Headquarters Daily report MAY 02, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0062 Hope Creek 1 Date: 05/02/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: HILLER ACTUATORS (SPRING-TO-OPEN AOVS) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 23, 1995, during routine functional testing, the licensee identified that two Hiller Actuator Anchor Darling double disk gate valves for the vital equipment area room coolers, failed to open on demand. The valves are normally closed and open to provide cooling water to the safety-related area room coolers. Typically, each safety-related equipment area has two, 100 percent capacity room coolers, each with a separate cooling water supply isolation valve. The licensee found that one such isolation valve failed to open in two of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) rooms. (The other two EDG rooms were not affected.) After troubleshooting the cause of the failure, the licensee found that the air regulator for the Hiller Actuator was not maintaining proper air pressure, allowing air pressure to drift high about 20 psi above the setpoint. This results in the air operator inducing higher than desired closing forces that could have contributed to the failure of the valves to open on demand. The licensee manually opened the two valves and commenced repairs. In addition, the remaining similar valves (32 total population) in the plant were inspected and four additional air regulators were found to not properly regulate air pressure and two other regulators were found to be leaking. Repairs have been made to all such valves. The licensee continues to functionally test all such Hiller Actuator valves on a weekly basis to ensure operability. Root cause assessment is on-going. Design change and corrective action efforts are in process. Regional Action: Routine resident followup. The residents are following the licensee's troubleshooting and root cause analysis efforts; and evaluating the effectiveness of corrective actions and planned design changes. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Robert Summers (609)935-3850 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0063 Hope Creek 1 Date: 05/02/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 2, 1995, PSE&G announced that Robert Hovey, General Manager, Hope Creek Operations, will resign effective May 26, 1995, in order to accept a position with Florida Power and Light Company. PSE&G also announced the selection of Mr. Mark Reddemann as the new General Manager, Hope Creek Operations, effective May 22, 1995. Mr. Reddemann comes to PSE&G from WPPSS. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Robert Summers (609)935-3850 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Advanced Medical Systems Inc. MR Number: 3-95-0077 Advanced Medical Systems Inc. Date: 05/01/95 Cleveland,Ohio TELEPHONE CALL TO REGION III Dockets: 03016055 License No: 34-19089-01 Subject: STOLEN TRUCK BURNED ON SITE GROUNDS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The licensee reported finding a burned pickup truck on their property early Monday morning. An unidentified person (or persons) apparently drove the truck through the licensee's chained gate during the weekend, and left many skid marks on the parking lot, before setting the truck on fire. The truck was located near a large warehouse building, and was not visible to the local residences. The fire was not reported to the local fire dept. The licensee indicated that there was no damage to the building. The licensee reported the incident to the police department, which responded Monday morning. The police indicated that the truck was stolen. The truck was subsequently towed away later in the day. Also, the licensee has repaired the gate. The licensee does not believe that the incident was a threat against the facility. Regional Action: Region III will review the incident during the next scheduled site visit this week. This information is current as of May 2, 1995. Contact: MICHAEL F. WEBER (708)829-9825 JOHN R. MADERA (708)829-9834 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0078 Prairie Island 1 2 Date: 05/02/95 Welch,Minnesota RI PC Dockets: 50-282,50-306 PWR/W-2-LP,PWR/W-2-LP Subject: PRAIRIE ISLAND DRY CASK INSPECTION EXIT INTERVIEW AND PUBLIC METTING. Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 28, 1995, the NRC conducted a team exit interview with the licensee at the Public Library in Red Wing, Minnesota, to present findings and conclusions of the dry cask storage inspection. The meeting was open to the public to attend as observers. Following the exit interview, the public was invited to ask questions. About 125 people were in the audience. The NRC received the licensee's results of the preoperational tests (dry run) on April 20, 1995. The NRC identified four open issues requiring resolution before the NRC considers the licensee ready to load fuel. The issues involve: 1) hydrostatic testing performed on the cask, 2) a nonconformance report regarding several welding discrepancies, 3) final review of the cask unloading procedure, and 4) fabrication of pressure and temperature monitoring instrumentation for cask unloading. A fifth issue was raised at the public meeting pertaining to retrievability requirements. The NRC published a federal register notice on March 6, 1995, which included an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact following the licensee's request for an exemption of the 10 CFR Part 72 requirement to wait 30 days following submittal of its preoperational test report prior to loading fuel. The NRC informed the licensee at the exit meeting that consideration will be given for granting the exemption after the open issues are resolved. Regional Action: Information Only. Contact: E. GREENMAN (708)829-9661 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Syncor International Corporation MR Number: 3-95-0079 Syncor International Corporation Date: 05/01/95 Miamisburg,Ohio TELECON FROM REGION IV Dockets: 03015204 License No: 34-19007-01MD Subject: CONTAMINATED PACKAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 1, 1995, the Department of the Air Force Radioisotope Committee reported to Region IV that a package containing approximately 30 millicuries of technetium-99m was delivered to its medical facility at Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) in Dayton, OH on May 1, 1995. The package survey showed significant removable contamination (562,000 dpm/100cm2) on the exterior of the package. WPAFB notified the radiopharmacy contractor, Syncor International, of the findings. The package was not opened and WPAFB personnel placed it in a double wrapped plastic bag. The package will be returned, after decay, to Syncor for investigation of the cause of the contamination. After being notified of the problem, Syncor personnel immediately contacted the driver and conducted contamination surveys of the driver and the delivery vehicle. Surveys of the vehicle included the steering wheel, gear shift, passenger compartment and trunk of the vehicle. No radiation levels above natural background were detected. It is, therefore, unlikely that there was any radiation exposure to licensee staff or the public as a result of this incident. Syncor is planning to open the package next week to determine whether the cause of this event was related to damage sustained by the source holder and shipping container. Syncor stated that its records indicate that prior to delivery of the package to WPAFB, the package was surveyed and wipe tested for removable contamination and no unusual radiation levels were found. Regional Action: Region III will monitor Syncor's investigation of the cause of the incident. NMSS and the State of Ohio have been notified. Contact: DARREL WIEDEMAN (708)829-9808 B.J. HOLT (708)829-9836 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-95-0057 Palo Verde 1 Date: 05/02/95 Wintersburg,Arizona Phone Call from Sen. Resident Insp. Dockets: 50-528 PWR/CE80 Subject: FUEL ASSEMBLY STUCK DURING CORE RELOAD Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 30, 1995, at 12:30 a.m. (MST), during the Unit 1 core reload, refueling personnel received an underload alarm as they were lowering a new fuel assembly into the core. During a subsequent attempt to raise the assembly, an overload interlock was received. Visual examination revealed that an assembly in an adjacent core location had not been positioned properly and was preventing insertion of the new fuel assembly. The fuel assembly was approximately 2 feet from the lower core support plate and was restrained on three sides by previously loaded fuel assemblies. Early on the morning of May 1, 1995, the licensee installed a restraining device to stabilize the mispositioned fuel assembly and four adjacent assemblies and then attempted to move the partially inserted fuel assembly manually in a horizontal direction. This attempt was not successful and the movement was suspended. The licensee subsequently requested a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) from the NRC staff to permit a 200 pound increase (in 50 pound increments) in the Technical Specification (TS) overload limit (from 1600 pounds to 1800 pounds) for the refueling machine. The licensee and the fuel vendor (ABB-CE) had determined that the additional 200 pounds would not adversely affect the core internals or the pressure vessel. They suspected that there could be damage to the fuel assembly grid straps, but did not anticipate fuel pin damage. On May 1, 1995, at 9:20 a.m. (MST), Region IV management granted the NOED based on a review of the licensee's evaluation. On May 1, at 1:30 p.m. (MST), refueling personnel were able to free the stuck fuel assembly with a force of 150 pounds over the TS limit. The licensee proceeded to move the fuel assembly and adjacent assemblies to the spent fuel pool for inspection. Regional Action: The resident inspectors monitored both the unsuccessful and successful fuel movement operations. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 K. Johnston (602)386-3650