite contamination is not likely and that staff at Ft. Campbell did not perform proper immediate bagging and storage of the device. The RPO at Rock Island, IL further indicated she will respond to Ft. Campbell, KY on June 5, 1995, to monitor and evaluate the incident. NMSS, Region 2, OSP and the State of Kentucky have been notified. Regional Action: Region 3 will continue to monitor licensee event evaluation. Contact: SAM MULAY (708)829-9859