Headquarters Daily report MAY 26, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corp MR Number: 1-95-0070 Saxton Date: 05/25/95 Saxton,Pennsylvania Dockets: 05000146 Subject: UNPLANNED PENETRATION OF CONTAINMENT VESSEL LINER DURING DECOMMISSIONING ACTIVITIES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At approximately 9:00 am on Thursday, May 25, 1995, workers performing decommissioning activities in the defueled Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation (SNEC) non-power reactor accidentally cut through the containment vessel steel liner. Workers were performing core sampling in the former "rod room" in the basement of the core vessel. They had planned to collect a concrete core sample to a depth of 18 inches from what was believed to be a 30-inch thick concrete pad over the vessel liner. The vessel liner sits on a concrete saddle at a depth which is known to be below the water table in the area. Groundwater is known to exist in the area of the concrete saddle. At a depth of 16 inches, however, workers apparently penetrated the containment vessel liner, resulting in leakage of groundwater through the borehole into the work area. The slow leakage rate of approximately 1 gallon per minute indicated to the licensee that a complete circular hole through the liner does not exist, probably because the core sample penetration was at an angle, not a vertical sample. Leakage of groundwater into the rod room was stopped at about 1:00 pm using a mechanical plug, to be replaced with a temporary inflatable plug. There was no radioactive material in the rod room other than loose contamination from previous activities. Approximately 200 gallons of water was vacuumed into 55-gallon drums for storage and future testing. The licensee does not believe that contamination of the groundwater occurred, since the pressure difference forced the groundwater to enter the vessel liner. The licensee does not know why the concrete thickness was not 30 inches as believed, and is continuing to investigate the incident. The telephone notification was made to NRC Region I as required by the SNEC Technical Specifications. Regional Action: The regional staff continues to follow the licensee's actions in response to this event. Contact: Tom Dragoun (610)337-5373 Betsy Ullrich (610)337-5040 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Yankee Atomic Electric Co. MR Number: 1-95-0071 Yankee Rowe 1 Date: 05/26/95 Rowe,Massachusetts GENERAL Dockets: 50-029 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MEDIA ATTENDANCE AT INFORMATIONAL MEETING AND TOUR OF THE YANKEE ROWE FACILITY Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Today, Yankee Atomic is holding a "Press Day" at the Yankee Rowe facility. They have invited various members of the media to attend an informational meeting and tour of the Yankee Rowe facility. They are expecting up to 25 individuals. The tour will include the Spent Fuel Pool Building, the Vapor Containment, and various other areas. Regional Action: This is for informational purposes only. Contact: Richard Conte (610)337-5183 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: U.S. Enrichment Corporation MR Number: 3-95-0096 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Date: 05/24/95 Piketon,Ohio (10:30 PM.)CALL RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 07007002 Subject: MINOR URANIUM HEXAFLOURIDE RELEASE AT PORTSMOUTH GDP Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 24, 1995, at 9:54 p.m. (EDT), the U. S. Enrichment Corporation reported to the Senior Resident Inspector that a minor uranium hexafluoride release (UF6) had occurred at the Toll Enrichment Facility. It was reported that an operator had noticed a slight outgassing from the valve of a recently filled 2 1/2 ton UF6 cylinder while it was being weighed. Following the plants' "See and Flee" policy for all releases, the operator sounded the building evacuation alarm and the onsite Emergency Response Team was called out. The team cooled the valve with carbon dioxide to stop the release and packed the cylinder with dry ice, which is a typical response. There were no further releases and the outgassing was estimated to be less than 1 gram of UF6. The cylinder will remain packed in dry ice until a three day cool down period has solidified the UF6 in the cylinder. The suspect valve will then be changed out and inspected. Significant offsite and media interest in this event was caused by a local resident who was monitoring a radio scanner and overheard the Emergency Response Team callout. The local resident proceeded to call state and local officials about a large release with an offsite plume. At that time, the resident also notified the press. The misunderstanding was cleared up when local officials called the plant and were informed of the true nature of the event. The gaseous diffusion plant is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy. The NRC has resident inspectors at the Portsmouth facility in preparation for the NRC assuming regulatory jurisdiction over the site. Regional Action: The resident inspection staff will followup on the valve change out and lessons learned. Contact: C.R. COX, PORTSMOUTH (614)289-3353 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0097 Quad Cities 2 Date: 05/26/95 Cordova,Illinois RI 5/24/95 Dockets: 50-265 BWR/GE-3 Subject: DROPPED BLADE GUIDE, UNIT 2 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 24, 1995, during a blade guide transfer in the reactor vessel, the guide disconnected from the mast's grapple and fell to a horizontal position across the reactor upper core plate and top edge of the shroud. At the time of event occurrence, Unit 2 was in a refuel outage and no fuel was in the reactor vessel. At the start of the transfer, the refuel bridge mast operator positioned the grapple over the blade guide and a second verifier confirmed the core coordinates. The fuel handler latched onto the blade guide with the grapple, and believed the engage light illuminated. The light indicated the grapple had successfully closed around the blade guide handle. The mast was then raised until the blade guide was about six inches above the upper core plate. As the operator moved the bridge toward the new core location, the blade guide disconnected from the grapple. Previously, three blade guides had been moved on that shift without incident. Work was stopped and the licensee conducted an investigation into the incident. Portions of the upper core plate where the blade guide came to rest and the blade guide itself were inspected for damage. Only minor scuff marks on the guide's nose piece was evident. Subsequently, the blade guide was moved back to its original location, using an auxiliary hoist. The refuel mast grapple was inspected and no apparent damage was found. Attempts to duplicate the event were unsuccessful. The licensee completed their investigation on May 25 with inconclusive findings as to the root cause. Corrective actions included discussions with all fuel handling crews of the event, and adding independent verification of the closed indicating light for the grapple. The licensee is evaluating a modification that would prevent raising of the mast if the jaws of the grapple are not fully closed. Regional Action: The resident inspector observed substantial portions of the licensee's investigation and inspected the as-found condition of the grapple. In addition, the resident observed attempts to duplicate the failure and interviewed personnel involved with the root cause investigation. Continued followup will be accomplished by the resident staff. Contact: P. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 26, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Union Electric Co. MR Number: 3-95-0098 Callaway 1 Date: 05/26/95 Fulton,Missouri PHONE CALLS TO SITES. Dockets: 50-483 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: FLOODING. CALLS ALSO TO FEMA REGION VII & MO. EMER MANAG AGENCY (SEMA) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The situation at each facility remains unchanged. Although flood waters continue to affect local communities, emergency access to the facilities remains open. Some preplanned evacuation routes in the Callaway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) continue to be impassible but the alternate evacuation routes, designated during the more severe flooding in 1993 are open. Evacuation routes at Hematite are not affected. The latest Missouri River Flood Forecast indicates crests of between 8 and 9 feet above flood stage in Callaway's EPZ this weekend. The community around Hematite expects no significant additional effect of the crest on Joachim Creek expected this weekend. Regional Action: Information only. Contact: J.R. CREED (708)829-9857