Headquarters Daily report JANUARY 27, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0030 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-07, "Radiopharmaceutical Vial Breakage During Preparation," will be issued on January 27, 1995. NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to 20 recent incidents in which radiopharmaceutical vials cracked during a heating process. The potential for cracking and significant contamination exists whenever vials containing radioactive materials are heated. Technical contact: Sally Merchant, NMSS (301) 415-7874 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 MR Number: H-95-0031 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 95-09, "Use of Inappropriate Guidelines and Criteria for Nuclear Piping and Pipe Support Evaluation and Design," to be issued January 31, 1995. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the use of guidelines and criteria for nuclear piping and pipe support evaluation and design in a manner inconsistent with published NRC staff guidance. Technical contact: Howard J. Rathbun, NRR (301) 504-2787 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0032 Bechtel Power Corporation Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION PT21 FILE NO: 95023 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/10/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9501130161 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: SRXB: W. LONG BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC/CALVERT CLIFFS 1/2 PROVIDES UPDATE REGARDING LONG-TERM COOLING PHASE OF LOCA WHICH DID NOT MODEL HEAT TRANSFER FROM RCS METAL. REANALYSIS TO BE PERFORMED. RESULTS EXPECTED TO NOT SIGNIF AFFECT PRIOR BASIS. SEE LOG #94310. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0033 Crane-Aloyco (Crane Valve) Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: CRANE-ALOYCO (CRANE VALVE) PT21 FILE NO: 95024 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/12/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9501200336 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: EMEB: SCARBROUGH CRANE VALVES PROVIDES FINAL REPORT REGARDING ANALYSES TO DETERMINE REQRD THRUST FOR MOVs IN RESPONSE TO GLs 85-03/89-10. CONCERNAROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN CURRENT MODEL RELATIVE TO ORIGINAL MODEL. DIFF IDENTIFIED. SEE LOG #94150. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0034 Borg-Warner Corp.(Bw/Ip Internat'l) Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: BORG-WARNER CORP. (BW/IP INTERNATIONAL, INC) PT21 FILE NO: 95025 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/10/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9501230121 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: EMEB: BW/IP INTERNATIONAL PROVIDES LISTING OF POTENTIALLY AFFECTED LICENSEES REGARDING NONCONSERVATIVE FRICTION FACTORS FOR BORG-WARNER GATE VALVES. SEE LOG #94127. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0035 Borg-Warner Corp.(Bw/Ip Internat'l) Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: BORG-WARNER CORP. (BW/IP INTERNATIONAL, INC) PT21 FILE NO: 95026 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/10/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9501230101 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: EMEB: M. KHANNA BW/IP INTERNATIONAL PROVIDES LISTING OF AFFECTED LICENSEES. SEE LOG #94278. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0036 Anchor/Darling Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: ANCHOR/DARLING PT21 FILE NO: 95027 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/25/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: MR REVIEWER: EMEB: R.WESSMAN PUBLIC SERVICE E&G/HOPE CREEK 1 REPORTS STICKING OF PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE ALLOWING REVERSE FLOW & PUMP SHAFT TO SPIN. POPULATION OF 32 VALVES TO BE INSPECTED. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0037 Cooper Energy Services Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: COOPER ENERGY SERVICES (COOPER-BESSEMER) PT21 FILE NO: 95028 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/29/94 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9412080257 SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 REVIEWER: OEAB: A.CHAFFEE COOPER ENERGY SERVICES PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFO REGARDING THROW LOCATION OF SUSPECT MASTER CONNECTING RODS. RODS MAY BE IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS THAN PREV IDENTIFIED. AFFECTED LICENSEES INFORMED. SEE LOG #94296. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0038 Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) Date: 01/27/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. (B&W) PT21 FILE NO: 95029 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/27/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: Part 21 via a Letter REVIEWER: OEAB:A.CHAFFEE B&W NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES REPORTS NONCONSERV CONDITION IN ECCS EVALUATION MODEL FOR LARGE BREAK LOCA ANALYSES DUE TO INITIAL CONDITIONS OF CORE FLOOD TANK. PCT COULD CHANGE BY >50F. FINAL ANALYTICAL RESULTS EXPECTED BY 8/1/95. AFFCTD LICENSEES INFORMED. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-95-0012 Salem 1 2 Date: 01/27/95 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-272,50-311 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MECHANICAL STEAM PIPING PENETRATION AREA VENT PANELS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On January 23, 1995, a PSE&G system engineer noted that vent panels located in steam piping penetration rooms outside containment for both Salem units were locked closed and not in accordance with plant drawings. Nuclear Engineering subsequently identified that the FSAR (Sections 3.6.5.4/3.6.5.10) required availability of the vent panels to provide an atmospheric vent path in the event of a high energy steam line break outside containment. The licensee concluded that if the break occurred in the steam line located in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump enclosure, failure of the vent panels to open could lead to overpressurization and failure of the TDAFW enclosure. Failure of the TDAFW enclosure, in turn, could cause failure of the motor driven AFW pumps immediately adjacent to the enclosure. The licensee determined that they had locked the penetration area vent panels to prevent unauthorized access into the auxiliary buildings. On January 24, PSE&G posted security guards and removed the locks from the vent panels. The licensee then discovered that the hinged vent panels were obstructed and would not fully open. PSE&G recognized that the degraded condition of the vent panels placed the plants outside their design basis and made the required 50.72 Reports. As of 5:00 p.m. on January 26, the licensee had removed the obstructions from the penetration area vent panels to permit full opening and security guards remain posted until an internal security grating can be installed. The security grating would allow for proper vent panel operation and serve to thwart unauthorized access. The resident inspectors were notified following the 50.72 Reports and have verified the licensee's corrective actions to date. Regional Action: Resident inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's review of this issue and will report any further indications of its generic nature and/or significance as it pertains to the operability of safety-related systems. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0011 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 01/26/95 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: EARLY START OF REFUELING OUTAGE DUE TO GENERATOR PROBLEMS Reportable Event Number: 28241 Discussion: The plant was shutdown on January 14, 1995 in response to a generator ground alarm. Subsequent inspection of the main generator has revealed that although the damage is not serious, it is apparently the result of loosening of turbine-end side fillers and shims which will require extensive maintenance. As a result, the facility intends to start the 1995 refueling outage (originally scheduled to begin on February 25, 1995) on February 6, 1995. An exact schedule for outage activities is being developed and depends on availability of various contractors. Among the major efforts for the outage are repair of main generator grounds, inservice inspection of the steam generator tubes, primary plant decontamination, and completion of the motor operated valve testing program. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JANUARY 27, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-95-0013 Brunswick 1 2 Date: 01/27/95 Southport,North Carolina Dockets: 50-325,50-324 BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4 Subject: RECIRCULATION PUMP RUN BACK - UNIT 2 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 6.58 a.m., on January 25, 1995, an offsite problem caused the loss of one of the four Unit 1 main transmission lines. Unit 1 experienced a load dip of approximately 100-200 Mw, but remained stable at 100 percent power. Unit 2 automatically attempted to pick up the momentary load dip from Unit 1. Due to a voltage dip, a relay for the "B" Recirculation Pump motor control circuit opened, causing the "B" pump to runback to the low speed limiter (28 percent speed, minimum pump operating speed). The operator immediately recognized that Unit 2 entered Region B of the core power-to-flow map, an area of potential thermal hydraulic instability (THI) that required an immediate exit but not an immediate scram. The operators monitored for indications of THI and observed none while exiting from the region. The operators entered the procedure Recirculation Flow Control Failure - Decreasing Flow. The procedure in use directed immediate exit from the region by inserting control rods. They were also appropriately concerned about minimizing the time that the two loop flows were mismatched. Due to time concerns, the operators deviated from the procedure and exited Region B by increasing the flow on the "B" Recirculation Pump. This appears to be technically acceptable in this case even though the action taken was not specifically directed by procedure. The loop flow mismatch was resolved upon exiting the regions of potential THI. Flow was decreased on "A" and increased on "B" recirculation pumps. The unit returned to 100 percent power later in the day without any further complications. Regional Action: The resident inspector was in the control room at the time of the event and observed the operators response and monitoring for indications of THI. Followup reviews are continuing regarding procedural adherence and adequacy. The region has been coordinating with NRR projects and technical staff to assess the technical adequacy of the operators actions. Contact: H. Christensen (404)331-5533