Headquarters Daily report MARCH 28, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0045 Indian Point 3 Date: 03/28/95 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: LOCAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND MEDIA TOURING INDIAN POINT 3 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 29, 1995, New York Power Authority senior management, including S. David Freeman, President and Chief Executive Officer, and William Cahill, Chief Nuclear Officer, will be conducting a tour of the Indian Point 3 nuclear power plant for local public officials and the media. The public officials, which have accepted NYPA's invitation to tour the plant include the Mayor of Buchanan, the Cortlandt Town Supervisor, the Mayor of Peekskill, and others. The staff from the New York Times, Reuters, Gannett, North County and the Cortlandt Observer have also accepted NYPA's invitation. Regional Action: Information item only. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0047 Hope Creek 1 Date: 03/28/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: MARCH 23, 1995 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING Reportable Event Number: 28579 Discussion: At 6:22 p.m. on March 23, while in Operating Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, and with RHR shutdown cooling in service, an automatic isolation of the "B" RHR shutdown cooling system occurred due to a loss of the power feed to the "B" RPS motor generator set. Consequently, the "B" RPS and the "B" and "D" NSSSS logic were deenergized. At the time of this event, operators were in the process of restoring the normal feed to the Number 00B180 unit substation, a non-class 1E bus. (One of the loads on this substation was the "B" RPS MG set.) This unit substation had been energized by an alternate feed via a cross-tie breaker to the Number 00B170 unit substation to allow a maintenance activity on the normal feeder breaker. After the maintenance activity (a non-intrusive PM that required the breaker to be racked out) was completed, the operators were requested to rack the breaker back in and then place the unit substation on the normal feed. Operators opened the alternate feeder breaker and then closed the normal breaker; however, the normal breaker failed to close, resulting in the unit substation deenergizing. The loss of the RPS MG set and subsequent loss of shutdown cooling was not recognized by the operators as a potential problem that could occur during this evolution. However, once the RPS deenergized and the shutdown cooling system isolated, operators recognized that the unit substation was the cause of the event, and recovered shutdown cooling by closing the alternate feeder breaker and resetting the NSSSS actuation to reopen the isolation valves for RHR. Shutdown cooling was lost for about 30 minutes, and reactor coolant temperature increased about 20 degrees F., from 120 to 140 degrees F. The apparent cause of the normal feeder breaker failing to close was a failure of the breaker racking device, a mechanical position indicator that interlocks with the breaker closing logic to prevent breaker closure if not properly racked in. Also, during the review of the event, operators discovered that they had not followed procedures while returning the unit substation to the normal electrical alignment. Operating procedures required that the unit substation operating loads be removed from service prior to swapping the feeder breakers. The operators had attempted to swap the feeder breakers while the bus was still loaded when the event occurred. It does not appear that the failure to follow the procedure caused the event; however, if the procedure had been followed, the operators most likely would have identified that one of the operating loads was the "B" RPS MG set and then would have recognized the risk of losing the shutdown cooling system. Regional Action: Routine resident inspector followup. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Robert Summers (610)337-5189 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0046 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 03/28/95 Wiscasset,Maine Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: EXPOSURES EXCEEDING ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 24, 1995, two Maine Yankee contractor employees received radiation doses in excess of the licensee's 1 rem limit. At 7:15 pm, the contractor employees entered the containment to decontaminate a reactor coolant pump (RCP) impeller shaft in preparation for dye penetrant test. A health physics (HP) technician was continuously monitoring the work. Shortly after entering the work area (decontamination container), the workers dosimetry began alarming. The HP technician was conducting a survey of the radiation field while the job was in progress. After about 12 minutes the technician read the worker's dosimetry and stopped the job. The workers dosimeter alarm was set for 400 mr or 4 rem per hour. One worker received a 2 rem job dose (2.4 rem for the year) and the other worker received a 1.5 rem job dose (1.6 rem for the year). The dose rate in the work area was approximately 4 R/hr. The projected dose for the job was based on a survey earlier in the day from the previous shift that indicated a dose rate in the work area of 1 R/hr. Preliminary information indicates that the HP technician did not survey the area prior to the beginning of the work and did not attend the pre-job briefing. In addition, the HP technician allowed work to continue after the workers informed him of the their alarming dosimeters. Although, regulatory dose limits of 10 CFR 20.2202 were not exceeded, the event appears to be similar to a previous unplanned exposure that occurred earlier during the refueling outage on February 11-13, 1995. Without an adequate pre-work survey by HP technicians, radiation workers were conducting repairs to the fuel "up-ender" device located in the reactor cavity. The workers were inadvertently exposed to a point source on the tip of a hydrolaser wand that is used for decontamination. The hot-spot on the hydrolaser had dose rates between 30 R/hr and 100 R/hr. A review of video tape of the work in process revealed that the workers were in direct contact with the hydrolaser wand during portions of their work activity. The licensee determined that an unmonitored exposure had occurred since the source had highly localized dose rates. The licensee estimates that the workers potentially received doses in excess of administrative limits. Maine Yankee senior officials have ordered a work stoppage of all high-radiation area work activities until management expectations are conveyed to supervisors and radiation workers. The licensee has also committed to complete radiological incident reports, complete root cause analysis, and initiate a high-level event review board to investigate both events prior to the resumption of high radiation work. The results of the licensee's investigation will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days. Regional Action: Licensee evaluation and corrective actions are being monitored by resident and region-based inspectors. Contact: Bill Lazarus (610)337-5231 Jim Joyner (610)337-5370 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0044 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 03/28/95 Wiscasset,Maine Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: Temporary Staff Change Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Plant Manager Robert W. Blackmore has been assigned to INPO in Atlanta, Georgia, as part of the loaned executive program. The assignment is expected to last about 15 months. His assignment will have him qualifying as an INPO Plant Evaluation Team Manager. During his absence from Maine Yankee, Chris Shaw (former Manager of Operations) will be acting Plant Manager. Contact: Bill Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0042 Dresden 2 Date: 03/28/95 Morris,Illinois RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 50-237 BWR/GE-3 Subject: EXTENDED UNIT 2 FORCED OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 22, 1995, the licensee identified that the maximum fuel design limiting ratio for centerline melt (FDLRC) exceeded the technical specification limit following movement of control rod D-6 during individual control rod scram testing on Unit 3 while at 60 percent power. The calculated ratio was 1.03 which exceeded the limit of 1.0. The licensee's preliminary investigation showed weaknesses in the reactivity control program and also identified two additional instances on March 22 where FDLRC exceeded TS limits (1.017 and 1.005). The licensee placed a hold on Unit 2 startup activities until short-term corrective actions recommended by the investigation team were completed. Actions taken included development of a new individual control rod scram time testing method and procedure, and additional training for the nuclear engineers and operations personnel. The licensee has not specified a Unit 2 startup date. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's investigation and corrective actions. Contact: P.L. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. MR Number: 3-95-0043 Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. Date: 03/28/95 Cleveland,Ohio NOTIFICATION ONSITE NRC PERSONNEL Dockets: 03016055 Subject: THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Sometime between 4:30 p.m. on March 27, 1995, and 7:00 a.m. on March 28, 1995, the Region III Mobile Environmental Radiation Laboratory (Lab) was burglarized. The Lab was locked and located at the Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (AMS) facility in Cleveland, Ohio inside their locked fenced property. The Lab was supporting the inspection effort regarding the licensees processing of contaminated waste water that has accumulated in and around the facility. The Lab was not readily visible from the street. Several pieces of computer equipment and tools valued at approximately $10,000 were stolen. No readily apparent damage was done to other equipment in the Lab, including the solid state detector. The radioactive sources used for testing and calibration purposes were not disturbed. The Cleveland Police Department and Federal Protective Service have been notified and are investigating the theft. After all investigative activities are completed with the Lab, it will be moved to a City of Cleveland facility several miles from AMS where more secure protection can be provided. Regional Action: Replacement equipment and a detection system expert will be flown to the site on March 29, 1995, and the Lab will be repaired allowing continuing support to the inspection effort. After the Lab is returned to Region III, security specialists will evaluate physical protection improvements that may be appropriate for the Lab. Contact: JOHN A. GROBE (708)829-9806 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 28, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0040 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 03/28/95 San Onofre 2 Phone Call from Resident Inspector San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-361 PWR/CE Subject: EXTENSION OF UNIT 2 CYCLE 8 REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The licensee has extended the Unit 2 refueling outage schedule to 75 days, from the originally scheduled 65 days, to accommodate repairs to cracks identified during inspection of the low pressure turbines. The outage commenced on February 11, 1995, and is now scheduled to be completed on April 27. The turbines were subjected to an extensive inspection that was expanded to include areas where cracking had been experienced at other facilities with similar turbines - Fermi and Kori (in Korea). The turbines at San Onofre Unit 2 (vendor - English Electric) did not exhibit severe cracking in the areas where other facilities identified significant cracks. However, the three low pressure turbines at San Onofre Unit 2 did experience notable cracking on the fourth stage rotor, particularly at the balance holes and at high stress areas where the blades were pinned into position. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring licensee progress in resolving the turbine deficiencies. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 J. Sloan (714)492-2641