Headquarters Daily report APRIL 14, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I APRIL 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Baltimore Gas & Elec Co. MR Number: 1-95-0055 Calvert Cliffs 2 Date: 04/14/95 Lusby,Maryland SRI PC Dockets: 50-318 PWR/CE Subject: FIRES IN CONTAINMENT AND AUXILIARY BUILDING Reportable Event Number: 28681 Discussion: Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 is shut down for a maintenance and refueling outage. At 3:30 a.m. on the morning of April 14, 1995, a small electrical fire was discovered in the containment. The fire occurred at a splice in an electrical cord supplying temporary lighting in the reactor vessel to support refueling. The fire was extinguished by dropping the cord in the refueling water. While attempting to recover the light, the electrical cord parted at the splice and the light dropped down onto, and lodged in, the upper core support grid. BGE is currently investigating means to remove the light. There was no apparent damage to any equipment or to fuel in the reactor vessel. On April 14, at approximately 5:10 am, a second fire was discovered on the 5' elevation of the Auxiliary Building, in a fan room. The fire brigade responded and attempted to extinguish the fire with CO2. When the CO2 proved ineffective, they switched to water. At 5:28 am, an Unusual Event was declared due to the fire being in an area containing vital equipment and not extinguished within 15 minutes. The fire was extinguished shortly thereafter. The Unusual Event was terminated at 5:55 am. The offsite fire department was not called for assistance. The fire has been attributed to welding activities on the 12' elevation of the turbine building igniting cork filler material in an expansion joint between the turbine and auxiliary buildings. A reflash watch has been established in the turbine building. A reflash watch was deemed unnecessary in the auxiliary building. Both areas have been secured to preserve evidence for evaluation. There was no apparent equipment damage. Regional Action: BGE is performing root cause evaluations of both fires. The resident staff are monitoring the BGE activities. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 R. Fuhrmeister (610)337-5059 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV APRIL 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0050 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 04/14/95 San Onofre 1 San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-206 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: LEAKAGE FROM SPENT FUEL POOL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During an inspection of the Unit 1 containment building on April 12, 1995, the licensee, accompanied by the Senior Resident Inspector for Units 2 and 3, unexpectedly found several hundred gallons of water in the reactor cavity, on the containment floor, and in the containment emergency and spherical sumps. Unit 1 was permanently shut down in November 1992. The inspection was performed as part of an investigation into the potential flowpath of approximately 800 gallons [3028 liters] of water that had drained from the spent fuel pool (SPF) on April 10, 1995. A similar draindown also occurred on March 21, 1995, though the licensee thought then that the water had been inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank through leaking isolation valves. The licensee now believes that when the SFP water level is increased to 40'10", the SFP skimmer pump transfers water from the SFP to the upender cavity, and the unsealed transfer gate allowed the upender area level to increase slightly above the SFP level. Water apparently overflowed into a cable guide for the transfer trolley, filled the transfer tube, and leaked through the blind flange into the containment cavity. Other spent fuel pool leakage issues have also been the subject of recent media interest. These issues were reviewed by the NRC during an October 1994 inspection to which the licensee responded with an action plan forwarded to the NRC on March 10, 1995. Approximately 1.85 gallons [7 liters] of water per week have been vacuumed from the space outside the SFP liner and within another membrane. The licensee determined that the leakage of 7 liters of water per week was not solely from the SFP as earlier postulated. The licensee reached the conclusion that this water was diluted with nonradioactive ground water because the tritium concentration was significantly less than that in the SFP. The licensee believes that ground water is seeping through the membrane into the sample area. The licensee does not believe that SFP water is getting into the ground water. Additionally, the licensee has determined that approximately 60 gallons [227 liters] per day have leaked into the refueling water storage tank (RWST) from the SFP cooling system, and another 70 gallons [265 liters] per day of water evaporate from the SFP. The licensee is investigating the source of leakage into the RWST which appears to be likely due to leaking isolation valves. In summary, the following has occurred: - SFP leakage to refueling water storage tank (60 gpd [227 lpd] - SFP leakage to containment building (2 occasions, 800 gallons [3028 liters] each) - SFP leakage to leakage detection area (less than 1.85 gallons [7 liters] per week) - Ground water flow to leakage detection area (less than 1.85 gallons [7 liters] per week) - SFP evaporation (70 gpd [265 lpd]) NRC Headquarters, Region IV, and the resident inspectors for Units 2 and 3 are monitoring the licensee's investigation into the SFP leakage. Contact: J. SLOAN (714)492-2641 C. CAIN (817)860-8186 H. WONG (510)975-0296