Headquarters Daily report FEBRUARY 02, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 02, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0045 Westronics, Inc. Date: 02/02/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: WESTRONICS, INC. PT21 FILE NO: 95036 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/30/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: OECB: A.CHAFFEE WESTRONICS REPORTS POSSIBILITY OF USE OF NONCONFORMING DIODES FOR SPARE PARTS IN CHART RECORDER MODELS S4N, D4N, T4N & 2100C. DIODES WERE MIXED WITH OTHER DIODES. CORREC ACTON TAKEN. AFFCTD LICENSEES IDENTIFIED & NOTIFIED. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 02, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0046 Anchor/Darling Date: 02/02/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: ANCHOR/DARLING PT21 FILE NO: 95037 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 10/17/94 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9401250232 SOURCE DOCUMENT: 50.55(e) REVIEWER: OECB: E. GOODWIN TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHOR/WATTS BAR 1 REPORTS FINDING CHECK VALVES IN FULLY OPEN POSITION & WOULD NOT HAVE CLOSED TO PREVENT REVERSE FLOW. VALVES ARE 8" TILTING DISK LOCATED IN VERTICAL PIPE RUN. VALVES LACKED INTERNAL MOD FOR ORIENTATION. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 02, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0047 Copes-Vulcan Inc. Date: 02/02/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: COPES-VULCAN INCORPORATED PT21 FILE NO: 95038 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/31/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: MR REVIEWER: OECB: A. CHAFFEE CONNECTICUT YANKEE AP CO/HADDAM NECK 1 REPORTS FAILURE OF PORVs TO FULLY OPEN & TO OPEN IN REQD TIME. PORVs ARE MODEL 080813 AO VALVES. FAILURE ATTRIB TO AIR LEAKAGE FROM ACTUATOR DUE TO DIAPHRAGM PROB & CORROSION OF AIR SUPPLY REGULATOR. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I FEBRUARY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0018 Salem 1 2 Date: 02/02/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-272,50-311 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM INABILITY TO WITHSTAND TURBINE BUILDING STEAM LINE BREAKS OR DESIGN BASIS SEISMIC EVENT Reportable Event Number: 28321 Discussion: PSE&G declared the solid state protection system (SSPS) inoperable at 10:30 p.m on 2/1/95, upon determining that a steam line break in the turbine building or a seismic event could cause both trains of SSPS to become inoperable. A related issue was initially identified at Diablo Canyon on 1/31/95 and informally communicated to PSE&G for their review. Operators entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for both units. The licensee initiated Unit 1 shutdown at 15 percent per hour; and Unit 2 was maintained in MODE 2 with the MSIVs shut. The licensee determined that a steam line break or seismic event could cause wiring to the turbine stop valves, the auto-stop pressure switches, and the Reactor Coolant Pump breaker position indication to short. Since the fuses that would open as a result of the short would also remove power from the SSPS 15 volt and 48 volt power supplies, both SSPS channels would be affected, rendering them incapable of performing all of their required functions; however, the fuse failures would cause a reactor trip. Specifically, the steam line break would render an SSPS train inoperable; postulating a subsequent single failure in the remaining SSPS train would result in loss of all SSPS. In the case of the seismic event, both trains of SSPS would be rendered inoperable without consideration of a single failure. The PSE&G staff communicated closely with Diablo Canyon and Westinghouse on this concern. The licensee stated that Westinghouse Owners Group initiated a Regulatory Response Group to address generic implications of this design inadequacy. At 2:30 a.m. on February 2, the NRC granted enforcement discretion for 96 hours to allow the licensee to modify the affected SSPS circuits. Subsequently, operators terminated the Unit 1 shutdown and began returning the unit to rated power. As of 7:00 a.m. on 2/2/95, operators were holding power at 72 percent, to perform a calorimetric. Upon completion, operators will resume power ascension at 5 percent an hour. Unit 2 will remain in MODE 2 with the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed until the SSPS has been modified in accordance with the licensee's design change. Region I agreed to a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) consistent with that issued by Region IV to Diablo Canyon. Salem's planned corrective action includes a modification to correct the lack of fault protection. Compensatory measures include reviewing events and procedures with control room operators and technicians that would necessitate manual actuation of Safety Injection, a moratorium on Engineered Safety Feature equipment maintenance until completion of the modification, maintaining Unit 2 in MODE 2 with the MSIVs closed, and maintaining Unit 1 in steady state conditions while the modifications are performed. In addition, prior to implementing the modification, the licensee will conduct walkthoughs in the simulator with operators and technicians to familiarize staff with modification procedures and precautions. Regional Action: The resident staff is verifying licensee compensatory actions and following SSPS modification activities. Region I and NRR staff will review and evaluate the licensee's request for enforcement discretion. NRR is expected to initiate actions to evaluate generic implications of this matter. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 Charles Marschall (207)882-7519 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV FEBRUARY 2, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-95-0012 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 02/02/95 Richland,Washington SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: UNPLANNED POWER REDUCTION DUE TO HIGH RCS SULFATES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At approximately 6:55 a.m. (PST) on February 1, 1995, WNP-2 operators began reducing power from 100 percent to 65 percent as a result of a rapid increase in reactor coolant system (RCS) sulfate concentration. Prior to the increase, RCS sulfate level was approximately 2 ppb. At approximately 10 p.m. on January 31, 1995, chemists reported that sulfate concentration was increasing. At 8 a.m. on February 1, 1995, RCS sulfate concentration peaked at 136 ppb. The licensee postulated that the increase in RCS sulfates was due to a resin intrusion from one of the condensate filter demineralizers (CFDs). In conjunction with the power reduction the suspect CFDs were removed from service resulting in the immediate reduction of RCS sulfate levels. By 7 a.m. on February 2, 1995, RCS sulfate concentration reached 7 ppb. The licensee continues to assess the exact source and cause of the resin intrusion, and plans to return to full power operation later on February 2, 1995. Regional Action: Region IV and the resident inspectors are following the licensee's actions. Contact: D. Kirsch (510)975-0290 R. Barr (509)377-2627 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319