Headquarters Daily report JANUARY 10, 1995 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0001 Westinghouse Date: 01/10/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: WESTINGHOUSE PT21 FILE NO: 95001 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 12/21/94 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9412280141 SOURCE DOCUMENT: REVIEWER: EMCB: P. PATNAIK WESTINGHOUSE REPORTS CURRENT STATUS OF RESOLUTION OF DEFECT IN PRESS REDUCING SLEEVE LOCKNUTS ON JHF MODEL SI PUMPS BY INGERSOLL DRESSER PUMP CO. OTHER PUMP PARTS MAY BE AFFCTD. REVIEW TO BE COMPLETE BY 1/31/95. SEE LOG#94274. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0002 Florida Power Corp. Date: 01/10/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: FLORIDA POWER CORP. PT21 FILE NO: 95002 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/05/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: REVIEWER: TSIB: R.PETTIS VSL CORP/FLORIDA POWER CORP REPORTS DELIVERY OF COMMERCIAL GRADE STUDS, NUTS & WASHERS WHEN SAFETY RELATED QUALITY WAS ORDERED BY LICENSEE. CAUSE OF NONCONFORMANCE IS UNDER REVIEW. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-95-0003 Tennessee Valley Authority Date: 01/10/95 Subject: Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: VENDOR: None Stated PT21 FILE NO: 95003 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/03/95 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: REVIEWER: EELB: J.KNOX TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHOR/SEQUOYAH 1/2 REPORTS NUMEROUS BREAKERS FOUND TO BE UNLATCHED. COMPARTMENT RETENTION LATCH, TWO FOR EACH BREAKER, NOT FULLY ENGAGED. WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN INOPER SI VALVES. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JANUARY 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-95-0002 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 01/10/95 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF LEAK IN FEEDWATER PIPE DRAIN LINE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On January 9, 1995, the plant initiated a plant shutdown from 100% power at about 10:45 a.m. at a rate of 5 percent per hour after a leak was discovered from a welded 3/4 inch drain line on the main feedwater discharge header. The leak was identified to be from the weld attaching the drain line to a nipple on the 27 inch main feedwater line. The leak could not be isolated without closing the discharge valves for the main feedwater pumps. The plant is currently in hot standby. Estimated time to complete repairs is one to two days. Regional Action: The region will follow up the licensee's investigation of the cause of the leak and the repairs. The resident inspector is monitoring licensee's analysis and repairs. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JANUARY 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. MR Number: 1-95-0003 Nine Mile Point 1 Date: 01/10/95 Lycoming,New York Dockets: 50-220 BWR/GE-2 Subject: DROPPED DUMMY FUEL BUNDLE IN SPENT FUEL POOL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 5:08 p.m. on January 9, 1995, at Nine Mile Unit 1, while testing the all-purpose grapple and performing the load cell calibration for the refueling bridge auxillary frame hoist, the test weight (dummy bundle, weight 470 pounds) disengaged from the grapple and fell approximately thriteen feet onto the work platform in the spent fuel pool (SFP). The bundle landed in a basically upright position, leaning against an adjacent empty spent fuel rack. The bundle did not come in contact with any spent fuel or any racks containing spent fuel, nor did the bundle come in contact with the SFP liner. The plant was at 85% power, in coastdown for a refueling outage scheduled to start February 11. After the initial determination that there was no substantive damage to the SFP, the Station Shift Supervisor authorized retrieval of the bundle about thirty minutes later. All subsequent work on the refuel floor was suspended pending a review of the incident and a determination of the root cause. Initial actions and discussions were observed by one of the resident inspectors, who was on the refuel floor observing the work when the bundle dropped. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will follow the root cause analysis and future refuel floor work. Contact: Barry Norris (315)342-4041 Larry Doerflein (610)337-5378 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JANUARY 10, 1995 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-95-0005 Arkansas Nuclear 2 Date: 01/10/95 Russelville,Arkansas Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-368 PWR/CE Subject: INACCURATE RCS LEVEL INDICATION DURING RCS DRAINDOWN Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On January 10, 1995, at 2:17 a.m. while draining reactor coolant system to reduced inventory in preparation for steam generator tube inspections, operators stopped the draindown at the 120-inch level as required by the procedure. The operators expected the reactor coolant level to remain constant at 120 inches relative to the bottom of the hot leg; however, the reactor coolant system level continued to decrease. The operators entered the loss of shutdown cooling abnormal operating procedure and isolated the flow path through a divert valve that they assumed was leaking; however, reactor vessel level continued decreasing. When the reactor coolant system level reached 95 inches, the operators started a charging pump and restored level to 125 inches. Subsequently, the operators secured the charging pump and opened the flow path through the divert valve to determine whether or not the divert valve actually leaked. Level remained constant at 125 inches and the operators initiated actions to identify the cause of the level decrease. The operators determined that they had not opened a reactor vessel head vent as required by procedure. The procedure directed the operators to open one of two reactor vessel head vents when level decreases below 180 inches. When the operators opened the head vent as required, indicated level increased to 155 inches. The licensee theorized that a partial vacuum, which was created in the reactor vessel by not opening the head vent during reactor coolant system draining, caused level indicators to read lower than actual level. The vacuum drew reactor coolant into the vessel and caused level to decrease in the pressurizer surge line. The temporary tygon tubing installed to locally monitor reactor coolant system level and the two permanently installed level indicators are all connected to a common pressure tap on the reactor coolant system hot leg located near the pressurizer surge line. The licensee exited the loss of shutdown cooling abnormal operating procedure and recommenced reactor coolant system draining at 3:41 a.m. At the time of the event, the licensee had the Train A low pressure injection pump and the Train A shutdown cooling heat exchanger in service to remove decay heat generated from the fuel rods. The low pressure safety injection pump drew suction from the reactor coolant system cold leg. The reactor coolant system level for reduced inventory was 24 inches. A sufficient amount of net positive suction head remained available to prevent low pressure safety injection pump vortexing during the event. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's action in response to this event. A conference call with licensee management will be conducted to discuss the event. Contact: Greg Pick (817)860-8270