Headquarters Daily report SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS SEP. 21, 1994 MR Number: H-94-0086 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Administrative Letter 94-14, "Distribution of Supplement to NUREG-1021, `Operator Licensing Examiner Standards'," to be issued September 22, 1994. The NRC is issuing this administrative letter to inform addressees that the NRC has issued Supplement 1 to Revision 7 of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner Standards." Technical contacts: D. J. Lange, NRR M. A. Ring, RIII (301) 504-3171 (708) 829-9703 G. W. Meyer, RI J. L. Pellet, RIV (610) 337-5211 (817) 860-8159 T. A. Peebles, RII (404) 331-5541 NRC Information Notice 94-67, "Problem with Henry Pratt Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves," to be issued September 26, 1994. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a problem with Henry Pratt motor-operated butterfly valves that can lead to the decoupling of the valve operator from the valve stem. Technical contacts: Scot A. Greenlee, RI (412) 643-2000 Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. MR Number: 1-94-0109 Vermont Yankee 1 Date: 09/21/94 Vernon,Vermont RI PC Dockets: 50-271 BWR/GE-4 Subject: LICENSEE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On September 19, 1994, Vermont Yankee announced that Mr. John Herron, Technical Services Superintendent (TSS), submitted his resignation to accept the position of Plant Manager at the Cooper Nuclear Power Station starting on October 3, 1994. Until a permanent replacement can be made, Mr. Bernie Buteau, Engineering Director, will be Acting TSS providing management oversight of positional responsibilities which include radiation protection, reactor and computer engineering, security, and plant chemistry. Regional Action: This is for informational purposes only. Contact: Paul Harris (802)257-4319 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0164 Byron 1 Date: 09/21/94 Byron,Illinois email Dockets: 50-454 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: exposure to amonia gas during s/g chemical cleaning (MEDIA INTEREST) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The release of ammonia fumes and subsequent personnel medical treatment due to exposure to the fumes during the Unit 1 refueling outage have stimulated local media interest several days after the occurrence. On September 10, 1994, the licensee commenced steam generator secondary side chemical cleaning. During this evolution, the steam generators were treated with cleaning chemicals and periodically vented using the atmospheric power operated relief valves. Venting released ammonia fumes, as a byproduct of the cleaning solution. The ammonia fumes did not adequately dissipate and were drawn into the auxiliary building through its ventilation supply fans. The smell of ammonia caused workers in the auxiliary building, in particular the chemistry hot sampling lab, to leave the area. Subsequently, Radiation Protection personnel took air samples and the ammonia concentrations were apparently within OSHA limits. The control room was not affected and the licensee determined that there was no detrimental effects on safe operation of the plant. Two security guards were affected by the fumes on September 10 and 11, and were transported to local medical facilities for treatment. Both individuals were treated and immediately released. Within three to four days following the initial release of the ammonia fumes, additional personnel reported symptoms of exposure to ammonia. The licensee has stated that 24 workers reported throat and eye irritation. None of the workers were hospitalized. The licensee has established a task force to formally investigate this event to determine the root cause. Regional Action: The resident inspector was partially informed of the initial event on Sunday, September 11, 1994. Additional information in this report was obtained by the resident inspector to assess the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's investigation. Contact: L.F. MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0165 Byron 1 2 Date: 09/21/94 Byron,Illinois EMAIL Dockets: 50-454,50-455 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SUPPLY LINE LEAK Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 18, 1994, the licensee identified water from an underground leak located east of the turbine building near the security fence. The licensee determined that the source of the water was the non-essential service water (WS) system. The WS supplies water for the main turbine and generator. The leakage rate was approximately 15 to 20 gpm at this time. The WS system was designed with only one common supply line into the turbine building for Units 1 and 2. The leak appears to be coming from an abandoned 3 inch pipe tee on the WS piping. The WS pipe is buried approximately 16 feet underground and encased in BASH, a composite of ash and concrete. Repairs to the WS leak were not immediately necessary; therefore, the licensee expected to perform excavation and repairs during the Unit 1 refueling outage in September. On September 19, 1994, the licensee commenced excavation on the WS leak. Once the ground was excavated down to the BASH the leak increased to approximately 2000 gpm. The WS system is rated for approximately 30,000 gpm with a header pressure of 85 to 100 psig. Furthermore, engineering review of the potential size and extent of the leak to allow implementation of pipe repairs was calculated to be up to 3000 gpm. With Unit 1 shutdown, and only Unit 2 requiring non-essential cooling water, no immediate detrimental affects towards the station WS system have been identified. Specialized contractors and divers are on site, and have started to remove the BASH to accurately identify the location of the leak. The licensee and contractor expect to repair the leak without shutting down the WS system. The licensee continues to monitor the leak closely. Regional Action: The resident inspectors observed the excavation and extent of the WS leakage. The inspectors will continue to monitor effects on the plant and the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: L.F.MILLER (708)829-9629 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-94-0104 South Texas 1 Date: 09/21/94 Wadsworth,Texas SRI Dockets: 50-498 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: RESTART PLANNED FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP Reportable Event Number: 27801 Discussion: The licensee plans to restart the South Texas Project, Unit 1, reactor at 8 p.m., on September 21, 1994. As previously reported on September 20, 1994, Unit 1 automatically tripped because of low steam generator levels. The steam generator levels were low because of a main feedwater pump trip. The licensee has determined Main Feedwater Pump 13 tripped due to a control circuit failure which caused an electrical overspeed trip. The tachometer failed to 0, causing the governor valve to go wide open. The electrical overspeed trip occurred when pump speed increased from a normal value of 5500 rpm to 5800 rpm. This speed was not high enough to cause pump damage or any significant pressure transient. The licensee identified a control circuit for the startup feedwater pump recirculation valve which required adjustment. This valve did not fully close during the event which limited the flow from the startup feedwater pump to the steam generators. The licensee is continuing maintenance activities to investigate the possibility of mechanical binding of this valve. Subsequent to the event, Main Feedwater Pump 12 was placed on the turning gear. After some time on the turning gear, the pump disengaged from the turning gear. The licensee initially speculated that the pump was damaged. However, the licensee conducted additional maintenance troubleshooting activities and determined that the turning gear had malfunctioned and that Pump 12 was not damaged. The turning gear was repaired. Subsequent to the event, the licensee identified a broken stainless steel flex line on a feedwater flow switch which was used to control the bypass feedwater isolation valve in the feedwater header to Steam Generator C. The flex tube was repaired. The licensee continues to evaluate the level recorder for Steam Generator 1C which stuck at approximately 36.5 percent. This led the operators to believe that they had successfully addressed the steam flow/feed flow mismatch, while actual level was still decreasing. The licensee also plans to improve their emergency response procedures to better focus on correcting any steam flow/feed flow mismatch rather than focusing primarily on level indication and equipment availability. Regional Action: The resident inspectors responded to the site and monitored the licensee's posttrip activities. Additional followup inspection will be performed prior to restart. Contact: William D. Johnson (817)860-8148 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gulf States Utilities Co. MR Number: 4-94-0105 River Bend 1 Date: 09/20/94 St Francisville,Louisiana SRI Dockets: 50-458 BWR/GE-6 Subject: EQUIPMENT CONTAMINATION IN CONTAINMENT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On September 18, 1994, during the removal of the reactor vessel head to support an inspection of the reactor vessel internals, the reactor building was contaminated when the containment ventilation system was prematurely restarted. During the normal process of removing the reactor vessel head, the licensee typically secures containment ventilation prior to opening the reactor vessel. The vessel head is raised approximately 6 inches and a temporary ventilation system with HEPA filters is used to remove any residual contamination from under the head. (River Bend expected elevated contamination levels due to a leaking fuel element.) The temporary ventilation is secured, the vessel head removed, and containment ventilation restarted after radiation levels have stabilized. In this instance, 5 minutes after the reactor vessel head was removed and placed on its pedestal, Radiation Protection gave the Operations Department clearance to restart the containment ventilation system (i.e., dome recirculation fans and two containment unit coolers). The ventilation systems agitated radioactive particles in the reactor cavity and caused contaminated dust to be distributed throughout the containment building. The containment purge system was in service at the time of the event with the containment equipment hatch open; however, no contamination was found outside containment. Swipe surveys of the refueling floor and near the containment purge suction area indicated contamination readings between 80,000 to 100,000 DPM. Swipe indications of all other areas inside containment were between the contamination levels of 20,000 and 30,000 DPM. Isotopic analysis of the swipes indicated Cobolt 60. The highest measurement of airborne activity after the reactor head was removed from the reactor cavity was 0.8 DAC. There was no personnel contamination during this event. The resident inspector also noted that the contamination event was not logged in the control room logs and that a condition report was not initiated as required; however, licensee managers were adequately pursuing the issue. Regional Action: Additional followup by the resident inspectors. Contact: C. A. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-94-0106 Arkansas Nuclear 1 2 Date: 09/21/94 Russelville,Arkansas SRI Dockets: 50-313,50-368 PWR/B&W-L-LP,PWR/CE Subject: RECORDS FALSIFICATION Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: In a morning report dated September 15, 1994, Region IV reported that the licensee had determined on September 12 that two contract employees (Bechtel Power Corporation) had incorrectly completed test records for a monthly surveillance of CO2 fire extinquishers at the Arkansas Nuclear One facility. The licensee initially believed that the contract employees had copied the fire extinguisher weights from an old inspection data sheet before actually weighing the fire extinguishers as required by the procedure. When questioned, the contractors admitted that they had not completed the procedure steps in order but stated that they had not falisified the data. As a disciplinary measure, the licensee removed the contractors from the site and terminated their site access while the licensee continued their investigation. The licensee has completed its investigation and concluded that there was no falsification of plant records. A reperformance of the surveillance by independent personnel confirmed the results of the surveillances performed by the craftsmen. In addition, a check of security computer logs substantiated that the individuals entered the required controlled access areas for performance of the surveillances for the last 5 months (including September). Based on this conclusion, the licensee has decided to rehire the individuals involved. Regional Action: None Contact: C. A. VanDenburgh (817)860-8161