Headquarters Daily report FEBRUARY 14, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I FEBRUARY 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0023 Haddam Neck 1 Date: 02/14/95 Hartford,Connecticut SRI E-Mail Dockets: 50-213 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: Inoperable Pressurizer Relief Valves - Update Information Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: See Region I Morning Report for January 31. While shut down for a refueling outage, the licensee reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) on January 29 that both PORVs (RC- 568 & 570) failed to operate properly. The PORVs are Copes-Vulcan model 080813 air operated valves. This was the third test failure of both valves in about two years (reference LERs 94-05 and LER 93- 07). Both valves operated smoothly in the open direction, but only to about 50% open; both stroked closed properly. Unlike past events, neither valve had excessive external leakage and a pressure drop test showed that the air supply header was tight. However, air regulators CA-RV-838A and B operated at 74 and 75 psig, instead of the desired setpoint of 85 psig. The PORVs by design need 65 psig to start opening, and 85 psig to stroke full open. When tested on February 5 in the as-found condition with 85 psig to the valves, both PORVs stroked open to the full open position smoothly and quickly. Thus, the 1995 PORV failures were caused by setpoint drift of the air regulators. The PORV design basis requires that the valves open within 15 seconds, and close within 2 seconds. The PORV's are assumed to remain operable for thirty hours, and cycle a total of four times during feed-and-bleed scenarios. In the outage test, the PORVs were operated with essentially zero reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure; RCS pressure at the normal operating value of 2000 psig would help open the valves. An engineering evaluation showed that the valves would have operated to the full open position with control air pressure reduced to 70 psig and assuming normal RCS operating pressure. Further, the valves would effectively operate with RCS pressure as low as 840 psig (assuming 70 psig air pressure to the actuator). The licensee concluded that the PORVs would have performed the intended safety function in the as-found condition. Based on the above, the licensee is reviewing whether to rescind the 10 CFR 50.72 report. Regional Action: Routine resident followup. Contact: William Raymond (203)267-2571 Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II FEBRUARY 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Babcock & Wilcox Co. MR Number: 2-95-0016 Babcock & Wilcox Co. Date: 02/14/95 Lynchburg,Virginia Dockets: 07000027 License No: SNM-42 URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Subject: WORKERS SPRAYED WITH HYDROFLUORIC ACID Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At approximately 10 am on Monday, February 13, 1995, two workers in the uranium recovery (UR) area of Babcock and Wilcox's Naval Nuclear Fuel Division were sprayed with hydrofluoric acid (HF). The two workers were changing the 55-gallon supply drum of HF used in the UR high level dissolution process. A malfunctioning switch on the air driven pump caused the pump to remain activated as the pump suction was changed from the empty drum to the full drum. Both workers showered and were transported to Lynchburg General Hospital. Surveys of the workers before leaving site and in route to the hospital indicated they were not contaminated. One worker was treated for inhalation and released. The other worker was admitted to the hospital and remains there at this time receiving treatments for second degree burns to 5 percent of the face and 15 percent of the upperbody (chest and upper abdominal areas). The licensee has replaced the pump on the HF supply drum and is conducting an investigation of the event. The licensee is currently working with the change review board to approve modifications to the dissolution system in UR to allow remote handling of the HF used in the process. Regional Action: The Resident Inspector is following the Licensee actions. Contact: Mark Elliott (804)847-7343 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEBRUARY 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Detroit Edison Co. MR Number: 3-95-0015 Fermi 2 Date: 02/14/95 Newport,Michigan RESIDENT OFFICE TELECON Dockets: 50-341 BWR/GE-4 Subject: TURBINE VIBRATION DURING FERMI 2 START UP Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: THE LICENSEE CONTINUES TO PERFORM BALANCING WORK ON THE TURBINE. HOWEVER, VIBRATION OF THE TURBINE DURING STEADY STATE CONDITIONS HAS INCREASED. YESTERDAY WHILE THE PLANT WAS AT 52 PERCENT POWER, VIBRATIONS FOR THE BEARINGS RANGED FROM 1.6 MILS TO 9.7 MILS, WITH VIBRATIONS SLOWLY INCREASING WHILE MAINTAINING THE SAME POWER. ALSO, THEY ARE SEEING VIBRATION IN THE LUBE OIL COOLER ROOM FROM SOME OF THE DRAIN LINES, AND IN SOME CASES, THE PIPE IS VIBRATING MORE THAN THE ASSOCIATED BEARING. THE LICENSEE SPECULATES THAT THE INCREASES IN VIBRATION ARE DUE TO THE ROTOR GRADUALLY ADJUSTING ITSELF AS IT HEATS UP WHILE SPINNING. DURING YESTERDAYS COASTDOWN AFTER THE TURBINE WAS TAKEN OFF LINE, TWO OF THE BEARINGS EXCEEDED 20 MILS VIBRATION AS THE ROTOR COASTED THROUGH THE CRITICAL SPEED. SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION OF THE TURBINE AREA BY THE LICENSEE FOUND THE #4 AND #5 JACKING OIL PUMP DRAIN LINES LEAKING FROM A CRACKED WELD AND THE #4 AND #5 BEARING DRAIN LINE ROD HANGER SUPPORT HAD SNAPPED. THE LICENSEE HAD DONE A DETAILED WALKDOWN OF THE TURBINE LAST FRIDAY WITH NO DAMAGE FOUND. THEY WILL PERFORM ANOTHER DETAILED WALKDOWN OF THE WELDS AND HANGERS, REPAIR ALL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED, INCLUDING THE ABOVE ALREADY DISCOVERED, AND COMPLETE ANOTHER BALANCE SHOT BEFORE SPINNING UP THE TURBINE AGAIN. Regional Action: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE INSPECTION COVERAGE OF THE STARTUP. Contact: M. PHILLIPS (708)829-9637 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV FEBRUARY 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0015 Arkansas Nuclear 1 Date: 02/14/95 Russelville,Arkansas Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-313 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: UNIT SHUTDOWN FOR TWELFTH REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 14, 1995, at 1 a.m., Unit 1 shut down to begin its twelfth refueling outage. The outage is scheduled to last 45 days. Major outage activities include a 10-year inservice inspection of the reactor vessel and an inspection of 20 percent of the steam generator tubes. In addition, the licensee will replace the Inconnel 600 steam generator tube plugs, two safety-related inverters, control rod drive seals, service water piping, Rosemont transmitters in containment, and the motor and seals on Reactor Coolant Pump B. Major balance of plant work includes a high pressure turbine upgrade, changeout of low pressure Turbine B, replacment of the Moisture Separator Reheater C and D tube bundles, replacement of a high pressure feedwater heater, and installation of two new feedwater flow venturis. Regional Action: The resident inspectors and Regional staff will monitor the unit shutdown and outage activities. Contact: K. M. Kennedy (501)968-3290 J. F. Melfi (501)968-3290 C. A. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV FEBRUARY 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-95-0016 Cooper 1 Date: 02/14/95 Brownville,Nebraska Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: ENGINEERING REORGANIZATION AT THE NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On February 13, 1995, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) announced that the engineering organization would be centralized at the Cooper Nuclear Station site. Currently, the design engineering organization is located in Columbus, Nebraska, NPPD's corporate headquarters, which is about 100 miles from the site. The licensee currently anticipates that the centralization will be completed by October 1995. The licensee has issued a press release that discusses the details of the reorganization. Regional Action: This morning report is for information only. Contact: P. H. Harrell (817)860-8250 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV FEBRUARY 14, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-95-0017 Cooper 1 Date: 02/14/95 Brownville,Nebraska Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: PLANT RESTART FROM UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN Reportable Event Number: 28366 Discussion: On February 13, 1995, at 11:32 p.m., Cooper Nuclear Station went critical after an unplanned shutdown of about 4 days. As of this morning, the plant was at 5 percent power and RCS pressure was at 58 psig. The plant was placed in a cold shutdown condition when the automatic depressurization system (ADS) was declared inoperable because three of the six ADS relief valves failed to operate on demand. The licensee determined that the solenoid valves, which are part of the relief valve assembly, failed to function because of internal corrosion. The solenoids were replaced and the ADS valves will be tested when RCS pressure reaches 300 psig. During the plant shutdown, a motor-operated valve (MOV) failed to operate because a stem cap had threaded itself into the MOV casing, preventing the stem nut from moving. This caused the motor to deenergize due to overloading. The licensee inspected the stem cap on MOVs that are not accessible during power operations and a selected sample of other valves. Three valves (RHR containment isolation, reactor recirculation pump discharge, and core spray pump test return line valves) were identified that had the potential to fail because of a relatively loose stem cap. Each of these valves had a stem cap installed that had been fabricated onsite by the licensee. It appears that the tolerance for the threads used by the licensee to fabricate the stem caps was not as close as the tolerances used when the original stem cap was manufactured. The licensee staked the threads on all MOVs with stem caps to ensure that the stem would not thread itself into the MOV casing. Inspection of the remainder of the MOVs is ongoing. In addition, a vacuum breaker was identified by a licensee individual that was not fully shut. The licensee inspected the vacuum breaker and identified that neither side of the disc was beveled so it would mate with the valve seat. The licensee repaired the disc, reinstalled it, and performed a test to verify that it operated satisfactorily. A review of this event indicated that the valve was seated when it was tested prior to the recent plant startup. When the ADS relief valves were tested, the disc was exposed to steam and thermal expansion caused the disc to enlarge. The enlarging of the disc caused it to come off its seat and not reseat when it cooled off. Regional Action: The Region is providing 24-hour coverage during the power ascension phase. Followup of these events is being performed by these additional inspectors. Contact: P. H. Harrell (817)860-8250