Headquarters Daily report MAY 04, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 4, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. MR Number: 1-95-0065 Susquehanna 1 Date: 05/04/95 Allentown,Pennsylvania RI PC Dockets: 50-387 BWR/GE-4 Subject: WORKER INJURIES DUE TO ACCIDENTAL GENERATOR SEAL OIL EJECTION DURING TEST Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 3, 1995, at 11:42 p.m. PP&L reported that three workers were injured while isolating a leak in the Unit 1 main generator hydrogen seal oil system. The plant was in cold shutdown and nearing the end of the unit's eighth refueling outage. Operators were performing a leak test of the main generator using nitrogen gas at 75 psig. In response to an alarm for the generator's seal oil system, three operators were dispatched to prepare the out-of-service filter for use by filling and venting the filter assembly. Due to confusing labelling and position indication on the three-way filter selection valve handle, the operators mistook the in-service filter (which was under pressure) for the out-of-service filter. Consequently, when they manipulated the vent plug (to open what they thought was the out-of- service filter assembly), the plug was ejected by the nitrogen pressurized oil. About three hundred gallons were estimated to be ejected on to the turbine deck (and consequently associated systems, structures and components) through the one inch vent opening. The oil ejection was terminated when the operators repositioned the three-way valve to isolate the in-service filter. Two of the operators sustained minor injury to their eyes and the other individual developed a respiratory problem. All were transported to a local hospital for evaluation and treatment, and were subsequently released. Most of the oil from the spill has been cleaned up from the floor areas. The licensee is currently assessing the consequences and impact of the oil spray on other systems, structures, and components in the area and determining corrective actions necessary to recover and resume startup activities. Reactor start-up activities have been suspended pending completion of assessment and restoration activities. Regional Action: The residents are continuing to critically evaluate and monitor the licensee's assessment and corrective action efforts. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Maitri Banerjee (717)542-2134 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 4, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Toledo Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0080 Davis Besse 1 Date: 05/04/95 Oak Harbor,Ohio CALL FROM LICENSEE SEC. DIRECTOR Dockets: 50-346 PWR/B&W-R-LP Subject: EXPLOSIVES FOUND OFFSITE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The Ottawa County Ohio Sheriff's Department initially notified the licensee that 50 sticks of dynamite were found "in close proximity" to one of their transmission lines. Actually, 40-50 sticks of dynamite were found by a county road crew on the ground outside of a large rock quarry along a county road. It was actually underneath a service line feeding the quarry and not a large transmission line. The Toledo City Bomb Squad responded and determined that the dynamite appeared to have been there some time, was partially crystallized and unstable. A local elementary school was evacuated as a precaution. The bomb squad destroyed the found dynamite at the scene. There have been no threats received by the licensee or law enforcement authorities and there appears to be no connection with the plant. Police authorities continue to investigate. Regional Action: Information only. We notified the Information Assessment Team and the EDO's Office. Contact: J.R. CREED (708)829-9857 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 4, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0081 La Salle 2 Date: 05/03/95 Marseilles,Illinois RI MORNING BRIEF Dockets: 50-374 BWR/GE-5 Subject: MULTIPLE HUMAN PERFORMANCE ERRORS- INVOLVING INTERRUPTION OF SHUTDOWN COLLING Reportable Event Number: 28757 Discussion: On 5/3/95 three events occurred. Two of these events led to injection of water into the reactor vessel. LaSalle Unit 2 was on day 73 of a refueling outage. The specific events were as follows: At approximately 3 a.m., operator error caused an interruption of the primary source of shutdown cooling. The operator was attempting to secure flow through the RHR heat exchanger and instead inadvertently manipulated the running pump's suction valve handswitch. The suction valve shut and the running RHR pump tripped. The operator recognized his error and notified the SRO. The valve was immediately reopened and the pump restarted. The pump was off for four minutes according to the alarm typewriter. No increase in reactor coolant temperature was observed. Alternate decay heat removal equipment available included the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system and the C Train of RHR. RWCU was in service during this event. In event two, at approximately 3:30 a.m., operators were cycling the feedwater manual stop valve (F065B). When the valve began to open, reactor vessel water level began to rise unexpectedly. Operators responded by stopping the valve motion and attempting to close the valve. However, the operator did not wait long enough for the motor operator to stop turning in the open direction. Consequently, the breaker tripped when the operator took the handswitch to closed. The breaker was subsequently reset and the valve was closed. Reactor vessel level rose 40 inches. The operators subsequently determined that the motor driven reactor feedwater pump's feedwater regulation valve was cracked off its seat. This allowed the condensate booster pumps to push water through the reactor feedwater pump and into the reactor vessel. Operations personnel had considered that condensate water could enter the reactor vessel as the valve was stroked. They had checked closed several valves, but the feedwater regulating valve was not included. While stroking the F065 valve was part of a procedure, steps necessary to isolate it from the condensate system were not included as part of the procedure. In event three, at 1:47 p.m., an instrument mechanic (IM) was valving a reactor vessel water level backfill system into service. In doing this he caused a hydraulic transient on the Division III Instrument rack; which in turn caused several transmitters to trip. The most significant of which caused the 2B diesel generator to start, the high pressure core spray pump to start, and the injection valve to open. Reactor level rose 10 inches before operators could secure the HPCS pump. The procedure that was used by the IM was different from that used during at power operations and appeared to be too rapid. The licensee is conducting an investigation of these events and developing corrective actions on these multiple human performance errors. Regional Action: Resident inspectors and regional management are following the licensee's investigation. Contact: L. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 4, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-95-0058 South Texas 1 Date: 05/04/95 Wadsworth,Texas Telecon w/SRI on 5/3/95 Dockets: 50-498 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MODE CHANGE WITH STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE Reportable Event Number: 28756 Discussion: On May 3, 1995, the licensee reported that the mode change from Mode 5 to Mode 4 on April 8, 1995, had been performed with Standby Diesel Generator 12 technically inoperable in violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4. During the early phase of a 24-hour test run, high field voltage and high stator temperature indications were evaluated and, based on input from the vendor, the indications were considered to be a normal result of recent slip ring reconditioning. Subsequently, after declaring the engine operable and changing modes, the generator tripped on directional overcurrent. Licensee review of the cause of the trip resulted in a determination on May 2, 1995, that the lug which failed was degraded before the reactor mode change from Mode 5 to Mode 4 was performed. Failure analysis indicated that the lug failed due to being bent, probably during recent slip ring reconditioning. Had the condition of the lug been known, the diesel generator could not have been declared operable as it was prior to the mode change. The engine was in a 24-hour test run in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.e.7 at the time of the trip. This test is required to be performed at least once per 18 months during shutdown and had last been performed less than 18 months prior to this test. At the South Texas Project, the standby diesel generators are not inoperable when running in the test mode and are capable of responding to emergency signals. Regional Action: Followup by resident inspectors. Contact: William Johnson (817)860-8148 Ryan E. Lantz (817)860-8104