Headquarters Daily report OCTOBER 19, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I OCTOBER 19, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-94-0114 Oyster Creek 1 Date: 10/18/94 Forked River,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-219 BWR/GE-2 Subject: OUTAGE EXTENSION DUE TO CORE SHROUD REPAIRS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On October 14, 1994, GPUN management decided to implement a reactor core shroud structural modification, to increase the shroud's stability. Oyster Creek commenced its 15R refueling outage on September 10, 1994. Contractor personnel had been ultrasonically and visually inspecting the shroud to detect weld cracks in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 94-03. They identified that one of the eight welds (H4) exhibited cracks to the extent that extensive structural analysis would have been necessary in order to justify continued operation. GPUN elected to discontinue the inspections and implement the structural modification. The modification, which had been previously developed as a contingency, consists of 10 hardened steel tie-rod braces within the reactor vessel annulus and connects the top and bottom portions of the shroud. The licensee will submit the details of the design and the associated analyses to the NRC for approval prior to plant startup. This modification is expected to delay plant startup by two to three weeks. Turbine-on-line is currently scheduled for December 2, 1994. The licensee issued a news release on October 17, 1994. Regional Action: Resident and specialist inspectors, and NRR technical personnel, have been monitoring the core shroud inspections. Additional inspections are planned to observe the shroud modification installation. Contact: John Rogge (610)337-5146 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I OCTOBER 19, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-94-0115 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 10/19/94 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT OF OCTOBER 11, 1994 Reportable Event Number: 27905 Discussion: On Tuesday October 11, 1994, ten University of Southern Maine (USM) Chemistry Students toured Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant including the radiological controlled area (RCA). The tour members were issued self reading dosimeters (SRD) and travelled through the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) and Spent Fuel Pool areas. At about 11:00 a.m., the group, including the tour guides, began processing out the RCA through portal monitors. Five of the students and all three tour guides caused the monitors to alarm. However, after about a 30 minute waiting period, all eight were able to process through the monitors without setting off the alarms. The plant determined that the contamination was apparently due to a short lived byproduct material (Rubidium 88). As a precautionary measure, the five students involved were whole body counted to ensure that they had not received any internal contamination. The whole body count results showed no measurable amount of nuclides other than naturally occurring potassium. Initial investigation revealed that the radioactive gas was released into the PAB area during a plant evolution involving flushing the spent resin storage tank drain line. Primary water may have leaked from a demineralizer into the spent resin storage tank following a resin sluicing evolution apparently causing some rubidium to be released into the PAB. The exact path of release has not been determined. Four Continuous Area Monitors (CAM) are located in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). None were observed to have alarmed during the tour. Maine Yankee has suspended tours through the RCA and has agreed to inform the NRC prior to resuming RCA tours. The plant will attempt to recreate the CVCS evolution to determine the source and path of release. A root cause analysis is also being completed. The resident inspectors became aware of this issue on the morning of October 12, when it was being discussed at the licensee's daily meeting. The licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 notification following extensive media interest which began on October 14. The resident inspectors are continuing to follow the licensee's root cause determination. The resident inspectors received inquiries from local news media and a state representative. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are reviewing licensee actions in response to the event and a health physics specialist inspector will go to the site to review the licensee's actions within the next week. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II OCTOBER 19, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-94-0087 Virginia Tech Date: 10/18/94 Blacksburg,Virginia Telephonic to Region II Dockets: 03011313 License No: 45-09475-30 Subject: Reported Missing Shipment of Licensed Material (UPDATE) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: UPDATE to MR Number: 2-94-0083 After discussions with Region II, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VA Tech) requested that the shippper (DuPont-New England Nuclear) put a second trace on the package of 5 millicuries (mCi) of tritiated thymidine (H-3) that had been reported as lost. According to the shipper's RSO, it was determined that the order was never filled, and therefore, no shipment was lost. Apparently, there was an error made at the shipper's facility with the assignment of package tracking numbers. Regional Action: The Commonwealth of Virginia has been informed. Region I has been informed. Contact: Michael L. Fuller (404)331-3932 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II OCTOBER 19, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duke Power Co. MR Number: 2-94-0088 Catawba 2 Date: 10/19/94 York,South Carolina Dockets: 50-414 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: UPDATE - CATAWBA UNIT 2 TRIP Reportable Event Number: 27916 Discussion: This is an update on the October 18, 1994, Catawba Unit 2 trip which occurred during reactor protection system related testing. Specifically, there were several tests in progress at the time of the trip... Train B solid state protection system/reactor trip breaker bi-monthly testing (which caused the expected General Warning Alarm Condition for Train B) and the quarterly analog channel operational test (ACOT) of 7300 process instrumentation associated with channel #4 to the solid state protection system (SSPS). To verify proper bistable/relay operation, the ACOT required the SSPS Train A multiplexer switch to be in the "A+B" position. While repositioning this multiplexer switch back to "NORMAL", the switch had to pass through the "INHIBIT" position which caused a momentary General Warning Alarm Condition for Train A. This, combined with the existing Train B alarm condition, made up the necessary logic to cause the reactor trip. The ACOT had begun as scheduled on October 17, 1994, but completion was delayed in order to effect repairs on the pressurizer pressure channel #4 trip bistable. When the ACOT was resumed on October 18, 1994, Operations questioned its compatability with scheduled Train B SSPS/reactor trip breaker testing. As the pit fall described above was not readily apparent, testing personnel assured Operations that the tests could be done simultaneously. To preclude similar occurrences in the future, the edict from licensee management is that monthly ACOTs and other SSPS related testing will no longer be performed at the same time. Additionally, the licensee is assessing its work control process in order to better control "carryover" work/testing. Subsequent to the trip, a 50 drops/minute tube connection leak was discovered on the reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS). The tube connection leak has been repaired and inspections for boron corrosion have been completed with satisfactory results. Unit restart is expected early this afternoon. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors were on site at the time of the trip. They have assessed the licensee's recovery actions as satisfactory, and will continue to followup on restart activities. Contact: Robert Carroll (404)331-5543