Headquarters Daily report OCTOBER 21, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION OCTOBER 21, 1994 MR Number: H-94-0096 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT Subject: Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Fire The NRR/AEOD Events Assessment Panel on September 27, 1994, classified the reactor coolant pump (RCP) lube oil fire at Haddam Neck as a Significant Event for the NRC Performance Indicator Program based on programmatic weakness. On July 11, 1994, while operating at 100 percent power, the licensee received a low oil level alarm for the upper lube oil reservoir of RCP 3. The licensee later observed that the upper bearing temperature for RCP 3 had been increasing for approximately 6 hours and had reached 180 F. The licensee began a controlled power reduction to allow the RCP to be taken out of service. Simultaneously, a maintenance crew was entering containment to fill the oil reservoir. Upon entering containment, the maintenance crew observed smoke just inside the airlock. At this time, the upper bearing temperature had reached nearly 200 F, and the licensee manually tripped the reactor. The fire brigade entered containment and reported a fire in the insulation around the pump casing and nearby piping of RCP 3. The fire brigade removed insulation and extinguished the fire using portable dry chemical fire extinguishers. A relief crew later observed a reflash on the remaining insulation, removed this insulation, and extinguished the second fire. The oil leak had resulted from a crack in a 1" PVC fitting in the pump lube oil system. The oil leaking from the crack was not properly collected and routed away from high velocity cooling air, which blew the oil onto the insulation on the pump casing and pipe. The cooling air came from the RCP motor and the area ventilation system. The high temperature of the reactor coolant system (approximately 540 F) ignited the oil-soaked insulation. (The flash point of the lube oil is approximately 400 F.) About 40 gallons of oil was collected by the oil collection system, and 40 gallons leaked onto the insulation and the containment floor. The licensee is installing a steel dielectric union on each RCP motor to replace the PVC fitting which failed. The licensee is also modifying the oil collection system to account for air currents near the reactor coolant pumps. The licensee has experienced several RCP fires in the past, one of which involved a failure of the same coupling on a different RCP. Although actions were taken then to replace the coupling and add precautions to maintenance procedures, the licensee failed to fully address the vulnerabilities in the coupling installation, and to take timely action to address deficiencies in the oil collection system. Information Notice 94-58, "Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Fire," has been issued to inform licensees of this event and the associated safety issues. The Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch has indicated that this event does not lend itself to a short-term risk assessment. The event may be evaluated as a longer term follow-up action. CONTACT: Eric Benner, NRR/DOPS/OECB (301) 504-1171 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I OCTOBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company, MR Number: 1-94-0119 Inc. Date: 10/21/94 Nen Products Boston,Massachusetts Dockets: 03028902 License No: 20-00320-21 Subject: CRUSHED PACKAGE CONTAINING 250 MICROCURIES OF PHOSPHORUS-32 Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 5:26 p.m. on October 20, 1994, the Radiation Safety Officer of E. I. du Pont, a licensee authorized for the production of radio-labelled compounds in research, informed Region I that a package containing 250 microcuries of P-32 was crushed during transport. The package shipped on October 13, 1994, was delivered by Emery Air Freight to a university in British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. The licensee reported that there is no contamination on the crushed container. This implies that the source vial was intact; even though the lead pig containing the inner source vial was crushed. The package may have been damaged at Emery's distribution center in Dayton, Ohio. There is no release of contamination. The Atomic Energy of Canada (AEC) is addressing this matter with the carrier, Emery Air Freight. The point of contact for the AEC is Mr. Norman Balter (613) 995-2125. Regional Action: Region I notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State of Ohio, and the NRC Office of International Programs. Contact: M. SHANBAKY (610)337-5209 K. DOLCE (610)337-5251 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III OCTOBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0190 Byron 2 Date: 10/19/94 Byron,Illinois resident Dockets: 50-455 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: NO SRO LICENSED OPERATOR IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR APPROXIMATELY 22 MINUTES Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On October 19, 1994, the licensee informed the senior resident inspector of an occurrence on October 14, 1994, when there was no Senior Reactor Operator(SRO) in the control room for 22 minutes. Units 1 and 2 share a common control room, and an SRO is required to be present at all times. At approximately 2:00 a.m. (CST), one of the nuclear station operators in the control room noticed that the shift foreman (SRO licensed) who had earlier relieved the shift control room engineer (SRO licensed), left the control room to assist in activities in the plant. The shift foreman was immediately called back and a problem report was written on October 14. The problem report correctly noted the event was a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii) and technical specification 6.2.2. However, station management was not made aware of the issue until October 18. The licensee is considering disciplinary action concerning the SRO who inappropriately left the control room. The licensee is also looking into the root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Regional Action: The inspectors will monitor the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: L. F. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV OCTOBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-94-0126 Waterford 3 Date: 10/21/94 Killona,Louisiana TELECON BY RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: LPSI PIPE CRACK IN NONSAFETY DRAIN LINE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On October 20, 1994, the resident inspector noted residue on the insulation of the common drain line from the LPSI system to the waste drain tank in a radiologically clean area of the reactor building. Upon exiting this area to inform the operations staff, the inspector's shoes were detected to be contaminated at the exit portal. At the inspector's request, Health Physics personnel performed a radiological survey and identified approximately 10,000 dpm of Cs-137 and Co-60 contamination in the area of the residue. Operations directed that the insulating material be removed in order to inspect the piping. The initial inspection indicated that a side wall crack existed in a non-safety portion of the LPSI system where the piping penetrated the concrete flooring. The licensee is currently evaluating the cause of the crack and the adequacy of the previous radiation survey. Regional Action: The resident inspector will followup on the root cause of the crack and the adequacy of the radiological survey. Contact: C. A. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161