Headquarters Daily report APRIL 17, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS APRIL 17, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0090 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-21: "Unexpected Degradation of Lead Storage Batteries," to be issued April 20, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to possible degradation of lead storage batteries within the first two years of service. Technical contacts: S. N. Saba, NRR (301) 415-2781 Thomas Koshy, NRR (301) 415-1176 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I APRIL 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0056 Ginna 1 Date: 04/17/95 Ontario,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-244 PWR/W-2-LP Subject: INCOMPLETE WELDS IDENTIFIED ON ABB-CE WELDED SLEEVES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During the 1995 steam generator eddy current inspections, a total of 750 sleeves were inspected using the Zetec "Plus Point" probe. Approximately 500 of these sleeves were ABB-CE welded sleeves. The inspection revealed indications on the inside surface of the upper weld in eighteen sleeves. Inspection of these welds revealed that two sleeves were not welded at all. The other welds had either pinholes or incomplete fusion. All of the incomplete welds had been inspected by the same NDE technician after sleeve installation in 1990. Further review is in progress, including a structural integrity evaluation and determination of the root cause of the failure to identify the problem in the original ultrasonic testing. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the facility inspection and disposition of the weld problems. A regional specialist inspection is planned to review the licensee steam generator inspection results. Contact: Ed Knutson (315)524-6935 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0065 Prairie Island 1 2 Date: 04/17/95 Welch,Minnesota RI PC Dockets: 50-282,50-306 PWR/W-2-LP,PWR/W-2-LP Subject: PRAIRIE ISLAND DRY CASK INSPECTION Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The licensee completed its preoperational cask handling exercises on April 14, 1995. During the week of April 17, 1995, representatives from NRR, NMSS, and Region III will conduct a review to assess the licensee's final preparations and review the preoperational test results prior to fuel loading. Regional Action: Information Only. Contact: E. GREENMAN (708)829-9661 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0066 Braidwood 1 Date: 04/17/95 Braceville,Illinois SRI PC Dockets: 50-456 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: UPDATE ON REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILED INSTRUMENT BUS INVERTER Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 9, 1995, Unit 1 received a reactor trip. The apparent cause was the failure of a capacitor in the inverter firing card for instrument bus 111. On April 11, the licensee completed modifying all four instrument bus firing cards to prevent this problem from recurring. Subsequently, the licensee unsuccessfully attempted to draw a condenser vacuum in preparation for unit restart. Upon investigation, the licensee discovered that 4 of the 12 low pressure turbine rupture discs had failed. A root cause investigation revealed that these rupture discs had failed prematurely due to age degradation. These rupture discs had never been replaced and were not part of any preventive maintenance program. On April 15, the licensee completed replacing all 12 Unit 1 low pressure rupture discs and successfully established a condenser vacuum. On April 16, at 3:30 a.m. (CDT), Unit 1 was taken critical and was synchronized to the grid at 7:11 p.m. Regional Action: The resident inspectors observed portions of the low pressure rupture disc repairs and continue to monitor licensee activities as power is raised to 100 percent. Contact: L.F. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0067 La Salle 1 2 Date: 04/17/95 Marseilles,Illinois SRI VIA TELCON Dockets: 50-373,50-374 BWR/GE-5,BWR/GE-5 Subject: STAND DOWN FROM OUTAGE WORK DUE TO MULTIPLE EVENTS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 15, 1995, LaSalle station management decided to stand down almost all activities for the next two days due to several events and personnel errors which happened in the same shift. Unit 1 was at 100 percent power and Unit 2 was shut down for refueling in Mode 5. First, an electrician pulled the wrong fuse during a Unit 2 surveillance and several ESF components actuated (Event 28687 - both trains of Standby Gas Treatment started, reactor building ventilation isolated for both units, and Unit 2 containment monitoring isolated, reactor recirculation hydraulic power unit isolated, and TIP purge isolated). All equipment responded as expected. The fuse was replaced and the ESF actuations reset. A second electrician present to verify the activity failed to identify the wrong fuse was about to be removed prior to removal. Second, an instrument technician was removing the leads from a Unit 2 Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) power supply, to measure the output voltage, when the ARI system actuated (Event 28689). The ARI actuation resulted in the scram air header depressurizing. When the scram air header depressurized, the scram inlet and outlet valves opened and the vent and drain valves shut, causing the scram discharge volume (SDV) to begin filling with water. This caused a scram on high SDV level. After the ARI actuated, all components responded as expected. Third, the 0 Diesel Generator (DG) cooling water pump failed to start when it received a valid signal from Unit 2 (Event 28688). The DG was declared inoperable. Since the B standby liquid control (SLC) pump for Unit 1 was already out of service and with the Unit 1 A SLC pump emergency power source now inoperable, both trains of SLC were inoperable for Unit 1. The licensee meggered the DG cooling water pump motor and tested the associated breaker. No problems were found. The pump was successfully run. The pump and diesel were then declared operable. Fourth, a laborer working on the refueling floor got a hot particle on his eyelid. Initial activity was 600,000 dpm. Isotopic analysis indicated Co-60. An initial Varskin calculation indicated 2.1 - 2.2 Rad to the skin, 31 mRad to the eye, and 6 mRad gamma deep dose equivalent. During this stand down, management intended to perform root cause analysis on each of these events, establish any commonalities between these and previous events, and prepare and execute briefings for all plant personnel. The SRI responded to the site and observed licensee activities. As of 0500 on April 17, 1995, the licensee has not solved the problem with the ARI. The licensee has also not established the root causes for the "0" DG cooling water pump failing to start. Subsequent testing has been unable to recreate the failure. The RP department surveyed the refueling floor and found no further hot particles. The investigation of this issue is still ongoing. Regional Action: Resident inspectors and regional management are following the licensee's investigations and recovery actions. Contact: L. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV APRIL 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-95-0051 South Texas 1 Date: 04/17/95 Wadsworth,Texas SRI Dockets: 50-498 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: REACTOR STARTUP FOLLOWING REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: South Texas Project, Unit 1, completed as scheduled a 41-day Refueling Outage 1RE-05 and closed the main turbine output breakers at 6:45 p.m. on Friday, April 14, 1995. The licensee is currently at 63 percent power and will perform NI calibrations and flux mapping at 76 percent power. During the outage, the licensee performed a containment integrated leak rate test with satisfactory results. Additionally, a 100 percent steam generator tube inspection revealed circumferential cracking in several tubes and resulted in plugging of 94 tubes, which is approximately 1/2 percent of the tubes and consistent with the licensee's expectations. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: William D. Johnson (817)860-8148 Ryan E. Lantz (817)860-8104 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV APRIL 17, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Omaha Public Power District MR Number: 4-95-0052 Ft Calhoun 1 Date: 04/17/95 Fort Calhoun,Nebraska SRI Dockets: 50-285 PWR/CE Subject: REACTOR STARTUP FOLLOWING REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Fort Calhoun Station completed their scheduled 49-day refueling outage and closed the main turbine output breakers at 6:15 p.m. on Saturday, April 15, 1995. The licensee is currently at 30 percent power and will continue increasing power at 3 percent per hour following a normal 24-hour boric acid soak. The outage began approximately 3 weeks earlier than scheduled due to an RCS leak into containment from a control rod drive mechanism seal. The licensee completed the outage in 53 days, 4 days past their scheduled outage time of 49 days. Following eddy current testing of both steam generators, the licensee plugged one tube on Steam Generator A and none on Steam Generator B. The licensee made a major modification to add additional cooling capability to their control room envelope air conditioners. This was done to meet safety analysis design for component cooling water (CCW) temperatures following a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA). During a design basis LOCA, the licensee will be able to reduce the heat load on CCW by isolating CCW from the control room air conditioners. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: William D. Johnson (817)860-8148 Ryan E. Lantz (817)860-8104