Headquarters Daily report MARCH 02, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 2, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0068 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-13, "Potential for Data Collection Equipment to Affect Protection System Performance," was issued February 24, 1995. The NRC issued this information notice to alert addressees to a potential single or common mode failure when using devices to collect data on protection system performance. Technical contacts: Monte Phillips, RIII (708) 829-9637 David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Princeton University MR Number: 1-95-0035 Princeton University Date: 03/01/95 Princeton,New Jersey Subject: Loss of Radioactive Material Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: NRC Region I was notified on March 1, 1995, at 4:30 p.m. that Princeton had lost a package containing approximately 150 microcuries of iodine-125. The package was received and checked in at 10:12 a.m. on February 24, 1995, and noted missing at 3 p.m. on February 28, 1995. The package survey indicated dose rate readings of 0.5 millirem/hour at contact and 0.1 millirem/hour at 1 meter. The licensee has: 1) interviewed janitors, trash haulers, and lab workers; 2) surveyed all dumpsters and material awaiting incinceration; and 3) sent an e-mail message to all labs requesting information on the whereabouts of the package. All attempts by the licensee have been unsuccessful in retrieving the package. The licensee is assuming that the material was inadvertently disposed of in the regular trash and sent to a compaction center in New Jersey and then to a landfill in Pennylvania. At the request of Region I, the licensee is planning to survey the compaction center for contamination and to contact the landfill. The State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were contacted on March 1, 1995. Regional Action: The NRC will review the licensee's investigation at the next inspection. Contact: Penny Lanzisera (610)337-5169 Mohamed M. Shanbaky (610)337-5209 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0034 Haddam Neck 1 Date: 03/01/95 Hartford,Connecticut SRI PC Dockets: 50-213 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLUGGED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE THAT RUPTURED Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 26, with the unit in a refueling/maintenance outage, the licensee identified a previously plugged tube in the No. 4 steam generator that was ruptured and bowed. The condition of the tube was identified during a secondary side visual inspection. The rupture was an axial "fish-mouth" crack greater than one inch long with a tube bow of approximately 1/2 inch between the tube sheet and the first support plate. The tube crack was approximately sixteen inches above the tube sheet on the cold leg side. The tube location was row 1 column 35. The tube was plugged in 1986 with a Westinghouse mechanical plug from heat lot NX- 3513, and a plug-and-plug (PAP) was installed on the plug in 1989. Prior to the visual inspection, the licensee identified that this particular tube plug and PAP was leaking based on a secondary pressure test. The licensee has postulated that the ruptured tube was due to overpressurization by water through the leaking plug and PAP. The licensee believes that water collects in the tube during cold shutdown conditions. Once the tube is filled, and during reactor coolant system heatup the trapped fluid expands and increases the internal pressure in the plugged tube, which may ultimately overstress the tube. As of March 1, the licensee has completed visual inspections of 50% of row 1 tubes in all four steam generators. The No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 steam generators did not indicate any failed tubes or tubes that were bowed in the inspected areas of row 1. The licensee has identified leaking plugs and PAPS in the No. 2 and No. 4 steam generators. The most severe leaking plugs and PAPs (12- No. 2 steam generator; and 2 - No. 4 steam generator) are being drilled out and eddy current tested. The tubes will be repaired with welded plugs. Preliminary results of the eddy current testing of 7 tubes in the No. 2 steam generator indicate two bulged tubes. Westinghouse is performing thermal hydraulic analysis for tube vibration and analyzing the tube bowing phenomena. Additionally, the licensee is reviewing recently completed eddy current testing data for tubes (approximately 1100) surrounding previously plugged tubes to evaluate the data for wear or tube-to-tube contact locations. Regional Action: On February 28, in a teleconference, the licensee discussed the status of repairs and proposed actions. The licensee has agreed to meet with NRC staff in Headquarters prior to plant startup. Contact: Michael Modes (610)337-5198 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0033 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 03/01/95 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: DEFECTIVE GE TYPE SBM CONTROL AND TRANSFER SWITCHES Reportable Event Number: 28456 Discussion: During routine cleaning of electrical switches on February 27, 1995, Maine Yankee found that several General Electric (GE) type SBM auxiliary switches used in the operating mechanism of safety and non-safety related 4160 and 6900 volts AC breakers had cracked or broken contact arms. The affected contacts provide a close permissive for open breakers and a trip permissive for closed breakers. Six cracks were found in the switch in Diesel Generator 1A output breaker, resulting in replacement of that breaker with one having a switch with contact arms made of a different material. Further investigation identified that the problem extended to switches and relays used in the main control room. These switches are primarily used for the control of circuit breakers, magnetic switches, relays, and instruments. Some new switches in stock were inspected and also showed evidence of cracking of contact arms. The licensee is still investigating the extent of the problem and the appropriate corrective actions to be taken. They plan to inspect all the switches and replace all found to be defective. The plant is presently defueled and the licensee has established a priority list for switch inspection based on verification and maintenance of safety in the current configuration and will verify operability of necessary equipment prior to making any changes into a different plant configuration. A 4-hour report was made to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The issue is being reviewed and discussed with GE for 10 CFR Part 21 reportability. Regional Action: The plant is currently in a refueling outage which is expected to be completed at the end of March. The licensee has identified this as a core reload/restart issue. Region I and the Vendor Inspection Branch are following up on the generic implications. Site activities are being followed by the resident inspectors. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Virginia Power Co. MR Number: 2-95-0022 North Anna 1 2 Date: 03/02/95 Richmond,Virginia Dockets: 50-338,50-339 PWR/W-3-LP,PWR/W-3-LP Subject: SECURITY SYSTEM POWER FAILURE Reportable Event Number: 28463 Discussion: At approximately 3:40 p.m., March 1, 1995, while completing the test of the security system power supply, the security computer system and several access control devices to security doors experienced a power failure. The licensee immediately instituted the required compensatory measures of posting security officers to degraded areas and has brought extra security guards to the site. Concurrent with this power failure, a fire panel annunciator located inside a security alarm station overheated and started to emit smoke. The onsite fire brigade was activated and deenergized this panel. At 4:15 p.m. a Notification of Unusual Event was declared due to the continued failure of other security alarms and access control devices. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Virginia of the Notification of Unusual Event. The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 5:00 p.m., March 1. The licensee has no indication that this power failure was intentional. There is no safeguards threat to the site. As of 9:00 a.m., March 2 the Security Force remains in a heightened state of readiness because of the extent of the power failure for security systems. Unit 1 is at 100 percent power, Unit 2 is at 75 percent. Regional Action: Region II continues to closely monitor the licensee's actions. Region II has informed the Information Assessment Team and continues to keep the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation aware of the situation. A Security Specialist has been dispatched to the site. Contact: W. J. TOBIN (404)331-5096 A. Belisle (404)331-4196 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Georgia Power Co. MR Number: 2-95-0023 Vogtle 2 Date: 03/02/95 Waynesboro,Georgia Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-425 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MULTIPLE PERSONNEL CONTAMINATIONS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 1, 1995, 50-60 workers were contaminated with xenon-133 while in containment. The licensee was removing the code safeties from the Unit 2 pressurizer as part of the ongoing Unit 2 outage activities. Containment purge ventilation was turned off in preparation for leak rate testing. The contamination was detected on workers exiting the radiologically controlled area the end of day shift. Air sampling identified and whole body counts of workers verified that only xenon-133 was involved. The licensee had initially determined the cause to be xenon-133 (a noble gas) coming out of solution when the code safeties were vented, releasing an unknown quantity into the containment atmosphere. The xenon concentration peaked at 15 derived air concentation (DAC) in containment during night shift and began steadily decreasing. The licensee chose to continue work based on the minimal risk to workers due to xenon. Workers are being briefed on the situation and decontaminations handled as needed. The licensee reported that no significant internal doses have occurred and skin doses range from 10 to 300 millirem. The licensee is investigating the cause of the event. Regional Action: Resident personnel are monitoring the event and the licensee's evaluation. A health physics inspection has been scheduled for the week of March 13, 1995. Contact: W. RANKIN (404)331-5618 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Harmon Electronics Company MR Number: 3-95-0025 Harmon Electronics Company Date: 02/24/95 Warrensburg,Missouri TELECON FROM LICENSEE Dockets: 99990003 License No: GENERAL Subject: BETA BACKSCATTER PROBE LOST DURING SHIPMENT Reportable Event Number: 28430 Discussion: On 2/7/95 Harmon Electronics Company shipped a beta backscatter probe (Veeco Model #Tl-204, serial #77307) to the manufacturer Veeco in Plainsfield, NY. When the shipment did not arrive, the shipper (UPS) was contacted and UPS attempted to trace the shipment. The last known location of the probe was the UPS Melville Terminal, NY. On 2/23/95, UPS officially declared the probe lost. The pencil sized probe was made in February 1990 and contained 100 microcuries of thallium-204. The NRC Office of State Programs and the Region I State Agreement Officer were notified. Regional Action: The continuing search for the probe is being monitored by Region III. Contact: DON J. SRENIAWSKI (708)829-9814 JOHN D. JONES (708)829-9832 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0023 River Bend 1 Date: 03/01/95 St Francisville,Louisiana Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-458 BWR/GE-6 Subject: TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT TO REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL AT POWER Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 28, 1995, with the plant at full power, the operators changed the position of a remote shutdown panel transfer switch in support of an instrument loop calibration and failed to appropriately consider the consequences. Although several remote shutdown transfer switches exist, this particular transfer switch transfers the control of 13 valves, 7 HVAC units, and 2 pumps. The system was designed to affect transfer of the functions after a scram and resultant Level I isolation. The operators did not recognize that transfer under the existing plant conditions cross-connected the service water system with the nonsafety-related chilled water system at Containment Unit Cooler 1A. The licensee identified that two normally closed valves that provide service water to the containment cooler under accident conditions opened and that the Level 1 isolation that normally isolates the chilled water system had not occurred. Consequently, the chilled water expansion tank filled until the chilled water relief valves lifted in the turbine building. At the same time, the service water expansion tank level decreased faster than makeup water could compensate for the loss. Operators returned the transfer switch to the normal position after noticing that the service water supply and return valves for the unit cooler had opened and that the service water surge tank level had decreased. When the operators closed the valves, the loss of service water inventory was terminated. Two other service water valves closed but did not cause any transients; subsequently, operators reopened the valves. This incident had the potential of degrading to a low service water level in the surge tank and resultant automatic start of the standby service water pumps. The licensed operators were not aware of the consequences of this test sequence, which demonstrates the need for special attention when manipulating any of the 42 remote shutdown transfer switches in support of testing or maintenance while the plant is on line. The causes appeared to be an inadequate calibration procedure, which did not provide any precautions or compensatory measures, coupled with insufficient attention to detail on the part of the operators. Regional Action: Followup by the resident inspectors. Contact: C. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-95-0024 Cooper 1 Date: 03/02/95 Brownville,Nebraska Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: FAILURE OF MOUNTING STUD ON A SERVICE WATER (SW) PUMP Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On March 2, 1995, the licensee's maintenance staff was in the process of replacing SW Pump D after planned maintenance, when a pump mounting stud sheared off. The stud is for securing the pump mounting frame to the floor. Reviews by an NRC inspector, performing supplemental coverage during power ascension, identified that the 3/4-inch stud had corroded to a point where only approximately one quarter of the diameter remained. It appears that this was the cause of the failure. The licensee is in the process of determining the root cause of the failure mechanism (i.e., the cause of the corrosion) and what actions will be taken to assess the status of the other bolting materials used in the SW system. This report will be updated when additional information is obtained. Regional Action: Followup by a supplemental inspector. Contact: P. Harrell (817)860-8250 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MARCH 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-95-0025 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 03/02/95 Wintersburg,Arizona Resident Inspector Call to Reg IV Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: UPDATE OF DISCOVERY OF STARTUP STRAINERS INSTALLED AT PALO VERDE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 17, 1995, during a refueling outage, the licensee identified a startup strainer in the containment spray system of Unit 2. Subsequently, the licensee has been performing additional reviews and inspections as necessary to determine the extent that other startup strainers may be installed in systems. On February 28, 1995, the licensee completed a review of the priority one (safety significant) systems, which included containment spray, safety injection, essential cooling water, auxiliary feedwater, essential chilled water, charging, condensate transfer, and spent fuel pool cooling. This review consisted of system walkdowns, work order documentation and print verifications, and ultrasonic testing (UT). During the review, the licensee did not find documentation to show that startup strainers were removed from the Unit 1 or 3 spent fuel pool cooling pump suction lines. The licensee conducted UT examinations of the piping in Units 1 and 3 where the strainers were suspected. The UT showed that there were indications of something in the Unit 1 and 3 lines. On March 1, the licensee removed the spool piece from the Unit 1 Train A spent fuel pool cooling pump and found a startup strainer. The licensee plans to remove the spool pieces from the Unit 1 Train B spent fuel pool cooling line and both the Unit 3 Train A and B spent fuel pool cooling lines to confirm the UT results. As of March 2, the licensee has found start-up strainers in both containment spray pump lines (Trains A and B) in Unit 2 and the spent fuel pool cooling pump line Train A in Unit 1. The licensee is also conducting system walkdowns on several priority two (significant to production) systems to identify the existence of any additional start-up strainers. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are closely monitoring and independently verifying the licensee's evaluation results. A special inspection is planned of the issue. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-2096 A. MacDougall (602)386-3650