Headquarters Daily report APRIL 12, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Indiana University Medical Center MR Number: 3-95-0059 Indiana University Medical Center Date: 04/11/95 Indianapolis,Indiana TELEPHONE CALL TO REGION III Dockets: 03001609 Subject: UNAUTHORIZED DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The licensee notified the Region III office that four bags of radioactively contaminated waste from research laboratories at Indiana University Medical School were inadvertently sent to the city incinerator for disposal. A janitor, hired from a temporary service, collected the waste on the evening of April 7, 1995, from specially labeled receptacles for radioactive solid waste and placed the bags with the normal trash. This trash was then picked up by BFI and transported to the City Incinerator in Indianapolis where it was burned. On April 10, 1995, the licensee was notified by individual researchers that the radioactive waste was missing. The bags contained disposable gloves, paper products, and other dry waste contaminated with approximately 533 uCi (1.97E7 becquerels) of phosphorus-32, 1.25 mCi (4.63E7 becquerels) of sulfur-35, and 250 uCi (9.25E6 becquerels) of hydrogen-3. The City Incinerator's remote radiation monitoring system was not triggered by the contaminated waste. Regional Action: NMSS and the State of Indiana were informed of the incident. The licensee will provide a written report to Region III within 30 days. Region III will review this matter during a special inspection. Contact: D.A. PISKURA (708)829-9867 T.L. SIMMONS (708)829-9842 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0060 Prairie Island 1 2 Date: 04/12/95 Welch,Minnesota RI PC Dockets: 50-282,50-306 PWR/W-2-LP,PWR/W-2-LP Subject: PRAIRIE ISLAND DRY CASK DRY RUN Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 11, 1995, the licensee initiated its dry run with its first TN-40 spent fuel storage cask. A Region III senior manager, the resident inspectors, and a regional radiation protection inspector observed the licensee's activities. The inspectors observed the licensee cautiously move the cask from the decontamination area to the spent fuel pool (SFP) enclosure with the Auxiliary Building crane and partially lower the cask into the SFP. After the cask had been lowered into the SFP a few feet and then filled with water, the licensee observed with a video camera that the one half-inch thick wear plate, upon which the cask is placed, was not fully resting on the SFP bottom. One corner of the wear plate was resting on top of two alignment pins used to align temporary spent fuel storage racks (used during the last two refueling outages). The licensee terminated the dry run, drained the cask, and returned the cask to the decontamination area in the Auxiliary Building. The licensee corrected the wear plate alignment problem during the night of April 11 and will resume dry run activities on April 12. Regional Action: The inspectors will monitor the licensee's efforts to realign the wear pad and observe further dry run activities. Contact: E. GREENMAN (708)829-9661 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Detroit Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0061 Fermi 2 Date: 04/11/95 Newport,Michigan RESIDENT INSPECTOR PC Dockets: 50-341 BWR/GE-4 Subject: REACTOR RESTART FOLLOWING UNUSUAL EVENT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On April 9, 1995, Fermi operators manually tripped the reactor and turbine from 80 percent power as part of a pre-planned evolution to monitor turbine critical speed coastdown vibration levels. The licensee anticipated that reactor water level would drop to approximately 130 - 135 inches due to the expected shrink following the scram. However, the actual plant response did not match the simulator response and reactor water level dropped to approximately the Level 2 (110.8 inches) setpoint. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) automatically started and injected to the core. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) initiated but did not inject to the core. An Unusual Event was declared based on a valid Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) injection. All anticipated Level 3 (173 inches) isolations occurred as expected. However, Division 1 Level 2 isolations and actuations were received, while Division 2 isolations and actuations did not occur. The licensee performed functional checks on the instruments that did not actuate and all checks were within allowed tolerances. The licensee confirmed through General Electric that the observed responses were not unusual for a condition in which the setpoint was just barely reached for a short period of time. The licensee commenced a reactor startup at 1139 EST April 11, 1995, and the reactor was made critical at 1358 of the same day. The main turbine was synchronized to the grid at 0508 April 12. The Resident Inspector and Operator Licensing ROAR were in the control room to observe the planned trip and operator response. The inspectors also monitored portions of the startup activities. Regional Action: Information Only Contact: M. PHILLIPS (708)829-9637 C. HARPER (708)829-9627 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Michigan State University MR Number: 3-95-0062 Michigan State University Date: 04/11/95 East Lansing,Michigan TELECON TO REG III & OPERATIONS CTR Dockets: 03000806 License No: 21-00021-29 Subject: LOSS OF 250 MICROCURIES OF PHOSPHORUS-32 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The licensee reported that a package containing 250 microcuries of P-32 was determined to be lost from a research laboratory. The package had been delivered to the University laboratory on March 31, 1995, and was determined to be missing on April 7, 1995. A search was initiated with negative results and the package was declared lost on April 11, 1995. A major cleaning of the laboratory took place on March 31, 1995, and the licensee believes that the P-32 was inadvertently discarded with normal trash to a landfill. The licensee does not believe that the licensed material was stolen. The licensee will submit a 30-day report of the incident. Regional Action: Region III will review the incident during a team inspection planned for July 1995. NMSS and the State of Michigan have been notified. Contact: DON SRENIAWSKI (708)829-9814 JIM LYNCH (708)829-9818 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV APRIL 12, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0049 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 04/12/95 San Onofre 3 Report from Resident Inspectors San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-362 PWR/CE Subject: FAILED REACTOR COOLANAT PUMP SEAL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 8:25 p.m. (PDT) on April 11, 1995, while the unit was operating at full power, the middle seal of reactor coolant pump (RCP) 3P004 failed. Each RCP has four seals, each designed to withstand full reactor coolant system pressure. When the middle seal failed, the differential pressure across the lower and upper seals increased by about 200 psid and 500 psid, respectively. The vapor seal differential pressure did not change. Controlled bleedoff flow from RCP 3P004 increased slightly, to about 2.1 gpm, and controlled bleedoff temperature remained in the normal range. The licensee is monitoring important parameters on the remaining seals. Licensee procedures allow continued operation with one failed seal, but licensee procedures require a controlled shutdown if a second seal fails. Pressure spikes have been observed throughout the cycle due to intermittent problems with the lower seal. The lower seal differential pressure would normally have been expected to increase to take half the load of the failed middle seal. The licensee evaluated the current performance and determined that the upper and lower seals remain an adequate barrier to the vapor seal, and that continued operation was acceptable. However, the licensee indicated that if the lower seal degrades beyond the revised alarm points established after the middle seal failure, the unit would be shut down. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's actions. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 J. Sloan (714)492-2461