Headquarters Daily report NOVEMBER 29, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS NOV. 29, 1994 MR Number: H-94-0107 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Administrative Letter 94-16: "Revision of NRC Core Inspection Program for Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise," to be issued November 30, 1994. The NRC is issuing this administrative letter to inform addressees of a change in the NRC inspection program which reduces the frequency of NRC inspection of emergency exercises and the need for the NRC to request advance information on exercise scenarios from licensees. Technical contact: Daniel M. Barss, NRR (301) 504-2922 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I NOVEMBER 29, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-94-0129 Salem 1 2 Date: 11/29/94 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-272,50-311 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: LOSS OF SECOND INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF OFFSITE POWER Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 3:32 p.m. on 11/28/94, with Salem Unit 1 at 100% power and Salem Unit 2 defueled, the no. 2 Station Power Transformer (SPT) lost power. The no. 4 SPT has been out of service since 11/18. As a result, operators lost one of two supplies to the vital buses, and the supply for three of the six Circulating Water (CW) pumps for each of the Salem units. Operators reduced power from 100% to 26% in 15 minutes. During the first six minutes of the power reduction, operators reduced power at the rate of 10% per minute. Since operators had taken one of the three remaining CW pumps out of service for modification of the ice racks, Salem Unit 1 operated with two CW pumps in service until 4:25 p.m., when operators cross connected CW bus sections 13 and 14, and started a third CW pump. As of 7:00 a.m. on 11/29/94, Salem Unit 1 remained at 30% power, and Unit 2 remained defueled with refueling preparations on hold, and with one source of power available to each of the vital buses for both units. Salem Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 for loss of the offsite power source effective at 3:32 p.m. The Technical Specification permits continued operation of Salem Unit 1 with one available source of offsite power for 72 hours. Although the loss of no. 2 SPT resulted from actuation of a differential protection relay, the licensee has not been able to identify a cause for the relay actuation. In order to support troubleshooting efforts, the licensee plans to re-energize no. 4 SPT, and no. 2 SPT relying on backup differential protection relays; and will remain in the Technical Specification Action Statement at 30% power while root cause investigation is in progress. The Senior Resident Inspector was onsite at the time of the transient, and in the control room during the restoration of the third and fourth CW pumps. Regional Action: Region I and PSE&G management will discuss reliability of the 500kv switchgear before the licensee begins to increase Salem Unit 1 power. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III NOVEMBER 29, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0224 Dresden 2 Date: 11/29/94 Morris,Illinois Dockets: 50-237 BWR/GE-3 Subject: DRESDEN UNIT 2 SHUT DOWN FOR NUMBER 3 CIV REPAIRS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During an 11/26-27 startup, the number 3 turbine combined intermediate valve was found to be mechanically bound. The licensee has shut the plant down and is in the process of cooling down to effect repairs, which are expected to take about five days. Regional Action: None - information only. Contact: P.L.HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III NOVEMBER 29, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Detroit Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0225 Fermi 2 Date: 11/28/94 Newport,Michigan LETTER FROM LICENSEE Dockets: 50-341 BWR/GE-4 Subject: FERMI 2 READINESS FOR RESTART- UPDATE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: ON NOVEMBER 28, 1994, THE LICENSEE SUBMITTED A LETTER TO THE NRC INDICATING THAT FERMI 2 WOULD BE READY TO ENTER MODE 2 LATER THIS WEEK. THE REMAINING ITEMS NEEDED TO BE COMPLETED TO START UP THE PLANT, INCLUDING ITEMS FROM AREA AND SYSTEM WALKDOWNS, WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS AFTER ENTERING MODE 2. THE LICENSEE HAS DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE RESTART CERTIFICATION PROGRAM. AS OF THIS MORNING, THE LICENSEE STILL HAD 59 OF 107 CERTIFICATION SIGNOFFS TO BE COMPLETED. THE NRC'S RESTART PANEL IS REVIEWING THE LICENSEE'S LETTER AND WILL BE PERFORMING AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE LICENSEE'S READINESS TO START UP THE FACILITY. Regional Action: INFORMATION ONLY. Contact: M. PHILLIPS (708)829-9637 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III NOVEMBER 29, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Syncor Corporation MR Number: 3-94-0226 Syncor Coporation Date: 11/28/94 Chicago,Illinois TELECON FROM IL DEPT. OF NUC. SAF. License No: IL-01721-02 Subject: RADIOPHARMACY CONTAMINATION Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety reported that the Syncor Corporation radiopharmacy in Chicago, Illinois became contaminated when a vial containing 400 millicuries of technetium-99m Cardiolite (a heart imaging agent) broke while being heated in a water bath. The water became contaminated and water vapor spread contamination throughout the laboratory. The problem was discovered when a pharmacy radiation monitor sounded. Personnel contamination appears to have been limited to laboratory coats. The pharmacy was decontaminated in approximately six hours by pharmacy staff, at which time operations resumed. Estimates of potential uptakes and effluent releases are being performed by the licensee. Regional Action: The Region III State Agreements Officer is monitoring State response to the situation. NMSS, Region I and OSP have been notified of this incident. Contact: JAMES L. LYNCH (708)829-9818 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV NOVEMBER 29, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-94-0135 Palo Verde 3 Date: 11/29/94 Wintersburg,Arizona RI Telecon Dockets: 50-530 PWR/CE80 Subject: REDUCED INVENTORY WITHOUT APPROPRIATE MAKEUP SOURCES ALIGNED Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On November 28, during an observation of control room activities in Unit 3, the inspector noted that the required makeup flow paths were not properly aligned to the reactor coolant system (RCS) with the RCS in a reduced inventory condition (RCS level < 111 feet). The operators were in the process of lowering the RCS level in preparation to go to mid-loop with fuel in the reactor vessel to install steam generator nozzle dams for mid-cycle outage steam generator eddy current inspections. The procedure for RCS draining operations requires two independent makeup paths to be available prior to entering reduced RCS inventory conditions. The inspector determined that the shift supervisor had selected a gravity feed flowpath from the refueling water tank (RWT) and a high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump as the sources of makeup to the RCS, but had not completed the appropriate appendices of the procedure to align the makeup paths to the RCS. The control room supervisor, who was in direct control of the draining evolution, assumed the appendices were completed and signed for completion of the step. After the inspector discussed the situation with the shift supervisor, the shift supervisor recognized the error and the alignment specified in the appendices were completed. The shift supervisor then intended to continue with the draining evolution to mid-loop. At that time, the RCS level was just above the top of the hot leg. The inspector was concerned that the shift supervisor was proceeding with the evolution and had not informed his management of the error. The inspector contacted the site management and licensee management placed a hold on the draining evolution. Site management initiated an investigation of the incident. Regional management conducted a call with licensee management to discuss the licensee's preliminary findings and corrective actions planned, which included a review of the procedure and briefing of the event with the next operating crew and on-site manager. The licensee conducted a detailed review to ensure that all the appropriate procedural prerequisites were completed. The next operating crew was briefed on the event, the safety basis of ensuring make-up flow paths are available, and the importance of stopping any evolution if any questions or problems are identified. The on-site manager was to be in the Unit 3 control room during the RCS draining evolution. The licensee is continuing their investigation to determine the root cause of the personnel error and to identify the appropriate long term corrective actions. After the immediate corrective actions were completed, the next operating crew commenced draining the RCS to mid-loop early on the morning of November 29. Regional Action: The resident inspectors and regional management will be having a followup conference call with the licensee to discuss the event and long term actions. The resident inspectors are closely monitoring the RCS draining operations. Contact: H. WONG (510)975-0296 A. MACDOUGALL (602)386-3650