Headquarters Daily report FEBRUARY 27, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I FEBRUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Boston Edison Co. MR Number: 1-95-0031 Pilgrim 1 Date: 02/27/95 Plymouth,Massachusetts SRI PC Dockets: 50-293 BWR/GE-3 Subject: IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN MATERIAL DURING RECEIPT INSPECTION OF NEW FUEL ASSEMBLIES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On 2/22, the licensee completed enhanced visual receipt inspections of the 136 new fuel assemblies received from the General Electric Company fuel facility at Wilmington, N.C. and found foreign material in three assemblies. The enhanced inspections were performed in response to recent instances in which metal chips have been identified at the lower tie plate (LTP) area of GE-9/10 type fuel assemblies. Pilgrim Station reactor core uses GE-11 type fuel assemblies. Morning report I-95-0027 documented the results of similar inspections of GE-9/10 fuel at Vermont Yankee. GE believes that the GE-11 fuel is less susceptible to the foreign material entrapment due to different machining processes, lattice configurations, and flow hole diameters. The inspections included unassisted visual and boroscopic inspections. Additionally, LTP flow holes were inspected with a push tool, designed to clear any material from the holes. Single metal chips were identified on the LTPs of two assemblies and a small metal shaving, similar to that resultant from tapping a threaded hole was identified on the LTP of a third assembly. In each instance, the foreign material was easily removed from the assembly with the use of the push tool. The metal chips and shaving recovered from the inspections were returned to GE for additional analysis. Regional Action: The resident inspectors observed portions of the fuel assembly inspections and continue to monitor licensee response to this issue. Contact: John MacDonald (508)747-0565 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEBRUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0021 La Salle 1 2 Date: 02/24/95 Marseilles,Illinois SRI VIA MEETING Dockets: 50-373,50-374 BWR/GE-5,BWR/GE-5 Subject: TECHNICAL TRAINING PROGRAM PLACED ON PROBATION Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On 2/24/95, ComEd informed the SRI that the maintenance and technical training programs had been placed on 6 months probation by the INPO training accreditation board. The affected training areas are instrument and electrical maintenance, mechanical maintenance, radiation protection, chemistry, and engineering support. The principal reason cited was insufficient management involvement in the training process. INPO will perform a re-accreditation visit in July - August 1995. Regional Action: Region III will monitor the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: L. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEBRUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0022 Byron 2 Date: 02/27/95 Byron,Illinois E-MAIL Dockets: 50-455 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: LOOSE PARTS INDICATIONS IN 2B AND 2C STEAM GENERATORS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Unit 2 was shutdown on February 10, 1995 for its fifth refueling outage. On February 23, during analysis of steam generator U-tube test data, indications of potential loose parts (PLP) were identified in the 2B and 2C steam generators (S/G). From the analytical data, these indications were located near the 5th tube support plate in each S/G. In 2B, the PLP indications were obtained from the analysis of five tubes. In 2C, the PLP indications were obtained from the analysis of two tubes. On February 24, another indication of a PLP was identified at the 8th tube support plate in 2C. On February 25 the licensee attempted to visually check the PLP locations. On both 2B and 2C, the handhole location for the 5th support plate had a feedwater preheater divider plate which obstructed the ability to use the miniature camera equipment. The handhole at the 8th support plate on 2C allowed the use of the camera to visually check the PLP found on February 24. The visual inspection at the 8th support plate found a metal object approximately 4 inches long, 1 inch wide and 1 inch thick wedge. It was identified as being an alignment wedge used during S/G fabrication/construction. In 1989, a jacking screw was removed from each of the 2B and 2D S/G's. Additionally, adjacent tubes for the 5th and 8th tube support plate PLP were plugged in the 2C S/G during previous outages. The licensee has attempted to remove the object at the 8th support plate, without success. Additional inspection with a magnetic probe was planned in an attempt to further identify the other PLP. The licensee was also investigating other ways to visually identify the other two PLP, and methods to remove the objects. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's actions. Contact: LEW MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV FEBRUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-95-0022 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 02/27/95 San Onofre 2 Phone Call from Resident Inspector San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-361 PWR/CE Subject: SUSPENSION OF CORE ALTERATIONS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 25, 1995, at around 2 p.m. (PST), movement of fuel assemblies from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool in Unit 2 began. At approximately 3:30 p.m. (PST), with a resident inspector observing fuel movement activities, the licensee identified that a fuel assembly had been placed in the wrong location in the spent fuel storage racks (location I1 vice KK21). The error was promptly identified and the fuel assembly placed in its proper location. The apparent contributors of the error were the informality of communications, the fuel movement sheets were not readily available to the spent fuel handling machine operator, and the operator was inexperienced in actual fuel movement (moved only dummy elements previously). The licensee subsequently suspended core alterations for approximately 7 hours to review the conduct of the fuel movement process with the operation crews. The licensee is performing a formal evaluation of the error. The resident inspectors discussed concerns regarding the apparent causes of the error with the licensee's outage manager. Additional resident inspector observations on February 26 found that improved formality and communication practices had been instituted. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's evaluation of the error and corrective actions. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 J. Sloan (714)492-2641