Headquarters Daily report MARCH 31, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 31, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0085 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-18, Supp. 1: "Potential Pressure-Locking of Safety- Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," issued March 31, 1995. The NRC issued this information notice supplement to alert addressees to additional analyses identifying the potential susceptibility of multiple safety injection flow paths to a common mode failure due to pressure-locking. Technical contacts: Thomas Scarbrough, NRR (301) 415-2794 John Tappert, NRR (301) 415-1167 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 31, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0049 Indian Point 3 Date: 03/31/95 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANNED PROTEST MARCH TO CLOSE INDIAN POINT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: A local group, Concerned Citizens to Close Indian Point, plans to march from downtown Peekskill to the Indian Point plants on April 1. In an application for a Village of Buchanan permit to conduct the march, the group estimated that between 50 and 100 individuals would participate in the march. The march will be from noon to 3:00 p.m., and will end at a municipal parking lot located across from the entrance gate to the Indian Point plants. The licensee and local enforcement officials are aware of the planned march. The NRC resident inspector will be on site during the march. Regional Action: Information item only. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MARCH 31, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 2-95-0038 Summer 1 Date: 03/31/95 Jenkinsville,,South Carolina Dockets: 50-395 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: INJURED NRC INSPECTOR (UPDATE) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 29, 1995, during an in-plant inspection at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, a Region II inspector fell approximately 6-8 feet from a ladder to a concrete floor in the Auxiliary Building. An accompanying inspector summoned assistance and the injured individual was removed from the Radiation Control Area (RCA) and transported to the Richland County Memorial Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina by ambulance. The injured inspector was released from the hospital later that day with a diagnosis of lumbar strain and no other injuries. The accompanying inspector complained of shortness of breath and dizziness and was transported to the hospital in the ambulance which transported the inspector with the back injury. Following medical tests, the inspector was diagnosed as having suffered a mild heart attack and still remains hospitialized in Columbia. He is expected to be released from the hospital later today. Although both inspectors were working in the RCA of the plant at the time of the incident, neither received any measurable exposure or radiological contamination as a result of the incident. Licensee response personnel were especially helpful and accommodating in this situation. Regional Action: Region II continues to maintain contact with the hospitalized inspector. Contact: T. Decker (404)331-2559 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 31, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. MR Number: 3-95-0045 Perry 1 Date: 03/31/95 Perry,Ohio SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-440 BWR/GE-6 Subject: POWER PERTURBATIONS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At about 11:30 a.m. on March 28, 1995, the APRMs spiked to an indicated 110 percent power resulting in a high APRM alarm. Investigation of computer data showed erratic output from the onservice steam throttle pressure detector in the electrohydraulic control system for approximately 30 seconds. The erratic pressure signal translated into turbine control valve movement and resultant reactor pressure and power pertubations. Thermal power remained below 101 percent based on 5-second heat balance sampling periods. Subsequently, all indications stabilized and remained at their original outputs. The licensee suspects that one of four electronic cards in the "B" pressure regulator circuitry malfunctioned momentarily. The "A" pressure regulator has been placed in service and a data acquisition system has been installed to monitor both pressure regulators in an attempt to identify the problem. The licensee plans to continue to monitor the data and then develop a testing process for the B regulator. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring licensee activities with regional assistance. Contact: R.D. LANKSBURY (708)829-9631 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 31, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0046 Braidwood 2 Date: 03/31/95 Braceville,Illinois SRI PC Dockets: 50-457 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: ELECTRICAL FIRE IN UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM CONTROL PANEL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 30, 1995, at about 1:45 p.m. (CST) a control switch for the Main Turbine Emergency Lube Oil Pump grounded and caught fire. The electrical fire was quickly extinguished without threat to the control room operators and without affecting any other control room equipment or operations. At the time of the fire, maintenance personnel were troubleshooting an electrical ground on the 250 Volt DC system and the loss of pump status indications. While removing the switch from the control panel to investigate the indication lamps, the switch grounded and a small electrical fire started. The technician removing the switch received minor burns to his hands and was treated on site. The licensee identified the cause of the ground and repaired the damaged switch. Regional Action: The inspectors went to the control room and verified that the fire was extinguished. The inspectors will review the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: L.F. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 31, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-95-0042 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 03/31/95 Wintersburg,Arizona RESIDENT INSPECTOR CALL TO RIV Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: INADEQUATE PENETRATION OVERCURRENT PROTECTION Reportable Event Number: 28611 Discussion: On March 29, 1995, based on a design bases evaluation of electrical penetrations, the licensee reported to the NRC that certain circuits did not have the required backup overcurrent protection (primary overcurrent protection was provided). A total of 34 circuits in each unit were identified to not have the required backup overcurrent protection. Based on not meeting TS 3.8.4.1 for overcurrent protection, the licensee entered the 72-hour action of TS 3.8.4.1 for all three units to either restore the backup overcurrent protection or deenergize the circuits. On March 30, 1995, the licensee requested two NOEDs regarding this situation - one for Unit 1 which is scheduled to shut down for its refueling outage on April 1, 1995; and another NOED for Units 2 and 3. The Unit 1 NOED is based on the licensee's need to remain in Mode 4 for an extended time to conduct steam generator chemical cleaning. The licensee has requested an extension of the time to achieve cold shutdown without the circuits deenergized or backup protection provided while in Mode 4. The NOED for Units 2 and 3 (both operating) is based on the need to maintain a nuclear cooling water containment isolation valve open in Units 2 and 3 to provide cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seals. The need to deenergize this circuit for compliance with TS 3.8.4.1 and the desire to keep to the valve open results in entry into TS 3.6.3.1 for an inoperable containment isolation valve. The licensee has requested an extension of the 4-hour action statement of TS 3.6.3.1 to allow installation and testing of a backup overcurrent protection device on this valve circuit. Regional Action: Regional management and NRR personnel are evaluating the licensee's NOED requests. A conference call has been established to discuss the NOED requests with the licensee. Contact: Howard J. Wong (510)975-0296