Headquarters Daily report MARCH 27, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0081 Brown Boveri Electric, Inc. Date: 03/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: BROWN BOVERI ELECTRIC, INC. PT21 FILE NO: 95061 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 02/15/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9502230282 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: OECB: T. KOSHY SOUTH CAROLINA E&G/SUMMER REPORTS THAT PREVIOUSLY IDENT FAILURE OF 27N DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAY IS NOT REPORTABLE UNDER PT21 BASED ON EVAL BY VENDOR. SEE LOG #94315. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0082 General Electric Date: 03/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: HEADQUARTERS VENDOR: GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) PT21 FILE NO: 95064 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 02/27/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9503030338 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: OECB: R.DENNIG FLORIDA POWER CORP/CRYSTAL RIVER 3 PROVIDES SUPPLEMENTAL INFO REGARDING FAILURE OF CONSTANT VOLT TRANS FOR VITAL BUS INVERTERS TO MEET ACCEPT CRITERIA. OUTPUT VOLT RQMNTS NOT MET. MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED TO CORRECT. SEE LOG #95034. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0083 Seabrook Date: 03/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: WESTINGHOUSE PT21 FILE NO: 95066 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 03/17/94 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9403230211 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LER REVIEWER: OECB: R.DENNIG NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERV CORP/SEABROOK REPORTS OPERATION PER TABLE 3.7-1 IN TS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN SECOND SIDE OVERPRESS IN EVENT OF LOSS OF LOAD/TURBINE TRIP TRANSIENT PER WEST NSAL 94-01. SEE LOG #94044. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0084 Farwell & Hendricks, Inc. Date: 03/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: FARWELL & HENDRICKS, INC. PT21 FILE NO: 95059 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 02/24/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: OECB: N. FIELDS FARWELL & HENDRICKS, INC REPORTS POTENT FAILURE OF MAGNETIC STYLE HE3 MCCBs DUE TO STRIPPED SCREWS/HOLES IN TRIP BAR RETAINING PLATE. 050191 DATE CODE AFFCTD. LICENSEES IDENT & WILL BE NOTIFIED. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0042 Ginna 1 Date: 03/27/95 Ontario,New York Dockets: 50-244 PWR/W-2-LP Subject: CYCLE 25 REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, March 26, 1995, Ginna began reducing power to begin the cycle 25 refueling outage. The plant was taken off-line at 11:00 a.m., and was placed in cold shutdown at 5:15 a.m. on Monday, March 27, 1995. In addition to refueling, major activities include retubing the main condenser with stainless steel tubes, replacement of the 5A and 5B high pressure feedwater heaters, an inspection of the low pressure turbine, and eddy current testing of steam generator tubes. The outage is scheduled to last 36 days, with projected startup on May 1, 1995. Regional Action: Resident and region based inspectors are performing scheduled inspections and monitoring licensee activities. Contact: Bill Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Boston Edison Co. MR Number: 1-95-0043 Pilgrim 1 Date: 03/27/95 Plymouth,Massachusetts SRI PC Dockets: 50-293 BWR/GE-3 Subject: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP Reportable Event Number: 28581 Discussion: At approximately 7:36 a.m. on March 24, 1995 with the reactor at 100 percent power, the operators on shift in the control room began responding to several main generator trouble alarms and indications, which provided evidence of stator cooling water flow, temperature, and conductivity problems and electrical field ground conditions. Operators dispatched to the field found a temperature control valve in the stator water cooling system failed open, causing the flow to bypass the system heat exchangers. The operating crew reduced reactor power, by controlling recirculation flow, to approximately 60 percent in anticipation of the turbine runback that was expected with the loss of generator stator water cooling flow. At 7:50 a.m., about the same time a turbine runback alarm was received, the nuclear watch engineer directed that the reactor be tripped, which was accomplished by placing the mode switch in shutdown. All control rods fully inserted and plant equipment responded as designed, except as noted below. Two reactor building clean air supply isolation dampers failed to indicate closure on the control board. The operators verified that a negative differential pressure was being maintained in the reactor building. Field personnel confirmed that one of the in-line series dampers was actually closed, providing the isolation function, and manually closed the other partially open damper. Both dampers were declared inoperable. Also, an unexpected main steam isolation valve (MSIV) isolation signal (channel "B" only) was input into the primary containment isolation logic circuitry. While the MSIVs properly remained open because the full group 1 isolation signal (i.e., both channels) was not received, initial licensee troubleshooting determined that the spurious isolation signal appeared to be related to slow circuitry response to the "B" train 4.16 KV bus transfer to the startup transformer following the reactor trip. The licensee is investigating this problem further, but currently Boston Edison has no concerns regarding the operability of the "B" train power supply. Both the reactor building damper and MSIV isolation logic anomalies were communicated as information items during the phone notification to the NRC duty officer to discuss the manual reactor scram as an engineered safeguards feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. Subsequently, the licensee deinerted the primary containment atmosphere in anticipation of drywell entries associated with the refueling outage which was scheduled to commence on March 25. The licensee would have begun power reductions at 2:00 p.m. on March 24 to correspond with the planned disconnect from the electrical grid at 8:00 a.m. on March 25. With the reactor trip, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was considered to be in a forced outage until the start of the refueling outage. During the primary containment deinerting process on March 24, a drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker actuation occurred as the nitrogen was being vented. Although the ENS report indicated a cause due to inadequate procedure, the licensee is evaluating root causes. This constituted another ESF actuation, which was reported separately to the NRC duty officer in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. The PNPS refueling outage (RFO 10) commenced as scheduled at 8:00 a.m. on March 25 with cold shutdown condtions achieved at 7:00 p.m. that same day. The plant currently remains in cold shutdown with the drywell head removed and reactor pressure vessel disassembly and other RFO 10 activities in progress. Boston Edison Company issued a press release regarding the manual shut down of the reactor and the start of the planned fifty-five day PNPS refueling outage. Regional Action: The resident inspectors responded to the control room when the plant alarm for operator recall sounded during the initial power reduction activities. The inspectors observed plant activities associated with the post-trip response, including the conduct of a critique held to discuss plant and operator response to this event. Further inspection of the equipment anomalies noted above is planned in conjunction with the routine followup of licensee refueling outage activities. Contact: John MacDonald (508)747-0565 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0040 Duane Arnold 1 Date: 03/27/95 Palo,Iowa SRI VIA LAN Dockets: 50-331 BWR/GE-4 Subject: CRACK IDENTIFIED IN CORE SPRAY BRACKET Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 23, 1995, during visual inspection of reactor vessel internals, an approximate 6-inch long crack was observed in a core spray support attachment welded to the reactor vessel cladding. On March 26, divers were sent into the defueled vessel to polish the surface of the crack and remove the indication. The licensee determined that the indication was only a surface crack or scratch approximately 1-2 millimeters deep. A General Electric nondestructive examination (NDE) expert was participating in the inspection and concurred with the licensee's conclusion. No further action is planned. The licensee notified the NRC on March 23 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(i) when the indication was first identified. Regional Action: The resident inspectors observed the licensee's repair activities. A Region III, Division of Reactor Safety inservice inspection specialist will be onsite to follow-up and evaluate the licensee's findings on March 27, 1995. Contact: J.A. HOPKINS (319)851-5111 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. MR Number: 3-95-0041 Duane Arnold 1 Date: 03/27/95 Palo,Iowa SRI VIA LAN Dockets: 50-331 BWR/GE-4 Subject: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN IES UTILITIES, INC. Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Mr. Lee Liu, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of IES Utilities, Inc., announced that Mr. Dan Mineck was appointed to the newly established position as assistant VP-nuclear of IES Utilities reporting to Mr. John Franz, the VP-nuclear, effective April 3, 1995. Mr. Mineck's duties will include shared responsibility for all phases of nuclear operations, primary responsibility for process redesign in the nuclear division, and developing alternatives for temporary storage of spent fuel. Regional Action: Information Only Contact: J.A. HOPKINS (319)851-5111 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0038 Waterford 3 Date: 03/25/95 Killona,Louisiana Regional Duty Officer Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: ALERT DUE TO RELEASE AT NEARBY CHEMICAL PLANT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 25, 1995, at approximately 2:50 p.m.,(CST), the W-3 control room was informed by site security personnel that a radio broadcast had reported St. Charles parish to be in an Unusual Event based on a release from the nearby Union Carbide chemical plant. The shift supervisor contacted the St. Charles parish industrial hotline office and was informed that the release was Tetralin. According to the shift supervisor, the release was later determined to also be known as tetrahydronapthalene. At 3 p.m. (CST), based on the release and the parish recommendation, the shift supervisor declared a Site Alert and sheltered personnel at 3:02 p.m. (CST). The NRC Operations Center was notified and informed of the event. Based on subsequent information from the parish hotline office, the supervisor downgraded the site's status to an Unusual Event at 3:31 p.m. (CST). The release was reported to be essentially terminated at approximately 4 p.m. (CST). However, the parish maintained road blocks of the immediate area until 7 p.m. (CST), at which time the site terminated the Unusual Event. The plant which was the source of the release is approximately 1.2 miles down river from the W-3 facility. Local news coverage reported the release from the chemical plant and the potential for problems with the parish drinking water as the vapors condensed on the river surface. There were no indications of the release on site. Regional Action: This morning report is being submitted for information only. Contact: C. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161 E. Ford (504)464-6293 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-95-0039 South Texas 1 Date: 03/27/95 Wadsworth,Texas Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-498 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: EXCESSIVE TIN SMEAR ON STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR (SDG) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: South Texas Project is a two-unit site, with three safety trains per unit. All six SDGs are 20-cylinder Cooper Bessemer diesels. During scheduled inspections of the SDGs during the current Unit 1 refueling outage, the licensee found indications of tin transfer on some of the pistons of Diesels 12 and 13. The licensee inspected all 20 of the pistons and liners, with the following results: SDG 12: Five pistons rejected for indications of tin transfer: two advanced, two intermediate, and one beginning stages. Three cylinder liners were also rejected. SDG 13: One piston and its associated liner were rejected based on indications of late stages of intermediate tin transfer. Two other pistons were rejected for tin separation (considered a manufacturing defect). One piston was rejected for indications of piston pin seizure. The root cause for the piston pin seizure is being evaluated. A lubricating oil modification is being installed on both of these generators, which involves removing the lower piston ring and lower oil ring seal. This modification has been shown to be successful in preventing tin transfer. After installation on these two diesels, this modification will have been installed on three of South Texas' SDGs. The third is Unit 2 SDG 22, which had a failed piston due to advanced tin transfer last year. The licensee plans to install the modification on the other three EDGs on a case-by-case basis when piston removal/ inspections are performed. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: David Loveless (512)972-2507 Ryan Lantz (817)860-8104