Headquarters Daily report FEBRUARY 16, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I FEBRUARY 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-95-0024 Fitz Patrick 1 Date: 02/16/95 Lycoming,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-333 BWR/GE-4 Subject: DEBRIS FOUND IN IRRADIATED FUEL BUNDLES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During irradiated fuel inspections on 2/14 by the GE staff, both of the GE08 fuel assemblies inspected were found to have debris within the assembly fuel matrix. Most of the debris was found in the vicinity of the bottom support plate. These two GE08 assemblies (not scheduled to be reloaded into the core) were identified earlier in December 1994 (during core off-load) via fuel sipping as two of the three fuel assemblies which demonstrated cladding degradation during the last operating cycle. One assembly's cladding degradation was attributed to debris inducted fretting. The other assembly did not show any indication of cladding wear, but did show signs of pellet clad interaction (PCI) failure. During removal of the top guide assembly, the welded end-cap fell off one of the fuel pins. As a result of these discoveries, NYPA expanded their inspection of irradiated fuel assemblies to include 20 of the 144 GE10 assemblies scheduled for core reload. Results this morning (2/15) showed that 3 of the 11 GE10 assemblies inspected had debris within the fuel assemblies. The GE technicians have characterized this debris as "soft", in that, it broke apart when removed from the assemblies. The remaining 9 GE10 assemblies will be inspected today. All 56 irradiated GE08 assemblies scheduled for core reload will be inspected in parallel with core spiral reload efforts. NYPA is awaiting GE's evaluation of the debris found during these fuel assembly inspections and the potential consequences. No additional inspections are currently scheduled prior to core reload. The resident inspectors are monitoring the fuel inspection activities. Regional Action: Resident followup Contact: William Cook (315)342-4907 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I FEBRUARY 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consolidated Edison Co. Of N.Y. MR Number: 1-95-0025 Indian Point 2 Date: 02/16/95 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-247 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: DEGRADED CONTAINMENT FLOOR COATING Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 8, during a containment walkdown, the licensee noted that portions of the containment floor coating, which was installed in 1993, were cracked and lifted. Initial estimates were that 30 square feet were degraded. The condition was reported as outside design basis in accordance with 50.72(b)(1)(ii)B and the licensee wrote an open item report to document the condition. A work order has been prepared to remove the existing coating and install a new coating. The plant was in cold shutdown, at the beginning of a refueling outage. The degraded coating was only found on the 46 foot elevation in containment. The coating is an epoxy self-priming surfacing enamel made by Keeler and Long. The licensee purchased the paint as Class A material and applied the coating during the 1993 outage. The concern is that, in a post accident environment, the degraded floor coating could potentially foul the recirculation pump suction. During spray recirculation operation, the water is screened through a 0.25 inch mesh before leaving the containment sump. The containment spray nozzles have a 0.375 inch diameter orifice and therefore should not be subject to clogging by particles ingested from the containment sump. The recirculation pump suction screen is approximately 100 square feet so the licensee's initial operability determination was that the condition would not cause the recirculation sump to be inoperable. However, evaluation of the containment floor coating and analysis of the condition is continuing. Regional Action: Region inspectors and the resident staff are following developments. Contact: Gordon Hunegs (914)739-9360 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I FEBRUARY 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0026 Salem 1 2 Date: 02/16/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-272,50-311 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: Atmospheric Steam Dumps Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 3, during a controlled shutdown of Unit 1, with atmospheric steam relief valve 13MS10 in automatic, an operator attempted to close the valve by increasing the pressure setpoint of the controller. In the four attempts by the operator, the indicated pressure setpoint behaved erratically; then the controller lights indicated transfer to manual control, and the valve opened fully. The operator had not selected manual control. The operator attempted to close the valve manually without success. He verified that the controller had shifted to manual operation and again tried to manually close the valve without success. Subsequently, in an effort to control the valve, the operator swapped the controller card with a similar card in 12MS10 and was able to regain manual control of the valve. Plant shutdown was achieved successfully, without further incident. Operators and technicians were unable to duplicate the loss of automatic and manual control of 13MS10 or to duplicate incorrect operation of the controller card, either during bench tests or in control room testing. However, technicians did find a leaking electrolytic capacitor that may have contributed to the swap from automatic to manual. They also speculated that an isolated temporary failure condition, possibly caused by dirty contacts where the controller board plugs into the control panel, could have been responsible for the operator's inability to adjust valve position in manual; and that the operator's action to sway the controller cards may have effected subsequent cleaning of the contacts. The technicians also found an incorrect resistance value relay coil installed on the 13MS10 controller card and speculated, based on circuit analysis, that the coil could have caused the observed erratic operation in automatic. On February 10, during a mode change from Mode 2 to Mode 3 in Unit 2, operators found that the controller for atmospheric steam relief valve 22MS10 would not properly track pressure. The operators also found that the valve would not open in automatic with steam generator pressure at 995 psig and the pressure setpoint at 916 psig. The controller automatic setpoint was designed to track main steam pressure to permit operators to achieve a "bumpless transfer" when shifting from manual control to automatic control. Technicians speculated that a nylon gear binding against metal gears in a servomotor control module may have caused the lack of automatic pressure setpoint tracking. Technicians also found a relay coil and resistor of incorrect resistance value installed on a controller card. As a result of the incorrect relay coil and resistor, in conjunction with current limitations of the power supply, technicians speculated that the coil may not have been energized due to insufficient voltage. Operation of 22MS10 in automatic requires the relay to be energized to permit the automatic control signal to be passed to the valve. The licensee is investigating the possiblity that the incorrect components may have been introduced during previouse refurbishment of the controller card, i.e., a 550 ohm resistor had been replaced with a 330 ohm resistor, and a relay with a 600 ohm coil had been replaced using a relay with a 300 ohm coil. The incorrect value components functioned correctly during bench testing, however, based on analysis, the technicians concluded that failure of the relay to pick up may have caused the failure of 22MS10 to open in automatic. Subsequently, the technicians replaced the components with components of the proper value, as specified in the design drawings. The licensee inspected coils installed in other controller cards, and found at least two additional coils of incorrect value in control circuits for feedwater flow and pressurizer pressure control, respectively. The licensee is investigating the cause of the introduction of the incorrect cards. As of 7:00 a.m. on Feb. 16, Salem unit 2 was at 27% power, and Salem unit 1 was in mode 4, making preparations to enter mode 3. Regional Action: The residents continue to monitor licensee corrective actions and startup activities; and will followup on the licensee's comprehensive root cause assessment team's efforts relative to fully understanding and resolving erratic MS10 operation.. Contact: Charles Marschall (207)882-7519 John White (610)337-5114 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II FEBRUARY 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-95-0019 Robinson 2 Date: 02/16/95 Hartsville,South Carolina Dockets: 50-261 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: UPDATE ON ALERT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE Reportable Event Number: 28376 Discussion: On February 13, 1995, the licensee declared an ALERT due to the inadvertent discharge of carbon dioxide in a vital area (auxiliary building pipe alley). The licensee was performing a surveillance test on the reserve bank of carbon dioxide bottles associated with a Fire Suppression System which serves a cable vault area. The surveillance test requires, in part, that the bottles be disconnected, weighed, then reconnected. The bank consists of 9 carbon dioxide cylinders. Cylinders numbered 1 and 2 are electronically actuated in the case of a fire. Upon pressurization of the common header, cylinders numbered 3 through 7 actuate. Cylinders 8 and 9 are a backup to cylinders 1 and 2 and are separated from the main part of the header by a check valve. During reconnection of the number 6 cylinder, the cylinder discharged pressurizing the common header which, in turn, caused cylinders 1 through 7 to discharge. Actuation devices for cylinders 8 and 9 were not pressurized due to the check valve which separates them from the main part of the header, and therefore did not discharge. The licensee believes that the cause of cylinder 6 discharging was a piston/stem device internal to the slave actuator head which had become partially unthreaded. Upon reconnection to the cylinder, the extended stem length caused the cylinder to discharge. The licensee plans to replace the empty cylinders (1 through 7). During cylinder replacement, they intend to check the internal component of the slave actuator head to assure that it is properly threaded and secured. In addition, the licensee plans to check for this problem on other Fire Suppression Systems during routine surveillance. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the licensee's actions. Contact: J. L. STAREFOS (404)331-5568 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEBRUARY 16, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0016 Byron 1 2 Date: 02/16/95 Byron,Illinois Dockets: 50-454,50-455 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: INTRODUCTION OF THE IL DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY (IDNS) RESIDENT SITE INSPECTOR Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 16, 1995, members of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) met with licensee management and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Byron station to formally initiate the IDNS resident site inspector program. Messrs. Roy Wight, Manager Office of Nuclear Facility Safety, and Bob Schultz, Supervisor IDNS Resident Inspector Programs, introduced Mr. Cliff Thompson as the IDNS Resident Inspector for Byron station. Mr. Thompson came from Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Nuclear Power Station, and was a licensed Senior Reactor Operator. Regional Action: Information Only Contact: LEWIS MILLER, JR. (708)829-9629