Headquarters Daily report MAY 08, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0066 Indian Point 3 Date: 05/08/95 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANT HEATUP ABOVE 350 DEGREES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 7, 1995, the New York Power Authority (NYPA) brought the Indian Point Unit 3 reactor coolant system (RCS) above 350 degrees Fharenheit using heat from the operation of reactor coolant pumps. NYPA is proceeding to the next hold point of their power ascension plan, which is the heatup of the RCS to normal operating temperature (547 degrees Fharenheit) and pressure (2230 psig). Continuing beyond the next hold point and commencing a reactor startup will be contingent on several operational and administrative requirements. Operationally, NYPA must complete numerous equipment retests and startup surveillances, including the RCS operational leak test at normal operating temperature and pressure. In the event that equipment deficiencies are identified during the operational leak test, NYPA scheduled a cooldown to the cold shutdown condition to effect repairs. Currently, there are no deficiencies which require a return to cold shutdown. However, NYPA is monitoring the loop 1 cold leg letdown stop valve, which has a several drop per minute packing leak when the valve is not on its backseat. The packing does not leak when the valve is opened on its back seat. Administratively, NYPA must complete six restart items identified from the Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI), conduct a hold point self-assessment, resolve significant issues identified by this self-assessment, and certify to the NRC in writing of their readiness for restart. After certifying their readiness for startup, NYPA must receive the agreement of the NRC Region I Regional Administrator. Region I, with support from NRR, will continue to monitor the Indian Point 3 startup activities. The NRC efforts will include augmented startup inspection coverage and sustained control room observations for about one week. The augmented inspection will focus on Operations performance, self assessment quality, and the effectiveness of the engineering and maintenance organizations to support Operations on emergent technical and equipment issues. Regional Action: Followup in accordance with current plan. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 David Lew (914)739-8565 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MAY 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Moses Cone Hospital MR Number: 2-95-0046 Agreement State Licensee Date: 05/08/95 Greensboro,North Carolina Telephone Call From State of NC Subject: TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT AT CITY LANDFILL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 6, 1995, a truck carrying trash picked up from the Moses Cone Hospital, Greensboro, North Carolina, set off a radiac monitoring device while entering a city landfill. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer responded and had the truck and its contents returned to the hospital, where it was later determined that the source of the activity was from Iodine-131 bearing trash. Based on specific identification markings on the bags, the Radiation Safety Officer concluded that the waste came from a patient's room who had recently undergone a low dose Iodine-131 procedure, i.e., less than 8 millicurie. The State is investigating and reviewing the licensee's procedures as related to the disposal of radioactive waste. No media interest has been expressed. Regional Action: The Region will monitor the State's activities. Contact: Robert Trojanowski (404)331-5597 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Texas Utilities Electric Co. MR Number: 4-95-0061 Comanche Peak 1 2 Date: 05/08/95 Glen Rose,Texas Call from SRI Dockets: 50-445,50-446 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: DUAL UNIT TRIP DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On Friday, May 5, 1995, the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 tripped due to a direct lightning strike to the Unit 2 containment during severe weather. The licensee believes that the lightning strike caused a voltage surge through the power supply ground into the +25Vdc rod control cabinet power supplies for both units and a subsequent overvoltage protection actuation. The loss of the +25Vdc power supplies resulted in the loss of power to the stationary coils for the rods. The control rods dropped into the cores and caused power range negative rate reactor trips on both units. All safety systems and automatic actions responded as expected during the trips, with the exception of the Unit 2 source range nuclear instrument (N-31B), which failed to automatically energize. The licensee replaced a failed card in the N-31B instrument cabinet and subsequently re-energized the source range instrument. Following the Unit 2 trip, the licensee began an unplanned outage to repair a leaking check valve in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). Unit 2 was scheduled to begin shutting down on May 6 to repair a suspected leaking check valve. The licensee has confirmed that the reactor coolant system leakage was from the bolted bonnet on Valve 2-8378A (CVCS Loop 4 cold leg charging downstream check valve) and repairs are in progress. On May 6, Unit 1 achieved criticality at 7:57 p.m. (CDT) and Mode 1 at 10:41pm. Unit 1 is expected to return to 100 percent power later today. Regional Action: The resident inspector and Region IV will monitor licensee activities. Contact: A. T. Gody (817)897-1500 G. E. Werner (817)860-8269 L. A. Yandell (817)860-8182 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 8, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0062 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 05/08/95 San Onofre 2 SRI Call to RIV San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-361 PWR/CE Subject: SHUTDOWN DUE TO STUCK OPEN PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 5:16 a.m. on May 8, 1995, the Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped from 8 percent power in preparation for inspection of pressurizer spray Valves 2PV100A and 2PV100B. Both valves appeared to stick partially open at 10 and 57 percent, respectively. The licensee was attempting to start up the plant following its Cycle 8 refueling outage, during which extensive turbine rotor repairs were required. Turbine balancing was in progress when high vibration (12.5 mils between low pressure Turbines LP2 and LP3) was observed. The licensee decided to take the main turbine off line. When the main turbine was taken off line, operators noted a reactor coolant system pressure drop. Pressurizer heaters were able to maintain primary system pressure. Licensee personnel subsequently entered containment and isolated spray Valve 2PV100B. The Senior Resident Inspector was notified of the stuck open condition of Valve 2PV100B and was in the control room when the reactor was tripped. All other systems appeared to respond as expected. The licensee intends to remove the actuator and inspect external portions of the valves. During the containment entry for Valve 2PV100B, the cognizant engineer determined that the actuator for the valve appeared to respond correctly to input signals, indicating that the problem was in the valve and not in the actuator. The licensee did not attempt to manipulate Valve 2PV100A in the open direction, but observed that it did not respond to a full closed signal. An inspection of valve internals would require going to Mode 4. The licensee noted that both valves were worked on during the Cycle 8 refueling outage and stated that they suspected that the lubricant applied to the stems may have dried out when heated and may have contributed to the valve sticking. Regional Action: The Senior Resident Inspector witnessed the manual trip of the reactor and will be monitoring the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 J. Sloan (714)492-2641